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We examine the use of a contracting method in mergers and acquisitions known as an 
earnout.  In this type of transaction, the bidder agrees to pay the target an initial amount 
for the acquisition plus future payments contingent on the achievement of performance 
milestones.  Theory suggests that the contingent payment associated with earnouts 
should reduce adverse selection problems facing both parties in the merger.  The 
purpose of this dissertation is to study the ability of earnouts to mitigate problems 
associated with asymmetric information and problem of agency.  Specifically, we 
answer the following questions in analyzing these transactions.  First, empirical 
evidence suggests that earnouts are used in response to differing problems associated 
with severe informational asymmetries.  Given that there are existing technologies 
addressing these same problems, what is the role of the earnout?  To shed light on this 
issue, we examine a sample consisting of earnout transactions.  We also examine the 
method of payment in these deals and use of investment bank advisors in these 
transactions.  These are two characteristics of acquisitions identified in the literature as 
mitigating problems associated with informational asymmetries and agency.  Second, 
are earnouts value-increasing events, and if so, how are the gains split between the 
parties?  To answer this question we recognize three sources of value in earnout 
transactions: (a) merger synergies (b) reduction of problems associated with asymmetry 
 viii
of information and (c) incentive alignment.  To isolate the information effects we 
compare our sample of earnout transactions involving publicly traded targets to a 
matched sample of traditional acquisitions of public targets, to separate the sources of 
value created in these transactions.  By isolating these effects we are able to test 
hypotheses concerning the mitigation of problems associated with agency, inefficient 









CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The study of control and ownership has been a prominent topic of interest among 
financial economists dating at least to the works of Berle and Means (1930).  Mergers 
and acquisitions are a laboratory for the study of this separation of ownership and control 
and the problems that ensue.  Numerous academic works look at the merger event and 
enumerate problems associated with asymmetries of information and agency, and the 
incentives of the parties involved.  These studies also examine the value created or 
destroyed by this event, determine how this value is split between the parties involved, 
and infer as to why these events are undertaken.  The literature has determined that, on 
average, mergers are not value decreasing events.  When mergers are value enhancing, 
one possible explanation of the increased value is the change in control of the target’s 
assets.  When target management is not fully utilizing the assets at its disposal, whether 
due to an underinvestment problem or an information asymmetry problem, a change in 
control of the target firm can be value enhancing for the combined firm.  When mergers 
are not value enhancing to the acquiring firm, the literature has pointed to issues of 
managerial entrenchment and hubris as the factors mitigating the value of the event.   
The literature has also examined the method of payment used in merger 
transactions.  According to these studies, stock is used as payment in a merger transaction 
to help mitigate bidder misvaluation due to asymmetry of information between the target 
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and acquirer.  Stock is also used when the bidding firm has valuable investment 
opportunities, reflecting the increased discretion implicit in equity funding relative to 
debt.  However, the discretionary nature of this equity payment becomes less attractive to 
the bidding firm’s management if the firm has high managerial ownership (due to the 
alignment of interests between shareholders and management) or if this equity payment 
creates a new blockholder.  Of course, internally generated funds have the greatest 
managerial discretion.  Therefore, firms with large free cash flow should be less likely to 
use stock as payment in a merger transaction.  
Research has also examined the use of investment bank advisors in merger 
transactions.  Such advisors presumably possess superior ability to process information.  
Therefore, in deals where information asymmetry is high, when deals are complex, or 
when bidders have little experience in acquisitions, one would expect a greater proportion 
of these bidder firms to employ investment bank advisors.  Also, since investment banks 
have valuable reputational capital at stake, they can credibly signal the quality of a target 
to an acquirer. 
  Numerous contracting technologies have evolved to reduce some of the 
problems inherent in merger transactions.  For example, each party has incentives to 
propose a contract that overvalues itself and undervalues its opponent, thereby gaining a 
larger share of any benefits to the merger.  Another possible problem is that informational 
asymmetries between the two parties may be such that a quality target may not be 
identified or if identified may not be able to credibly reveal its value to the bidding firm.  
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Among the contracting solutions to these conflicts are the joint venture, the partial 
acquisition, and the earnout.   
    The joint venture mitigates these informational issues by allowing all parties 
increased monitoring over the assets contained in the joint venture, allowing for a more 
informed determination of the assets value and quality.  If expectations about the assets in 
question do not come to fruition, the venture can be terminated.  In joint ventures, two or 
more entities form a corporate alliance involving the joining of assets to accomplish a 
specific, limited objective.  The combined management controls the assets of the joint 
venture.  Empirical evidence has noted that these transactions are for the most part, value 
increasing.  The usually explanation is that joint ventures that combine specific 
operations of two firms should generate gains in productivity (synergy) and thus increase 
the combined market values of the participating firms.  Joint ventures are an alternative to 
a merger or asset sale when a firm has a value-creating project but has limited free cash 
flow and adverse selection problems that restrict its access to the external capital markets.  
The joint venture creates a relationship that reduces asymmetries of information, and can 
facilitate the financing of projects or the sale of assets.  Rather than engaging in a 
conventional asset sale, a firm can place an asset into a joint venture that is co-owned by 
a partner firm that is, in effect, a potential buyer.  In turn, the potential buyer, while a 
partner in the ongoing joint venture, has an opportunity to participate in the management 
of the asset and to gather information about its value before deciding whether to purchase 
the remaining stake of its partner in a second stage transaction.  
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Partial acquisitions also mitigate informational problems by giving a buyer a 
major ownership interest in the target firm.  The buyer increases monitoring, and can 
make a more informed decision concerning the value of the target in question.  If the 
prior beliefs concerning the value of a combination of the two firms are not realized, the 
remaining shares of the target will not be purchased and the bidding firm can sell its 
equity claim on the target.  In partial acquisitions, one entity obtains shares in a target 
firm such that their ownership stake in the corporation effectively gives them control.  
However, this equity purchase is not accompanied by an intent to acquire the remaining 
shares of the target firm’s stock.  Effective control of the firm is transferred to the 
majority shareholder from the target firm.  The target firm is still a distinct legal entity, 
but is an affiliated subsidiary of the acquiring firm.  Empirical evidence has shown that 
partial acquisitions are value enhancing for the target firms and at least a non-negative 
event for bidding firms.  As in mergers and acquisitions, the change in control of the 
assets in question is value enhancing and the same explanations for the observed excess 
returns in mergers holds for partial acquisitions.  These explinations, mentioned earlier, 
can be grouped as efficiency theories, information theories, and theories of agency. 
Joint ventures and partial acquisitions attempt to circumvent the problems 
associated with asymmetry of information by providing an “engagement period” in which 
each party can monitor the other and gain improved information concerning the value of 
a combination.  Each technique contains the likelihood that sometime in the future, a 
recontracting will occur resulting in a completed acquisition.  These solutions, however, 
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add the risk of never being completed, in the sense that there is no explicit, final step 
merging one firm wholly into the other.   
 The third technique mentioned, an earnout, mitigates informational 
asymmetries by shifting some of the risk of misevaluation to the target firm.  If a bidder 
misvalues a target, the contingent payment portion of this deal will be reduced, possibly 
to zero.  The earnout contract also provides the target with the ability to signal its quality.  
Only high quality targets will agree to have a larger portion of the deal to be paid as a 
contingent claim based upon future milestones of the combined firm.  An earnout is a 
relative newcomer to contracting technologies in mergers and acquisitions.  Briefly, in an 
earnout, the bidder agrees to pay the target an initial amount for the acquisition plus 
predetermined future payments contingent on the target’s achievement of performance 
milestones within a specified time period.  In earnouts, the acquired assets can be those of 
either an entire firm or a subsidiary of a firm.  The literature contends that the use of this 
technique in acquisitions leads to a mitigation of bidder misvaluation resulting from 
informational asymmetries between the parties and alleviates adverse selection problems 
associated with the significant informational asymmetries and agency problems in these 
transactions.  Yet another reason for the use of this acquisition vehicle is that it facilitates 
retaining valuable human capital from the acquired firm.  The contingent nature of this 
type of contracting method can be arranged such that owner/operator knowledge is 
retained, non-compete constraints are placed on these individuals, and the retained human 
capital has the incentive to put forth optimal effort in order to maximize the contingent 
payments associated with an earnout.   
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On the other hand, earnouts impose the costs of inefficient risk sharing, increased 
contractual complexity, increased administrative costs, and litigation risk potentially 
offsetting any informational benefits.  Nonetheless, the use of contingent payments in 
mergers and acquisitions is growing.  The increased use of earnouts despite their costs 
and complexity implies that the benefits associated with this acquisition vehicle outweigh 
its costs.  That is the gains an earnout creates or the problems it solves must be of some 
significance in order to outweigh the pitfalls that the use of this contracting technology 
entails.  The relevance of this study stems from this idea. 
Originally, earnouts were mostly a vehicle for acquiring private companies.  A 
growing trend is their use when public targets are involved.  As was noted earlier, the 
evidence points to earnouts as being value increasing.  To answer the question whether 
any added value is associated with the contracting method as opposed to the acquisition 
itself, a sample of public bidders acquiring public targets using an earnout contract are 
contrasted to a sample of traditional mergers where both the target and bidder are public 
entities.  This will allow for the observation of the value created in these transactions and 
how that value is split between the firms involved.  Previous studies note that earnouts 
are more common if the target is in a hi-tech or service sector and if the target is private, 
and from those characteristics infer the motives behind the use of earnout contracting in 
acquisitions.  In order to give a more direct test for the motives behind the use of an 
earnout, this dissertation examines the method of payment used to finance these 
transactions and the use of investment banks as advisors for the set of companies that 
have the same characteristics as the firms determined by the literature to have a increased 
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probability of using an earnout.  The method of payment used in these transactions is 
relevant in that the literature on mergers argues that method of payment mitigates 
misvaluation and aligns incentives between the parties involved.  The advisory role of 
investment banks used in these transactions is also examined since their use has been 
identified in the literature as being beneficial due to their superior information gathering 
ability and reputational capital that is at stake.   
Since both method of payment and use of investment advisors are hypothesized in 
the merger literature to help alleviate the same problems that earnouts mitigate, the 
empirical question is whether these tools are used in earnouts to solve the same problems; 
or will it be the case that by delineating the sample into earnout vs. non-earnout 
transactions, one will observe that the tools in question are not really solving the same 
problem at all.  Also, since there is a contingent claim issued, a distinction should be 
made concerning the publicly traded status of the target firms involved.  This contingent 
claim is effectively a placement of equity.  The market reacts much differently to equity 
that is placed privately compared to that of a public placement.  Due to this, publicly 
traded firms are examined in this dissertation separately from other firms.  
This dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter two will examine the relevant 
literature necessary to build the hypotheses of this dissertation.  First, the merger and 
acquisition literature is examined.  Next, I look at the literature on earnouts.  Finally, the 
literature with respect to the method of payment used in acquisitions and the use of 
advisors in acquisitions is examined.  Chapter three will examine the characteristics of 
the earnout sample as well as explore possible motives for their use.  Chapter four will 
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examine the method of payment used in financing the acquisition of a private or 
subsidiary target when earnout contracting is employed.  Also, the use of investment 
bank advisors will be examined in this chapter.  Chapter five will look at the use of 
earnouts when a public firm acquirers another public firm.  Since both firms in the 
transaction are public, it is possible to determine the value created by these transactions, 
and how these gains are split between the two entities.  Due to the cross sectional 
variation and the availability of information concerning the public firms involved in 
earnout, more exact inferences can be made concerning the motivations for the use of this 
contracting technology, as well as issues concerning synergy, managerial entrenchment 
and hubris.  Chapter six will summarize the findings of this dissertation as well as contain 






CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
  
 
This section examines the literature that supports and frames the research in this 
dissertation.  The first section looks at the literature with respect to mergers and 
acquisitions.  The second section examines the literature related to the earnout contacting 
method that is the focus of this study.  Finally, the third section reviews the literature 
dealing with the method of payment and the use of investment bank advising in 
acquisitions. 
 
2.1 Merger Literature 
 A large body of literature examines the behaviors of the parties involved in a 
merger transaction.  Many studies assess the magnitude of the value created by these 
events, and how this value is split between the target and bidding firms involved in these 
transactions.  Other literature develops and tests models aimed at explaining the observed 
behavior in acquisitions.  These models take differing approaches; some posit hypotheses 
of value creation based on synergy, while others deal with sets of hypotheses examining 
managerial hubris, managerial entrenchment, and managerial empire building.  In other 
words, is it the synergy created by the merging of these two firms that creates value, or is 
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it that by a change in control ineffective management is replaced by a more efficient 
form?   
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) examine the stock returns of target firms and 
bidders of unsuccessful tender offers to investigate the rationale behind interfirm tender 
offers.  In other words, the authors look at why the combined firm has a greater value 
than the sum of the parts.  Looking at the returns of target firms from unsuccessful tender 
offers: (1) the results for the total sample suggest that it is the announcement of a tender 
offer that precipitates the revaluation of the target shares, not necessarily the transfer of 
control of the targets resources that accompanies the successful completion of a tender 
offer; (2) the abnormal returns to the 86 firms in the “subsequently taken over” sub 
sample show a further positive revaluation over the one year period following the 
announcement of an unsuccessful offer; and (3) the cumulative abnormal return to the 26 
firms in the “not taken over” sub-sample is negative over the one year period following 
the announcement of an unsuccessful offer. 
 Looking at the returns to firms making unsuccessful tender offers, the positive 
revaluation quickly disappears if it becomes apparent that the bid will fail.  The statistics 
indicate there is no change in the wealth of the shareholders of these firms.  The results 
indicate that the negative returns realized by unsuccessful bidding firms are due solely to 
the change in control sub-sample. 
 Their conclusions are consistent with the synergy hypothesis.  The permanent 
positive revaluation of the unsuccessful target shares is primarily due to the anticipation 
of another bid, which would be successful.  Also, acquisitions via tender offers are 
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attempts by bidding firms to exploit potential synergies.  The synergy hypothesis the 
authors propose in this article is further buttressed by their 1988 paper in which they find 
that excess returns for the bidder in a takeover fall from about 4 percent in the 1960’s to 
1.3 percent in the 1970’s, to a –3 percent in the 1980’s.  Even with the fluctuations in 
excess gains/losses for bidders during this period, the combined gains for both target and 
bidder are statistically significantly positive.  
Mulherin and Boone (2000) find significant industry clustering in both 
acquisitions and divestitures. The authors contend this is evidence in favor of the idea 
that economic change is the underlying source of the observed behavior.  They find that 
the activities of divestitures and acquisitions create shareholder wealth, as measured by 
the combined stock price reaction at announcement, using a three-day window.  For 
acquisitions, even though the returns to bidders are insignificantly negative, when 
combined with the average target return of 20.2 percent, this generates shareholder 
wealth.  The authors find that these wealth effects are significantly related to the value of 
the target firm relative to the bidding firm’s value.  The authors contend that this is 
evidence in favor of a synergy hypothesis, and find the evidence inconsistent with 
hypotheses concerning entrenchment, hubris, or empire building. 
 In contrast to the findings of evidence supporting the synergy hypothesis, Kale, 
Kini and Ryan (2003) find that when the bidder is more diversified, the target wealth gain 
is higher and this wealth gain is primarily at the expense of the bidder.  They argue this 
supports the managerial hubris hypothesis.  When bidders acquire targets in related lines 
of business, the total value created by the takeover is greater and this increase appears to 
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accrue mainly to the bidder.  When insider ownership in the bidding firm is high, the 
proportional wealth gain to the bidder is higher and the wealth gain to the target is lower.  
These results are consistent with the argument of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) that 
managerial ownership may be the most effective mechanism for aligning the interests of 
managers and shareholders.  Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) find a negative relation 
between insider ownership and the total wealth created by takeovers. 
Examining the relative performance of targets and bidders in acquisitions, Lang, 
Stulz, and Walkling (1989) document that the abnormal returns in tender offers are 
related to the Tobin’s Q ratios of the target relative to the bidder.  They find the target 
returns, bidder returns, and total returns are higher when the takeover targets have low Q 
ratios and bidders have high Q ratios.  Bidders with high Q ratios have significant 
positive returns while bidders with low Q ratios have significantly negative abnormal 
returns.  The highest value creating mergers occur when the bidder has a high Q ratio and 
the target has a low Q ratio.  The worst-case takeovers are those that involve a low Q 
ratio firm taking over a high Q ratio firm.  When Tobin’s Q is interpreted as a measure of 
managerial performance, the results show that the highest value creation comes from well 
performing firms taking over poorly performing firms.  That is, when management of a 
target firm is underperforming, the gains created from the change in control of the assets 
of the target are greater for the combined firm. 
Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) further examine the share price performance 
following corporate takeovers.  The authors use multifactor benchmarks from portfolio 
evaluation literature that overcome some of the mean-variance inefficiencies of more 
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traditional single factor benchmarks.  The authors conclude that the previous findings of 
poor performance after takeovers (i.e. Jensen and Ruback (1983) on average –5.5 percent 
cumulative abnormal return during the year after the takeover) are likely due to 
benchmark errors rather than mispricing at the time of the takeover. 
Previous literature (i.e. Dodd and Warner (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983), and 
Langetieg (1978)) could not find consistent evidence that the acquiring shareholders 
benefit from merger transactions.  Moreover, Amihud and Lev (1981) find that 
corporations with disperse ownership engage in conglomerate mergers more often than 
other firms.  Lewellen, Loderer and Rosenfeld (1989) argue that this could be evidence 
that the managers of these firms are not as closely monitored.  Therefore, managers can 
more easily implement risk-reduction strategies for their own personal gain. Specifically, 
Lewellen, Loderer and Rosenfield (1989) examine whether managers make investment 
decisions that are aimed at reducing the risk of the firm at the detriment of shareholders.  
These decisions are undertaken in an attempt to control the manager’s personal wealth 
risk.  The authors find some evidence that that these risk-reduction outcomes occur, but 
are in the minority, and only weak evidence that these outcomes occur when executives 
have large holdings of their firm’s common stock.  Also, the authors find no evidence 
that when these risk-reduction outcomes occur, they are detrimental to shareholders 
returns.  
Hansen and Lott (1996) examine the returns to bidders acquiring 252 private and 
public targets during the period of 1985-1991.  Examining abnormal returns, the authors 
find that acquirers realize a 2 percent higher return when taking over a private target 
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compared to the acquisition of a public target.  They also find that in 43 percent of the 
acquisitions the returns to bidders were negative, while in 65 percent of the cases when 
bidders acquired public targets their return was negative.  The authors hypothesize in an 
acquisition of a public target the investors are indifferent as to how the gains from the 
acquisition are split since they hold a well-diversified portfolio.  When a private target is 
acquired by a public entity, the investors do not hold a claim on the firm value of the 
target, and that part of the gains from the transaction (if value increasing) will be imputed 
in the bidders share price. 
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) propose that part of the gains to targets in mergers 
is due to the fact that bidders signal the existence of valuable assets that the market had 
not discounted.  However, it may be that the risk of misvaluation of the acquisition may 
be too severe due to the high asymmetry of information between the target and bidder.  In 
this case, the deal would not be undertaken and the quality of the target’s assets would 
not be signaled to the market.  In this case, an earnout can effectively shift some of the 
risk of misvaluation to the target.  In addition, the target can effectively signal its value to 
the bidder by the terms of the earnout agreement it accepts.  By accepting a greater 
portion of the acquisition payment in the form of a contingent earnout payment, the target 
can signal its higher quality to the bidder.   
 
2.2 Earnout literature  
The literature concerning the use of earnouts is not as well developed as other 
areas of the acquisition literature.  In the first study of earnouts, Kohers and Ang (2000) 
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examine a sample of 938 acquisitions involving earnouts.  Of the 938 acquisitions, 620 
involve the acquisition of a private entity, while the other 275 involve the acquisition of 
divested subsidiaries.  The authors use a logistic regression to predict the use of earnout 
contracts in acquisitions.  To examine the merger hypotheses mentioned earlier, the 
authors use proxies for asymmetric information and target human capital to discriminate 
between earnout and non-earnout mergers.  Consistent with their predictions, acquiring 
firms that purchase targets in high-tech and service industries have a higher probability of 
using an earnout contract in the acquisition.  The authors also find a higher probability of 
the use of earnouts in acquisitions that are diversifying versus intra-industry takeovers.  
In these cross-industry acquisitions, the target is more likely to be run as a separate 
subsidiary, further enhancing the measurability of the milestones to which the earnout 
contract is tied.   
The authors also find a higher probability, of 72 percent, that the acquirer will use 
an earnout in the acquisition of a private entity when compared to the acquisition of a 
divested subsidiary.  The problem of asymmetric information should be greater in the 
acquisition of a private target than a subsidiary due to the fact that information may be 
more accessible for subsidiary targets than for private entities.  Consistent with the notion 
that small buyers may employ earnout contracts in order to shift some of the risk 
associated with misvaluation (i.e. due to their lack of bargaining power, and lack of 
information-gathering resources), the authors find a positive relation between the use of 
earnouts and the size of the private entity and subsidiary target relative to the bidder. 
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The results from the authors’ Tobit regression analysis show that the same 
variables affecting the probability that an earnout is used also affect the size of the 
earnout proportion of the deal.  As the target size relative to the bidder size increases, the 
earnout portion of the transaction increases.  Also, the higher the transaction value, the 
higher the percentage of the deal funded by an earnout.  These findings suggest that the 
smaller the bidder and the bigger the transaction, the greater are the adverse effects of 
misvaluation and the higher the earnout component of the deal tends to be.  They also 
suggest that the higher the information asymmetry and value of target firm human capital, 
the larger the proportion of the transaction funded by the use of an earnout will be.   
The authors then test the hypothesis that earnouts add value to the bidding firm by 
reducing the risk of misvaluation by bidders and by retaining valuable target human 
capital.  They find that for the bidder that uses an earnout the average abnormal returns 
on announcement date are a significant 1.356 percent.  Therefore, investors view the deal 
as a favorable outcome.  The authors also find that the wealth gains are significantly 
higher for acquirers that use earnouts to take over high-tech and service industry firms 
than non-earnout transactions.  The wealth gains are also higher when the bidder uses an 
earnout for diversifying acquisitions.  However, these results do not hold when looking at 
similar samples involving subsidiary acquisitions.  The rationale for this result may be 
that subsidiary targets are more transparent, due to the separate reporting of financial 
position from the parent firm, as well as the fact that talented subsidiary employees may 
be retained via the use of long-term employment contracts. 
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The long-term findings of the authors support their short-term results, in that the 
ex-ante benefits from earnouts is not reversed in the long run.  However, the authors find 
no significant abnormal performance when looking at the post-merger period. 
The study of earnouts by Datar, Frankel, and Wolfson (2001) confirms the 
implications drawn by Kohers and Ang (2000).  They find that earnouts are used to 
mitigate problems associated with informational asymmetries and agency.  However, the 
authors assert that significant costs associated with earnouts, including costs of inefficient 
risk sharing, increased contractual complexity, increased administrative costs, and 
litigation risk associated with the earnout, may likely offset the informational benefits 
associated with this form of contracting. 
 
2.3 Method of Payment and Investment Bankers in Mergers Literature 
Throughout the literature on mergers and acquisitions, researchers appeal to 
informational asymmetries to motivate hypotheses, explain empirical evidence, and 
determine the relevance of various characteristics of the deal.  For example, one 
explanation for the choice of method of payment in merger transactions involves 
management’s private information about the future prospects of the firm.  Myers and 
Majluf (1984) argue that managers issue equity only if they believe it to be overvalued.  
In the merger and acquisition literature, therefore, the use of equity in an acquisition of a 
publicly traded firm is the equivalent of a public issuance of equity, and one should 
observe a negative stock price reaction to the announcement.   
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Previous research in this area finds a negative stock price reaction for bidding 
firms that pay for an acquisition of a public firm with stock.  Travlos (1987), Wansley, 
Lane and Yang (1987), and Franks, Harris, and Mayer (1988) document significantly 
negative returns to bidders using stock to finance a merger transaction.  Asquith, Bruner 
and Mullins (1987) and Servaes (1991) find a significantly higher return to bidders that 
use cash as a means of payment compared to stock transactions. Amihud, Lev and 
Travlos (1990) document a negative return for bidders with low managerial ownership 
that use stock as a means of payment. Also, Ghosh and Ruland (1998) examine how a 
manger’s preference for influence in the combined firm will prefer to receive stock, 
rather than a cash offer.  Their analysis shows that targets with managers that have large 
holdings of the firm’s stock are more likely to receive stock as a form of payment in 
acquisitions.  Also, top managers who have voting influence in the combined firm are 
more likely to retain their jobs. 
When looking at stock as a method of payment in acquisitions, one must also 
consider the publicly traded status of the target involved in the transaction.  This is of 
importance since the market views an issuance of equity differentially based on whether 
it is a public or private placement.  With a public placement of equity, the implications of 
Meyers and Majluf (1984) are relevant and the market may view this behavior negatively.  
However, when the target is private and the acquisition is paid for by stock, this is 
effectively a private placement of equity.  Chang (1998) studies the acquisition of 281 
private targets made by a public entity during the period of 1981-1992 and compares this 
to 255 public targets acquired by public entities during the period between 1981-1988.  
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He finds that when a bidding firm uses cash for its acquisition of a private target there are 
no statistically significant abnormal returns generated for the bidder at announcement.   
However, when the bidding firm announces the use of stock as its method of 
payment for the acquisition of the private target, a statistically significant 2.64 percent 
abnormal return is observed for the bidder, using a two-day window.  The author reasons 
that a possible explanation for this observed abnormal return is that when a bidder 
acquires a private target using stock, a large blockholder is created and positive 
information is conveyed to the market about the future of the bidding firm and the merger 
transaction.  This blockholder potentially has the ability and incentive to better monitor 
the actions of the bidding firm’s management, thereby increasing the performance of the 
combined firm.  When a blockholder is created due to the acquisition, Chang observes a 
statistically significant abnormal return of 4.96 percent, compared to a significant 1.77 
percent return when no blockholder is created.  The difference between these returns is 
also statistically significant. 
Investment advisors also can reduce informational asymmetries in mergers and 
acquisitions.  Hunter and Walker (1990) find that merger gains are positively related to 
the use and effort of investment bankers in these transactions.  Bowers and Miller (1990) 
look at the use of top-tier advisors in merger transactions and report that wealth gains to 
the parties involved are significantly higher when either the target or the bidder utilizes 
an investment banker.  Servaes and Zenner (1996) find support for three reasons for the 
utilization of investment bankers in merger transactions.  First, investment bankers have a 
comparative cost advantage in analyzing transactions.  Second, the investment banker 
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reduces informational asymmetries.  Third, the certification of the acquisition by the 
investment banker reduces agency costs.    
McLaughlin (1992) investigates tender offers and the role the fee contract plays in 
mitigating the agency problems faced by bankers and firms in acquisitions.  The author 
finds no evidence that corporations make systematic errors when choosing contracting 
type.  He examines types of investment bank fee contracts used by firms in tender offers 
from NYSE listed firms in the period of 1978-1986 to test hypotheses in three categories.  
The fist deals with contract selection and the fact that the banker’s reputation, the value 
of the initial offer, the level of managerial resistance to the deal, and the value 
management places on incumbency should all affect the contract selected by the 
investment bank and the firm.  The second deals with the relation between the fees 
generated by the deal and the reputation of the investment bank.  High quality advisors 
should realize higher fees that will compensate them for their superior ability and 
knowledge.  The third category deals with the outcome of the offer.  Similar to the type 
of contract, the outcome of the offer, whether completing the deal or obtaining a higher 
price, should be affected by the signaling content/incentive content of the type of contract 
used as well as the reputation of the advisor involved. 
 The author finds that fee contracts are used to mitigate the agency problems 
associated with firms and their bankers in tender offers.  He finds that managers use 
contract incentives as a tool to achieve their objectives and that these incentives guide 
investment banker behavior.  However, while some of the tests and evidence observed 
show associations between contract incentives and firm objectives, others do not.  The 
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same is true for the associations between incentives and the outcome of the offer.  The 
author finds some evidence that the selection of a particular contract is associated with 
the quality of the investment banker.  However, there is no evidence of this resulting in a 
higher payoff for bankers maximizing their return on their superior ability and 
information.  The author concludes that although contracting between firms and 
investment bankers may mitigate the problems associated with agency, it will not 
completely alleviate them.      
In further investigation of this topic, Rau (2000) examines the determinants of 
market share for investment bankers advising bidders in acquisitions.  The author also 
looks at the relation of this market share to the fee structure paid to advisors and the post-
merger performance of acquirers.  In doing so, the author examines two hypotheses 
related to the determinants of markets share for advising investment banks.  The deal 
completion hypothesis argues that due to the incentive structure of fees paid to advisors, 
their role is to simply complete the deal.  The value added or destroyed by the deal is of 
secondary importance.  In this case, market share will be determined by the deals 
successfully completed by the investment bank.  Therefore the market share of the 
advisor should not be related to the excess returns generated by the deal.  The superior 
deal hypothesis posits that the performance of the acquirer should be a major determinant 
of market share for the investment banks used for advisement in the transaction.  The 
implication of this hypothesis is that acquirers advised by high market share investment 
banks should realize superior excess returns compared to acquirers advised by lower tier 
investment banks.   
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 The author finds that bulge bracket banks charge a significantly higher proportion 
of their fees as contingent fees, which is consistent with hypotheses proposed by the 
author.  In both mergers and tender offers, the author finds that the percentage of 
successful deals in which the bank advised an acquirer is significantly positively related 
to the market share of the advisor in subsequent years.  The author also finds that there is 
no relation between the post-acquisition performance of the firm and the market share of 
the bank used for advisement in the acquisition.  This evidence is consistent with the deal 
completion hypothesis and inconsistent with the superior deal hypothesis. 
 When Rau’s evidence is considered in total, it is in favor of the deal completion 
hypothesis while the superior deal hypothesis is inconsistent with what the author 
observes.  This suggests that contingent fees are used by acquirers to “get the deal done” 
whether it creates value or not.  This contradicts the notion that an investment bank uses 
the contingent fee structure to signal its quality and ability to complete a superior deal.  
Also, these finding show that this contradiction is not mitigated by the advisor’s concern 
over the destruction of reputational capital by completing a value destroying deal.  
However, the paper by Kale, Kini and Ryan (2003) is the first study to document the 
benefits of employing prestigious financial advisors.  Looking at the role of bidder 
advisor reputation relative to the reputation of the targets advisor, the authors find that the 
total as well as proportional wealth gains to the bidder or the target increase as the 
reputation of their advisor increases relative to that of the opponent.  Also, the authors 
find that higher reputational advisors are associated with greater wealth creation. 
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The literature reviewed in this chapter is relevant to constructing the hypotheses 
tested in this dissertation.  Specifically, we want to examine the notion that empirical 
evidence suggests that earnouts are used in response to differing problems associated 
with severe informational asymmetries.  Given that there are existing technologies 
addressing these same problems, what is the role of the earnout?  We also examine the 
method of payment in these deals and use of investment bank advisors in these 
transactions.  These are two characteristics of acquisitions identified in the literature as 
mitigating problems associated with informational asymmetries and agency.  Second, are 
earnouts value-increasing events, and if so, how are the gains split between the parties?  
To answer this question we recognize three sources of value in earnout transactions: (a) 
merger synergies (b) reduction of problems associated with asymmetry of information 
and (c) incentive alignment.  To isolate the information effects we compare our sample of 
earnout transactions involving publicly traded targets to a matched sample of traditional 
acquisitions of public targets, to separate the sources of value created in these 
transactions.  By isolating these effects we are able to test hypotheses concerning the 
















Before we examine the method of payment and investment bank utilization in 
earnouts, we need to examine the motives underlying earnouts in general.  While the 
motives behind the method of payment in acquisitions and the use of investment bank 
advisors have been widely examined in the literature, the fostering the use of an earnout 
agreement have not.  In this chapter we analyze the determinants for the use of an 
earnout.  In addition, we look at the proportion of the contingent payments associated 
with the earnout contract, relative to the total value of the deal.  Finally, post-merger 
retention of management and post-merger contingent payments are examined.   
The literature has identified various motives for the use of earnout contracting in 
the acquisition of target firms.  In particular, Kohers and Ang (2000) and Datar, Frankel, 
and Wolfson (2001) contend that earnouts are relegated to mergers where problems of 
informational asymmetry and agency are so detrimental that this costly type of contacting 
must be employed to protect the interest of bidder shareholders and target firms.   
In this chapter, we examine the use of earnouts through an empirical comparison 
of a sample of acquisitions involving earnouts to a control sample of traditional 
acquisitions.  Within each sample, we also examine differences that exist when the target 
is a private firm compared to a subsidiary of another firm.  Using logistic regression, we 
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employ a logistic regression to determine the variables that contribute to the choice of an 
earnout in an acquisition.  Next, within the earnout sample, a tobit regression analysis is 
used in order to examine the determinants of the proportion of the contingent payments 
relative to the total size of the acquisition.  Finally, we report a descriptive analysis of the 
post-merger payouts and the post-merger retention of the target firms’ management 
In order do accomplish this analysis, a sample of transactions involving earnouts 
is compiled.  The earnout sample is contrasted to a sample of traditional merger 
transactions.  In doing so, we are able to separate the effects of earnout contacting in the 
acquisition.  This allows us to test hypotheses with respect to the earnout and be certain 
that these effects are due to this type of contracting tool and are not a consequence of the 
merger sample.    
 
3.2 Earnouts in Merger Transactions 
 
3.2.1  Bidder and Target Motivations for Using Earnouts 
 Bidders propose earnout contracts for a variety of reasons, ranging from reduction 
of the problems associated with asymmetry of information, to reduction of problems 
associated with agency.  It is well known that successful bidders in competitive auctions, 
including mergers, are likely to overbid, whether due to overoptimism and hubris (Roll, 
1986) or as a form of winner’s curse resulting from incomplete or uncertain information 
(Eckbo, et al., 1990).  The latter is especially likely when the target is a private firm, a 
firm with few assets in place, or when the value of the target is dependant upon the 
knowledge of the managers or clientele relationships that can easily “pocketed” and taken 
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to another firm.  In the absence of competition (explicit or implicit) for the target firm, 
however, the bidder is likely to protect itself against overbidding resulting from 
incomplete information about the target and offer a lower price. In cases when the target 
firm is informationally opaque, managers of the target firm are unable to credibly convey 
their favorable private information to the bidder.   
 The earnout mitigates this problem through the contingent payments associated 
with the contract.  The bidder will be able to adhere to its valuation of the target by 
structuring the upfront payment and the contingent payments in such a way that its 
valuation is verified if the target performs as the bidder predicts.  The bidder and the 
target agree on contingent payments tied to various milestones concerning future 
performance and structured to reflect the payoffs each believes appropriate to compensate 
the target.  If the future milestones are met and exceeded, the target owners will receive 
higher payouts, which will compensate them in such a way that is more in line with their 
own valuation. 
 The target can also use the earnout agreement as an opportunity to signal their 
quality to the bidding firm.  For a signal to be credible, it must be costly to replicate.  The 
proportion of the transaction value that the target is willing to take contingent on future 
performance serves this purpose.  In effect, the situation is the same as the model 
presented by Leland and Pyle (1977).  In their model, an entrepreneur signals the quality 
of his future opportunities by the amount of ownership he retains in his firm.  By a target 
accepting a deal that has a greater proportion of the transaction value contingent on future 
performance, the target is signaling a high quality of future prospects to the bidding firm.  
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This signal is costly to replicate for low quality firms due to the fact that these firms will 
not be able to achieve the future performance milestones required for the contingent 
payments to be made.  Knowing this, the low quality firms would want to receive the 
highest upfront payout possible.  
 The earnout, as mentioned earlier, also helps to mitigate problems associated with 
agency.  If a target firm is in a service or hi-tech industry, for example, proprietary 
knowledge and the existing human capital are necessary to the continued success of the 
firm.  Existing clientele relationships are extremely portable, and these relationships are 
also necessary to the firm’s success.  Thus, the retention of key personal is essential to 
preserving the value of the target.  The earnout helps to alleviate some of these concerns 
by requiring key personnel to remain with the firm after the acquisition takes place.  The 
earnout also helps to align the incentives of these key personnel with those of the 
shareholders in the combined firm.  The contingent payments are, in effect, an equity 
claim on the post-merger performance of the target (the earnout is not necessarily an 
equity claim on the combined firm, however.  The contingent payoffs should be based on 
the post-merger performance of the target only (Slovin, Shuska, Polonchek, 2003)). 
 The earnout can also facilitate financing the acquisition.  If a high growth firm is 
acquiring another high growth firm, the bidder can use an earnout agreement in order to 
postpone some of payment necessary to secure the deal.  This type of agreement is 
superior to an issuance of stock to finance the deal, due to the fact that the target will not 
be able to share in the future prospects that the bidding firm already has in place prior to 
the acquisition.  With the earnout, the only future prospects that the target will share in 
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are those that come about from their operations.  So by using an earnout, a bidder with 
valuable future opportunities can make the acquisition while keeping his financing for the 
future prospects of the firm and prevent the target from sharing in these gains that were in 
place prior to the acquisition. 
 
3.2.2  Hypotheses Regarding the Use of Earnouts 
Testable hypotheses concerning the use of earnout contracting in mergers and 
acquisitions fall into the same three categories: those concerned with problems associated 
with asymmetry of information, those that relate to problems associated with agency, and 
those that relate to the financing nature of the earnout agreement.  It should be noted that 
the objectives are not mutually exclusive.  In some cases, we observe firms that are 
attempting to reduce problems that relate to all three.  Further, the implementation of 
earnout contracts is difficult and costly (due to monitoring, etc.).  Therefore, firms will 
not engage in this type of agreement unless the benefits are clear and outweigh the costs 
associated with them. 
The first set of hypotheses relates to the merging firms employing an earnout 
contract in an acquisition to reduce the problems associated with informational 
asymmetries.  Based on the logic presented earlier, we expect that earnout contracts will 
be used in deals that involve targets that operate in multiple industries, have few assets in 
place, have low information disclosure, high growth opportunities, and valuable human 
capital relative to firm assets.  These firms are difficult to value.  By using an earnout, 
some of the risk associated with misvaluation is shifted from the bidder to the target.  
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These types of target firms tend to be found in the hi-tech and service industries.  Also, 
bidders acquiring private and subsidiary targets, which have little or no publicly disclosed 
information, will also benefit from employing an earnout agreement in the transaction.  
As was mentioned earlier, an earnout enables the managers of these types of targets (hi-
tech, service, private, subsidiary, and multi-line) to credibly signal their quality to the 
bidding firm.   
We also expect that bidder experience in merger transactions will be a factor that 
influences the use of an earnout.  Specifically, if a bidder has had prior experience in 
acquisitions, we expect that these firms would have greater expertise in target valuation.  
Also, if a target were within the same industry classification as the bidding firm, the 
acquirer would also have greater accuracy in the valuation of the target firm.  Therefore, 
as the expertise of the bidding firm’s management increases, as measured by the number 
of prior acquisitions and inter-industry mergers, we expect to observe a decrease in the 
use of earnout contracting. 
The second set of hypotheses deal with issues related to the mitigation of 
problems associated with agency.  In some industries it is necessary to retain the target’s 
key employees in order for the organization to remain successful after the acquisition.  It 
is also necessary to align the incentives of these key personnel with the incentives of the 
newly combined firm.  For this reason, we expect to observe that the acquisitions of hi-
tech and service firms will have a greater propensity to utilize an earnout contract, all else 
equal.  In addition, private firms are generally owner operated and it may be the case that 
these individuals have proprietary knowledge that must be utilized or not allowed to 
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compete in order for the organization to remain successful.  Therefore, we expect to 
observe an increased probability that the acquisition will utilize an earnout contract when 
the target firm is private. 
The third set of hypotheses is related to the use of an earnout as a vehicle for 
financing the acquisition.  When a bidding firm has valuable growth opportunities it 
would like to maintain its flexibility to fund these future investments.  Also, it will not 
want the target firm to be able to share in the gains from opportunities that were already 
in place prior to the acquisition, to the detriment of existing shareholders.  An earnout 
agreement can accomplish the objectives and is superior to a stock payment in these 
situations.  Therefore, we expect to observe an increased probability of the use of an 
earnout contract the higher the bidding firm’s market to book ratio and growth in sales.  
However, it may be the case that a bidding firm has the ability to fund the acquisition 
with cash and in these cases the acquirer may want to pay for the target outright, rather 
than creating a claim to the future cash flows of the firm.  For this reason, we expect to 
observe a decreased probability that an earnout will be utilized the higher are the bidding 
firms cash flow and near cash holdings relative to the value of the transaction.  In 
addition, if a bidding firm is using an earnout contract as a financing vehicle, we expect 
the earnout payment relative to the value of the deal to be higher.   
Finally, it should be noted that the implementation of these contracts is costly.  A 
firm would not engage in this type of contract unless the benefits are meaningful, clear, 
and outweigh these costs.  Therefore, when an acquisition is not as “material” to the 
future health of the bidding firm, this type of contracting method would not be employed.  
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We expect that when the target firm is large relative to the bidder, we should observe an 
increased probability that an earnout contract will be used.  The analysis that follows 
examines not only the firm’s choice to utilize an earnout contract in the acquisition, but in 
addition, the amount of the contingent payment relative to the total value of the deal is 
explored.  We believe that the same proxies and hypotheses developed earlier not only 
hold for the choice of whether to use and earnout contract, but also hold for the 
proportion of the contingent payments relative to the total value of the deal. 
 
3.2.3  Variables Used in the Analysis of Earnouts 
Essentially there are three groups of hypotheses that we will examine in this 
chapter.  The first set of hypotheses relates to the mitigation of the problems associated 
with informational asymmetries.  The second set of hypotheses deal with problems 
associated with agency.  The third set of hypotheses examines the use of an earnout as a 
tool to finance the acquisition.  In order to test these hypotheses, a logit and tobit analysis 
will be used.  We have identified the following independent variables to be used in order 
to analyze the hypotheses developed earlier in this section.  
Based on the hypotheses presented earlier, we expect that earnout contracts will 
be used in deals that involve targets that operate in multiple industries, have few assets in 
place, have low information disclosure, high growth opportunities, and valuable human 
capital relative to firm assets.  Therefore, we use two dummy variables that take the value 
of one if the firm is in a hi-tech or service industry.  These types of firms will have few 
assets in place, high growth opportunities and valuable human capital.  Targets that 
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operate in multiple industries will be more difficult to value by the bidder.  Therefore we 
use the number of target SIC codes in order to measure this dimension of the deal.  
Targets that have a low amount of information disclosure will also be more difficult for 
the bidder to value.  A dummy variable that takes the value of one will be used to 
measure whether or not the firm is a privately held entity, since these firms have low 
amounts of information disclosure.  If the firms are in the same industry the bidding firm 
will have less difficulty in valuing the target.  To capture this, we use a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if the target and bidding firm have the same first two digits of 
their SIC code.  When a bidding firm has more experience in merger transactions they 
should be more competent in information gathering and valuation with respect to a target 
firm.  To measure this, we use the number of prior acquisitions in the ten-year period 
preceding the announcement of the merger.  The variable that measures the value of the 
earnout relative to the value of the deal is used to test our hypothesis that relates to the 
target firm signaling its quality to the bidder.  
In some industries it is necessary to retain the target’s key employees in order for 
the organization to remain successful after the acquisition.  It is also necessary to align 
the incentives of these key personnel with the incentives of the newly combined firm.  
For this set of hypotheses related to agency, we use two dummy variables that take the 
value of one if the target is in a service or hi-tech industry.  These are the types of 
industries where human capital must be retained.  It is also necessary to align the interests 
of the human capital to the shareholders of the combined firm.   
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When a bidding firm has valuable growth opportunities it would like to maintain 
its flexibility to fund these future investments.  Also, it will not want the target firm to be 
able to share in the gains from opportunities that were already in place prior to the 
acquisition, to the detriment of existing shareholders.  We use variables of the bidding 
firm’s market-to-book ratio and 3-year prior growth rate in sale to measure the bidding 
firm’s future investment opportunities.  In order to determine if the earnout agreement is 
being used as a vehicle to finance the transaction, the bidding firm’s cash holdings plus 
marketable securities relative to the value of the deal, the bidding firm’s free cash flow 
(as measured in Lehn and Poulsen (1989)) relative to the value of the deal, and the 
bidding firm’s debt-to-capital ratio relative to the industry average are used in our 
analysis of earnouts. 
 
 
3.3 Earnout Data and Sample Analysis 
The sample of merger transactions involving earnouts consists of 533 acquisitions 
of private and subsidiary targets by public firms completed through the period of January 
1, 1990-May 31, 2001.  These observations were identified from Thompson Financial 
Securities Data Mergers and Acquisitions files (SDC).  The data were collected using 
Compact Disclosure, Thompson Financial Securities Data Mergers and Acquisitions files 
(SDC), Standard and Poor’s Compustat files on Academic Universe, news releases found 
in Lexis/Nexis and Valueline Investment Surveys.  Observations involving the 
acquisition of public targets, acquisitions involving foreign entities, and acquisitions 
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involving financial firms or holding companies were excluded, as were acquisitions for 
less than $1.0 million dollars. 
The term “earnout” is commonly applied to the entire transaction when referring 
to the contracting form.  The earnout itself, however, is only the contingent payout 
portion.  In this chapter, we define “earnout value” to be the value of the future 
contingent payments, and “transaction value” to be the sum of the initial (upfront) 
payment and the earnout value. 
The comparison sample of traditional mergers consists of 8603 transactions that 
were completed during the period of January 1, 1990 to May 31, 2001.  These mergers 
were identified using the Thompson Financial Securities Data Mergers and Acquisitions 
files (SDC).  The data for the dependant and independent variables, discussed in the 
previous section, were collected using Compact Disclosure, Thompson Financial 
Securities Data Mergers and Acquisitions files (SDC), Standard and Poor’s Compustat 
files on Academic Universe, news releases found in Lexis/Nexis and Valueline 
Investment Surveys.  Observations involving the acquisition of public targets, 
acquisitions involving foreign entities, and acquisitions involving financial firms or 
holding companies were excluded.  Acquisitions for less than $1.0 million dollars are 
dropped from the sample.  The traditional sample is split into private and subsidiary 
categories, as we did with the earnout sample.  This gives us a sample that involves 3484 
subsideary targets and 5119 private targets.  Again, if information was not available for 
the variables considered in the tobit and logit regressions, the merger was dropped from 
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the sample.  This leaves 6574 transactions where 3819 involved private firms and 2755 
involved subsidiary firms.  
Table one presents the summary statistics for merger transactions using an 
earnout that involve subsidiary and private targets acquired by a public entity.  For the 
period in question, 392 of the 533 observations are private targets.  The remaining 141 
observations are subsidiary targets.  The mean transaction value for private targets 
($54.12 million) is substantially lower than that for subsidiary targets ($119.91 million).  
Private targets are more likely to be in earlier stages of development than are subsidiary 
targets.  Also, in general, subsidiary targets are able to obtain funding for growth and 
future opportunities from their parent firm. 
The value of the earnout is also presented in table one.  The value of the earnout is 
computed by taking the sum of the total value of the future contingent payments.  The 
mean earnout value for the subsidiary firms in the sample is greater than those of their 
private counterparts.  However, the discrepancy between the two is not as large as it was 
for the total value of the transaction.  The mean earnout value for subsidiary firms is 
$21.53 million, compared to the mean value for private targets of $16.10 million.  Table 
one also includes the total value of the earnout relative to the total transaction value.  The 
value of the contingent payment as a proportion of total deal value is larger for private 
targets than for subsidiary targets.  On average, private targets are paid 36.96 percent of 
the total transaction value as a contingent payment, compared to 28.05 percent of the total 
transaction value for subsidiary targets. 
The number of hi-tech targets, service targets, and cross industry acquisitions are  
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Table 1.  Summary statistics for the sample of acquisitions of private and subsidiary firms involving an earnout. 
 
Comparative summary statistics are presented for merger transactions involving the acquisition of private and subsidiary targets by a public entity using 
an earnout.  The transaction size is the sum of the up front payment and the estimated value of the earnout in millions of U.S. dollars.  The value of the 
earnout is the sum of the estimated value of the contingent payments in millions of U.S. dollars.  Earnout to deal value is the value of the earnout 
divided by the transaction value. 
 
 
  Subsidiary Targets  Private Targets  All Targets 
 
Panel A.  Earnout Mean and Median Values  
           
          
Obs. Mean Median  Obs. Mean Median  Obs. Mean Median
Value of Transaction 141 119.9083 25.0000 392 54.1172 13.9000 533 71.5216 15.5000
Value of the Earnout 141 21.5319 5.0000  392 16.0959 4.0000  533 17.5340 4.5000
Earnout to Deal Value 
 
141 0.2805 0.2358  392 0.3696 0.3475  533 0.3460 0.3000
           
Panel B.  Earnout Maximum and Minimum Values 
 Obs. Minimum Maximum Obs. 
        
Minimum Maximum Obs. Minimu
m
Maximum
Value of Transaction 141 1.000 2050.00  392 1.000 3250.00  533 1.0000 3250.00
Value of the Earnout 141 0.100 270.00  392 0.100 822.80  533 0.1000 822.80
Earnout to Deal Value 141 
 
0.031 1.00  392 0.020 1.00  533 
 
0.0196 1.00
Panel C.  Earnout Transactions by Type 
  Number % of Total Number % of Total  Number % of Total 
Number of Service Targets  52 36.88 194 49.49  246 46.15 
Number of Hi-Tech Targets  55 39.01 164 41.84  219 41.09 
Number of Cross Industry Transactions 
 
78 55.48 179 45.66  257 
 
48.22 
      
Panel D.  Traditional Transactions by Type 
 Number % of Total Number % of Total  Number % of Total 
Number of Service Targets 1332 38.23 2617 51.12  3949 45.90 
Number of Hi-Tech Targets 975 27.99 2124 41.49  3099 36.02 
Number of Cross Industry Transactions 1371 39.35 2195 42.88  3566 41.45 
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also examined in table one.  Private firms are more likely to be involved in service related 
industries than their subsidiary counterparts.  Of the private targets, 49.49 percent were in 
service related industries, compared to 36.88 percent of subsidiary firms.  Many of the 
deals involved private medical practices and similar entities.  Similarly, 41.84 percent of 
the transactions involving private firms were the acquisition of a hi-tech entity, while 
39.01 percent of subsidiary firms that were acquired engaged in a hi-tech business.  Cross 
industry acquisitions accounted for 55.32 percent, compared to 45.66 percent of the 
acquisitions of private targets.   
The results from table one can be couched in this chapter’s earlier discussion of 
the motives for the use of earnout contracts.  One would expect that there are more 
earnout acquisitions that involve a private target than earnouts involving subsidiary 
targets.  Private targets are harder to value due to the asymmetry of information between 
the parties.  Also, it makes sense that the contingent payment portion of the deal should 
be greater for private targets than for subsidiary targets.  As was mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, private firms can use the earnout contract to signal their quality to the bidding 
firm.  Due to the larger asymmetry of information innate to the acquisition of a private 
target, this signal is more valuable to the target when it is private.  Again, for a signal to 
be credible, it must be costly to replicate.  Lower quality firms will want to get the largest 
proportion of the deal value up front, if they would even enter into this type of contract at 
all.  Therefore, the target can credibly signal its value to the bidding firm by taking a 
larger proportion of the deal value as a contingent payment. 
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With respect to industry type, hi-tech and service firms traditionally have fewer 
assets in place, thereby exacerbating the problem of valuation of private firms.  In 
addition, private targets have a greater propensity to be operated by their owner.  In the 
case of hi-tech and service firms, the retention of the owner/operator may be necessary 
for a variety of reasons.  It may be that management needs to be retained due to 
relationships established with the clientele of the firm.  It may be that management needs 
to be retained due to their proprietary knowledge that is needed for the success of the 
venture. Alternatively, it may be that management needs to be retained so that this 
proprietary knowledge or client base is not lost to a competitor or a future firm that the 
operator initiates.  Not only does the earnout contract facilitate the retention of important 
players in the target firm, it also gives these individuals incentive to operate in such a 
way as to maximize the value of the target firm’s operations after the acquisition.  For 
these reasons, it is a logical result that the acquisition of private firms via the use of an 
earnout would have a larger proportion of the deal paid as a contingent payment.   
Table two examines the independent variables that will be used in the cross-
sectional analysis of this chapter.  Since a logistic regression determining the factors that 
affect the choice to use an earnout as acquisition vehicle is examined later in this chapter, 
characteristics of a sample of traditional acquisitions involving public firms acquiring 
private and subsidiary firms are also presented.  Differences in means are tested for 
significance using pairwise univariate tests and the level of significance is reported as 
stars appearing to the right of the mean values.  The data was checked for 
heteroskedasticity and colinearity and no problems were found.  The first analysis is the 
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comparison of acquisitions using an earnout involving private firms to those involving 
subsidiary firms.  Significant differences in means between private and subsidiary firms 
are designated by stars appearing to the right of the subsidiary mean for earnout 
transactions. 
Within the sample of earnout transactions, statistically significant differences are 
associated with variables measuring informational asymmetry and thus suggest that 
private firms are more informationally opaque than subsidiary targets.  A significantly 
greater proportion of private targets are in service related industries than are subsidiary 
targets.  Similarly, a significantly greater proportion of private targets are in hi-tech 
industries.  Private targets are also more likely to share the same two-digit SIC code with 
the bidder than are subsidiary targets in an earnout, while the majority of subsidiary 
targets are outside the bidder’s SIC.  While the mean transaction value is significantly 
larger when a subsidiary is the target, the proportion of value represented by the 
contingent payment is significantly larger for private targets.  The finding of a higher 
mean earnout to deal value of the private firms is also consistent with a greater need to 
retain managerial talent in private targets than in subsidiary targets.  Bidders are 
significantly more experienced acquirers when the target firm is a subsidiary.  Bidders in 
earnouts are on average numerically larger when the target is a subsidiary, but the 
difference is not statistically significant.   
Within the sample of traditional acquisitions, acquisitions involving private firms 
are similarly compared to acquisitions involving subsidiary firms across the same  
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Table 2.  Descriptive statistics of the determinants of the earnout choice in merger  
    transactions. 
Means are presented for the mergers in the sample.  Market to book is calculated as the market value of the firm 
divided by its book value.  Growth in sales is estimated for a three-year period prior to the transaction.  Cash holdings 
and marketable securities are for the bidding firm and are measured for the year prior to the transaction.  Cash flow is 
for the bidding firm and is measured for the year prior to the transaction as in Lehn and Poulsen (1989).  The debt to 
capital ratio is for the bidding firm and is measured for the year prior to the transaction and is divided by the industry 
average.  Target value is measured for the firm prior to the transaction and is divided by the value of the acquirer plus 
the amount paid for the acquisition. Prior acquisitions are measured for the ten-year period prior to the transaction.  
Earnout to deal is measured as the estimated earnout payment divided by the value of the transaction.  Significant 
differences in means are identified by t-tests performed on pairwise comparisons of means between private vs. 
subsidiary in each subcategory, private earnouts vs. private traditionals, and subsidiary earnouts vs. subsidiary 
traditionals 
 
 Earnout Transactions Traditional Acquisitions 
 Private Firms Subsidiaries Private Firms Subsidiaries 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Target is Service 0.49 0.37*** 0.51 0.38*** 
Target is Hi-Tech 0.42 0.39* 0.42 0.28***/*** 
Same SIC 0.55 0.45** 0.57 0.61***/*** 
Bidder Value 2476.1 3186.5 5747.3 4461.3* 
Transaction Value 54.12 119.91*** 67.25*** 150.13*** 
Target Value Relative to the 
Bidder Value plus Amount Paid 0.13 0.15* 0.09*** 0.13*** 
Prior Acquisitions 1.35 1.91*** 2.18*** 2.17 
Target # of SIC 1.75 1.88 1.63** 1.69**/* 
Market-to-Book ratio 4.07 6.27 6.97 6.23 
Growth in Sales 56.77 84.87 74.88 41.96***/** 
Cash Holdings plus Marketable 
Securities Relative to Deal Value 9.82 6.89 13.05 14.22 
Cash Flow Relative to Deal Value 0.34 -0.29 1.37 0.92 
Debt to Capital Ratio Relative to 
the Industry Average 30.42 31.81 32.10 48.46***/*** 
Earnout to Deal 0.37 0.28*** ----- ----- 
Number of Observations 291 104 3819 2755 




dimensions.  Significant differences in means between private and subsidiary firms are 
designated by the first set of stars appearing to the right of the subsidiary means.  As was 
found within the sample of earnout transactions, a greater proportion of private targets are 
in service and hi-tech industries than is observed among the subsidiary targets.  The mean 
transaction value remains significantly larger when a subsidiary is the target.  However, 
unlike the earnout sample, private targets in traditional acquisitions have a significant 
greater growth in sales than do subsidiary targets.  (Among the earnout transactions, 
those involving private targets had a numerically but not statistically smaller growth rate 
in sales.)  Also unlike the earnout transactions, bidders acquiring private firms in 
traditional acquisitions are significantly larger than those acquiring subsidiaries.  In 
another dissimilarity with the earnout sample, the sample of traditional acquisitions 
shows a significantly greater tendency for subsidiary targets to share the same SIC as the 
bidder than do private targets; moreover, also unlike the findings for the earnout sample, 
the proportion in each sample sharing the bidder’s SIC is above 0.50.  Informational 
asymmetry is likely to be smaller when the bidder and the target are in the same industry.  
The third set of differences to be examined involves the comparison of the means 
for private firms acquired using an earnout transaction to means for private firms 
acquired using traditional methods.  Stars appearing to the right of the means for the 
traditional private target designate the level of significance of the differences in means.  
For the samples involving private targets, acquisitions involving earnouts have a smaller 
mean transaction value, a greater target value relative to the combined firm value, smaller 
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number of prior acquisitions by the bidder, and a larger number of SIC codes for the 
target than those means for traditional acquisitions.  No significant differences are 
observed between the two samples in the proportions of targets that are in service or hi-
tech industries, or in the proportion of targets that are in the same SIC as the bidder, or in 
the mean bidder value (although the mean bidder value is numerically larger for the 
traditional acquisitions sample). 
The findings of a greater mean number of SIC codes for the target and a lower 
transaction value for earnouts than for traditional acquisitions of private firms are 
consistent with the increased informational asymmetries of these deals.  Also, the larger 
mean value of the target value relative to the combined firm value for earnout 
acquisitions points to the greater consequences resulting from misvaluation for the deals 
that employ earnouts.  In addition, this evidence can also be used to further the notion 
that earnout contracts are also used as a financing vehicle for merger transactions.  This 
will be explored later in the cross-sectional examination of the sample. The mean for 
prior acquisitions by the bidder is significantly greater for traditional transactions than for 
those that involve an earnout.  Therefore, bidders with more experience have more 
expertise in the valuation of targets, lowering the risk associated with misvaluation.    
The final set of univariate tests examines the differences in means for the sample 
of subsidiaries acquired via an earnout to those subsidiary targets acquired using 
traditional methods.  Significantly different means are designated by the second set of 
stars appearing to the right of the means for traditionally acquired subsidiary targets.   
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A significantly greater number of subsidiary targets that operate in hi-tech 
industries were acquired via the use of an earnout compared to those that were 
traditionally acquired.  Hi-tech targets have fewer assets in place and are therefore more 
difficult to value.  Also, the human capital of these firms is necessary to the future 
success of these firms.  It is much more important to retain the managers and give them 
incentives in a merger that maximizes the quality of their output.  It is for these reasons 
that we see a greater proportion of hi-tech subsidiaries acquired by the use of an earnout.  
No significant difference is observed in the proportion of targets in the service industries, 
however.    
Cross-industry acquisitions of subsidiary targets are more frequent in the sample 
of earnout transactions, consistent with managers of the bidding firm having a much more 
difficult time valuing the operations of a firm that is outside their area of expertise.  The 
earnout sample of subsidiary acquisitions exhibits a higher mean number of target SIC 
codes than the set of traditional subsidiary acquisitions.  Multiple lines of business also 
exacerbate the difficulty of valuation of the targets.  Again, the earnout would shift some 
of the risks of misvaluation from the bidder to the target. 
Subsidiaries that were acquired by earnout have a significantly greater growth in 
sales than traditional acquisition of subsidiaries.  The question of whether a target could 
maintain a high sales growth would add uncertainty to its valuation, favoring use of an 
earnout.  Subsidiaries that were acquired by earnout also have a significantly smaller 
relative debt to capital ratio.  Debt financing, particularly when provided by private 
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lenders, produces a method for managers to signal positive inside information (Fama, 
1985; James 1987).    
 
3.4 Cross-sectional Analysis of the use of Earnouts 
In this section, cross-sectional analysis of the sample of earnout transactions and 
traditional acquisitions is performed.  A logit model using the variables identified in the 
previous section is employed to determine the choice between an earnout vs. a non-
earnout transaction.  The results are reported in table three.  A tobit analysis is also used 
to examine the proportion of the transaction that is paid contingently when an earnout is 
used.  The results for this analysis are reported in table four. 
 
 3.4.1  Logistic Analysis of the Use of Earnouts 
As mentioned earlier, using an earnout contract in an acquisition serves many 
purposes.  First, earnouts are hypothesized to lower the problems associated with 
asymmetry of information between targets and bidders.  The earnout accomplishes this 
by allowing for differential valuations of the target by its own management and the 
management of the bidder.  It also allows the target to signal its quality to the bidder by 
the proportion of total deal value that is paid contingently.  It thereby shifts some of the 
risk of misvaluation from the target to the bidder.  Second, an earnout helps solve some 
of the problems associated with agency.  It does this through its forced retention of target 
management while providing these managers with the incentive to maximize their efforts 
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to achieve a higher payout.  Third, it can be used as a financing vehicle for the acquisition 
by deferring some of the payment needed to acquire the target.   
The logit regressions model the choice of using or not using an earnout as a mode 
of contracting in the acquisition.  The dependant variable takes the value of one if an 
earnout is the choice and zero if a traditional mode of acquisition is used.  The sample 
consists of the two sub-samples of earnout and traditional acquisitions discussed in detail 
in the last section.  The independent variables that are used test hypotheses concerning 
agency, asymmetry of information, and financing of the transaction, as outlined in the 
introduction.  The results for the logistic model of choice are reported in table three.  A 
logit model is used rather than a probit model because the errors are not normally 
distributed.  There are 8037 observations in models one and two and 6969 observations in 
models three and four.  The difference in the number of observations is due to the fact 
that certain independent variables were not available for all of the observations.  If data 
was not present for all of the independent variables in the analysis, the observation was 
dropped.  There are 466 earnout transactions in models one and two and 395 earnout 
transactions in models three and four.  The control sample of traditional acquisitions 
consists of 7571 observations in the first two models and 6574 in the last two models. 
Model one and model three differ from models two and four in that model one 
and three use the natural log of bidder value and transaction value while the other two use 
target value relative to the combined value of the firm.  The significant correlation among 
these variables precludes their being included in the same model.  Model three and four 
include proxies to test the hypotheses associated with the financing of the deal along with  
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Table 3.  Predicted sign and logistic results of the determinants of the use of 
    an earnout in the acquisition of private and subsidiary firms. 
Predicted signs and logistic regression results are presented for the mergers in the sample.  Market to book is calculated 
as the market value of the firm divided by its book value.  Growth in sales is estimated for a three-year period prior to 
the transaction.  Cash holdings and marketable securities were measured for the year prior to the transaction.  Cash 
flow is measured for the year prior to the transaction as in Lehn and Poulsen (1989).  The debt to capital ratio is 
measured for the year prior to the transaction and is divided by the industry average.  Target value is measured for the 
firm prior to the transaction and is divided by the value of the acquirer plus the amount paid for the acquisition.  Prior 
acquisitions were measured for the acquiring firm for the ten-year period prior to the transaction. 
***Significantly different than zero at 1%   **Significantly different than zero at 5%     *Significantly different than zero at 10%  
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Service Target + 0.4682** 0.3820** 0.1091 0.2472 
Hi-Tech Target + 0.2497*** 0.1683** 0.1813* 0.1379* 
Same SIC - -0.2238** -0.2084** -0.1758* -0.1720* 
Private + 0.6582*** 0.6980*** 0.5937*** 0.6194*** 
LN(Bidder Value) - -0.2095*** ----- -0.1989*** ----- 
LN(Trans Value) + 0.1253*** ----- 0.1316*** ----- 
Tgt Value Relative to 
the Bidder Value plus 
Amount Paid 
+ ----- 1.1587*** ----- 0.9971*** 
Prior Acquisitions - ----- ----- -0.0167* -0.0347** 
Trgt # of SIC +/- ----- ----- 0.0751 0.0665 
Mkt-to-Book + ----- ----- -0.00010 -0.00010 
Sales Growth +/- ----- ----- -0.00008 -0.00012 
Cash+Mktable 
Securities to Deal 
Value 
- ----- ----- -0.0274* -0.0702** 
Cash Flow/Deal Value - ----- ----- 0.0037 0.0031 
Debt to Capital 
Relative to Industry +/- ----- ----- -0.0047*** -0.0045*** 
Obs.  8037 8037 6969 6969 
Pseudo R2  0.027 0.018 0.030 0.024 
Lklihd Ratio  97.2623*** 62.5613*** 88.3870*** 70.4803*** 
Wald Statistic  91.0584*** 59.4713*** 80.2349*** 62.0616*** 
 46
 
two additional proxies used to test asymmetry of information between the target and 
bidder.  In each model, the likelihood ratio statistic and Wald statistic are significant at 
the one percent level, indicating that the explanatory variables have more power in 
determining the choice to use an earnout than the intercept alone.  A pseudo R2 is 
calculated using two alternative definitions of McFadden’s formulation of pseudo R2 as a 
measure of the explanatory power of the model. 
Looking at models one and two, we observe that the proposed independent 
variables are all significant and the signs of their coefficients are all in the direction 
hypothesized earlier.  When a target operates in a service related industry there is a 
greater probability that these acquisitions will involve earnouts.  This points to the notion 
that with service related industries, it is key to retain managers and their client 
relationships.  The earnout effectively forces the manager to stay and provides incentives 
such that he will maximize his return on his client base.  Also, since these targets 
generally have fewer assets in place, they are more difficult to value.  The coefficient for 
hi-tech is evidence that when a target is involved in a high-tech industry there is a greater 
likelihood that an earnout will be used in the acquisition.  Since hi-tech targets are 
difficult to value, due to the uncertainty of their future opportunities and little amount of 
assets in place, this is exactly what was expected and hypothesized earlier. 
Upon further examination of models one and two, we observe that mergers where 
the target and bidder share the same first two digits of their SIC code are associated with 
a decreased likelihood that the deal will employ an earnout contract.  In these 
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transactions, the bidder is better positioned to analyze the value of the target firm.  
Therefore, the risk of misvaluation is not as high as those transactions involving cross-
industry acquisitions.  The coefficient on the dummy variable for a private target is 
significant and in the direction hypothesized.  This is evidence supporting the notion that 
since private targets involve a higher degree of asymmetry of information an earnout is 
chosen to help shift some of the risk of misvaluation from the bidder to the target.  Also, 
private targets are more likely to be operated by their owner.  The earnout will help in 
retaining this valuable human capital and help align the interest of target managers and 
the acquiring firm.     
In model one, the coefficient for the independent variable associated with bidder 
value is significant and in the direction hypothesized.  This is evidence that when a bidder 
is of large enough size, the problems associated with the risk of misvaluation are not as 
devastating to the bidder’s financial position and therefore as bidder size increases we 
observe a decreased likelihood that the transaction will involve an earnout.  The same is 
true for the coefficient for target value relative to the firms combined value in model two 
and the natural log of transaction value in model one.  As the value of the target rises, 
especially with respect to the value of the combined entity, there are greater 
consequences associated with the risk of misvaluation.  As the consequences for taking 
on this risk rise, we see a greater tendency of the use of an earnout contract. 
Models three and four add to the analysis by bringing proxies associated with the 
financing hypotheses outlined in the introduction.  The independent variables used in 
models one and two are still significant and in the hypothesized direction in models three 
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and four, except for the coefficient on the dummy variable for targets in service related 
industries.  All of the implications made earlier in this section are still the case for models 
three and four.  Looking at the coefficient on the independent variable for the number of 
prior acquisitions in the previous ten years, we observe that it is significant and in the 
hypothesized direction in both models.  This is evidence in support of the notion that as 
bidding firm have more experience in acquisitions, their expertise helps them to better 
value the target firm.  Therefore, as bidder merger experience increases, we observe a 
decreased probability that an earnout contract will be utilized. 
Examining models three and four, we also find support for the financing 
hypotheses outlined earlier in this chapter.  As the bidders proportion of cash and 
marketable securities relative to the value of the deal increase, we observe a decreased 
probability that an earnout will be employed in the transaction.  Since these firms will 
have the financing necessary to do the deal, their need to rely on the future contingent 
payments (thereby reducing their up front expense) will be lowered.  We also observe 
that the coefficient on the independent variable of the bidder’s debt to capital ratio 
relative to the industry average is negative and significant.  It may be that the bidder is 
able to call upon its lenders for advice in the valuation, reducing the need for an earnout.  
Alternatively, it could be that the lenders are less willing to allow a bidder to proceed 
when there is clear uncertainty about the future prospects of the target, as would be the 
case for an earnout.  The remaining variables do not appear to contribute to the decision 
to use an earnout. 
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3.4.2  Tobit Analysis of the Contingent Payment Proportion Associated with 
  Earnouts 
 
A tobit regression analysis is used in order to examine the determinants of the 
proportion of the contingent payments relative to the total size of the acquisition.  The 
sample of earnout transactions is used for this analysis.  Again, if information is not 
available for all independent variables in the analysis, the observation is dropped.  This 
leaves a sample of 466 earnout transactions for models one and two, and 395 earnout 
transactions for models three and four.  The independent variables used to analyze the 
determinants of this choice are the same proxies identified earlier and used in the logistic 
regression analysis.  A tobit regression is used due to the fact that the data for the 
dependant variable is continuous and truncated at zero.  The errors are determined to 
follow a Weibull distribution, and are specified as such.  This is also the reason that the 
logistic model was employed earlier. 
All of the coefficients for the proxies associated with hypotheses relating to 
agency and informational asymmetry are significant and in the hypothesized direction.  
Examining the results from model one and two in table four, we observe that when a 
target is in a service related industry the contingent payments associated with the earnout 
are a greater proportion of the total value of the transaction.  This is evidence in support 
of the hypotheses related to agency and asymmetry of information.  Service industry 
related targets have fewer assets in place making them harder to value.  Also, the human 
capital and clientele relationships must be retained and the return to these must be 
maximized in order for the bidding firm to realize the full potential of their acquisition.  
The greater the contingent portion of the deal relative to the total size of the transaction,  
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Table 4.  Predicted sign and tobit results of the determinants of the size of the 
    contingent payment as a percentage of the transaction value. 
Predicted signs and tobit regression results are presented for the mergers in the sample.  Market to book is calculated as 
the market value of the firm divided by its book value.  Growth in sales is estimated for a three-year period prior to the 
transaction.  Cash holdings and marketable securities were measured for the year prior to the transaction.  Cash flow is 
measured for the year prior to the transaction as in Lehn and Poulsen (1989).  The debt to capital ratio is measured for 
the year prior to the transaction and is divided by the industry average.  Target value is measured for the firm prior to 
the transaction and is divided by the value of the acquirer plus the amount paid for the acquisition.  Prior acquisitions 
were measured for the acquiring firm for the ten-year period prior to the transaction. 
***Significantly different than zero at 1%   **Significantly different than zero at 5%     *Significantly different than zero at 10% 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Target is Service + 0.0101** 0.0091* 0.0170* 0.0062* 
Target is Hi-Tech + 0.0955*** 0.0676** 0.0712** 0.0539** 
Same SIC - -0.0841*** -0.0790*** -0.0640** -0.0616** 
Private + 0.2337*** 0.2545*** 0.2076*** 0.2225*** 
LN(Bidder Value) - -0.0726*** ----- -0.0702*** ----- 
LN(Transaction 
Value) + 0.0387*** ----- 0.0427*** ----- 
Tgt Value Relative 
to the Bidder Value 
plus Amount Paid 
+ ----- 0.4213*** ----- 0.3853*** 
Prior Acquisitions - ----- ----- -0.0064* -0.0130** 
Trgt # of SIC +/- ----- ----- 0.0171 0.0209 
Mkt-to-Book + ----- ----- 0.0000 0.0000 
Sales Growth +/- ----- ----- 0.0000 0.0000 
Cash+Mktable 
Securities to Deal 
Value 
- ----- ----- -0.0011 -0.0014** 
Cash Flow to Deal 
Value - ----- ----- 0.0007 0.0008 
Debt to Capital 
Ratio Relative to the 
Industry 
+/- ----- ----- -0.0017*** -0.0016*** 
Obs.  466 466 395 395 
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the greater the link is between human capital, clientele retention and the target operator’s 
payout. 
The coefficient for the dummy variable associated with the target firm operating 
in a high-tech industry is significant and in the hypothesized direction in models one and 
two.  This supports the notion that since hi-tech targets are difficult to value, the earnout 
is used in order to shift some of the risk of misvaluation from the bidder to the target.  
Since these deals are also associated with high levels of asymmetry of information 
between targets and bidders, the target can signal its quality to the bidding firm by 
increasing the contingent proportion of the transaction.  Also, the need to retain valuable 
human capital and proprietary knowledge is greater for deals that involve these types of 
targets.  There is an increased benefit to requiring the operators of the target to remain 
and maximize their performance in order to receive a higher payout. 
In models one and two, we observe that when an acquisition is a cross-industry 
combination, there is a higher contingent proportion of the payment.  This supports the 
notion that bidding managers have less knowledge in valuing firms outside of their realm 
of expertise and rely on the increased contingent proportion of the total deal value to help 
shift some of the risk of misvaluation to the target.  The coefficient on the independent 
dummy variable for private firms is significant and its sign is in the hypothesized 
direction.  Private firms are harder to value due to the absence of information as well as 
the fact that for these firms it is necessary to retain and provide incentives to operators 
such that they maximize the bidder’s value received from the acquisition.  Therefore, 
when a bidder is acquiring a private firm there is a greater proportion of the deal that is 
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paid contingently via the use of an earnout.  As was mentioned earlier, the earnout also 
provides the private target an opportunity to signal its quality to the bidding firm.  The 
greater the amount of the transaction that is paid contingently, the more credible the 
signal that is sent by the private target to the bidder. 
As the size of the bidder increases, the lower is the impact of the consequences for 
the acquirer associated with misvaluation.  Therefore, as the size of the bidder increase 
we would expect that a lower proportion of the total deal will be paid contingently.  The 
evidence in models one and two support this contention.  The coefficient on the 
independent variable associated with the natural log of the value of the bidder is 
significant and its sign is negative.  As the value of the transaction increases, especially 
relative to the size of the bidder, one would expect that a greater proportion of the 
transaction would be paid contingently.  This is the case in models one and two.  Not 
only are the consequences of misvaluation greater in these cases, the bidder may also 
need a vehicle to help finance the acquisition.  The earnout serves this dual purpose, and 
we find evidence in support of this in these two models as the values of the coefficients 
for the natural log of the transaction size and the target value relative to the combined 
value of the entities is significant and their signs are in the direction hypothesized. 
Models three and four further support the evidence found in models one and two.  
The coefficients for the independent variables used in models one and two are all 
significant in models three and four and their signs are in the hypothesized direction.  We 
find evidence in models three and four that the more experience the bidder has in merger 
transactions, the better the bidder is in the evaluation of target value.  Since these bidders 
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have more expertise in determining the value of the target, the risks associated with 
misvaluation are lower and the bidder will rely less on the use of a contingent payment to 
help shift some of these risks to the target.  This is the case in these two models since the 
coefficient on the variable associated with the number of prior acquisitions the bidder has 
been involved in during the prior ten-year period is negative and significant. 
The evidence regarding the hypotheses associated with the use of an earnout as a 
financing vehicle is not as prominent as it was in the logistic regressions discussed in an 
earlier section.  The coefficient of the independent variable for the target value relative to 
the combined value of the entity is significant and its sign is positive, as discussed in the 
previous paragraph.  However, the only other proxies that test the financing hypotheses 
that are significant are the coefficients for cash plus marketable securities relative to the 
deal value (at ten percent significance) and the coefficient on the variable of debt to 
capital ratio relative to the industry average.  This is weak evidence in support of the 
notion that bidding firms that are able to employ existing financing are less likely to 
require that a greater proportion of the transaction amount be paid via the use of future 
contingent payments. 
 
3.4.3 Post-merger Analysis of Earnout Payments and Target Management 
 Retention   
 
To obtain information regarding the post-merger analysis of the earnout, 10Qs 
and 10Ks for the acquiring firm are obtained for the earnout period, as well as for the 
two-year period following the conclusion of the earnout.  The reason for the extra two-
year period of time that the reports are searched is due to the sparse accounting for 
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payments associated with the payment of earnouts and the retention of target 
management. 
The news wires on Lexus/Nexus as well as Compact Disclosure were also 
searched for this information.  There are major problems with the collection of this data.  
First, some firms report the payments without using the term earnout.  Therefore, 
documents were searched for various combinations of the terms earnout, earn out, earn-
out, contingent, reliant, and conditional.  Second, some acquirers are acquired before the 
period of the earnout is completed.  Third, some acquirers use earnouts in multiple 
transactions, pooling the payments for financial reporting purposes.  There is no way to 
parcel out the individual earnout payments to specific targets.  Fourth, in some cases the 
target is sold prior to the completion of the earnout period. 
Starting with our initial sample of 466 earnouts, we were able to acquire some 
information regarding these transactions in 121 of the observations.  Of these 121 
observations we were only able to find 82 cases where the information in question was 
decipherable or of any value.  The resulting information from these searches is presented 
in table five.  Earnout payments are tied to future milestones of target performance.  In 
almost all cases these milestones are tied to the profitability of these entities.  In only a 
few cases were the payments were tied to other factors, such as operating efficiency.  On 
average, the length of time that the earnout agreement is in effect is for two to five years. 
Examining the results presented in table five we observe that there are 46 cases in 
which we could determine the exact amount of the earnout that was paid.  In 36 of the 
cases, the entire earnout was paid during the course of the agreement.  In 10 cases, only a  
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Table 5.  The post transaction payment of earnouts and information on target  
    management  retention. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
A.  The Post Transaction Payment of Earnouts 
 Total Number of Cases                                                                               121 
A. Number of cases with some earnout disclosure                                 82 
           1.  Cases where a portion of the earnout is paid                                35 
                 a.  The average portion of the earnout paid(%)                           48 
                 b.  Unknown portion of the earnout is paid                                 25 
           2.  Cases where the entire earnout payment is made                         36 
           3.  Cases where no earnout payments are made                                11 
 
    B.  Number of cases with no earnout disclosure                                      39 
           Reasons for unavailability of information: 
           1.  Target is divested                                                                            8 
           2.  Bidder is acquirered                                                                      14 
           3.  No information available                                                                8 

















B.  Post Transaction Target Management Retention 
 Total Number of Cases                                                                                121 
B. Number of cases with some disclosure                                               98 
           1.  Cases mentioning target management retention                            43 
           2.  Cases with specific information on target managers                     55 
           3.  Cases where: 
                 a.  Target managers stays past the earnout period                        36 
                       1.  Full or partial earnout paid                                                35 
                       2.  No earnout is paid                                                               1 
                 b.  Management has left by the end of the earnout                       10 
                       1.  Full or partial earnout paid                                                 4 
                       2.  No earnout is paid                                                               6 
                 c.  Specific manager retention is indeterminate                             9 
                       Due to: 
                         1.  Bidder is acquired                                                             3  
                         2.  Target is divested                                                              3 



















portion of the contingent payments was made to the previous target owners.  For these ten 
cases, on average, bidding firms paid targets 48 percent of the contingent payments 
agreed upon at the onset of the contract.  In 25 of the cases, some portion of the earnout 
was paid.  However, the proportion of the earnout that was paid could not be determined.  
This is due to either the fact that the bidding firm acquired other targets using an earnout 
and pooled the payments, or that the bidding firm acknowledged that a payment was 
made, but did not disclose the amount of the payment.  In 11 cases the bidding firm 
specifically stated that no earnout payment was made. 
In 39 of the 121 it could not be determined if any of the earnout was paid due to a 
variety of reasons.  In 8 cases the target was divested before the completion of the 
earnout agreement; of this eight only three mentioned that a payment was made.  
However, the amount was not disclosed and, in any event, the targets were divested prior 
to the completion of the earnout period.  In 14 of the 39 cases the bidder was acquired 
prior to the completion of the earnout.  In 8 of the cases there was absolutely no mention 
of the earnout what so ever.  Finally, in nine of the cases the earnout period is still in 
effect and therefore results could not be compiled. 
In panel B of table five, the results for the retention of target management are 
reported.  This information was compiled using 10K reports, news wires on 
Lexus/Nexus, and Compact Disclosure.  Looking at these results, there are 98 cases in 
which some type of disclosure could be found concerning the retention of target 
management.  In 43 of the 98 cases, there was mention of target management retention, 
however, no specific information could be found.  In 36 of the remaining 55 cases, target 
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managers remain with the firm past the earnout period.  For these transactions where 
management was retained after the completion of the earnout, 35 received the entire 
earnout payment.  This is evidence that points to the value of the retention of human 
capital and clientele base needed to make the acquired target a successful performer in 
the combined firm.  In 10 of the 55 cases, retained management had departed prior to the 
completion of the earnout.  Of these ten cases, the majority did not receive any earnout 
payment.  This is indicative of the fact that the retention of these managers was not the 
key to the successful post-acquisition performance of the acquired firm.  In 9 of the 55 
cases specific manager retention is indeterminate due to the bidder being acquired, the 
target being divested or lack or useable information.  Overall, this evidence points to the 
use of the contingent payments associated with the earnout to retain target management 
and provide incentives for them to maximize their efforts, thereby maximizing their 
payouts from the transaction. 
 
3.5 Summary  
The results of the analysis completed in this chapter confirm that earnouts are 
being used for the motives that we hypothesized earlier.  Specifically, we examine the 
determinants of the use of an earnout contract.  We find that firms who employ an 
earnout contract in a merger do so in order to mitigate problems associated with agency 
and asymmetry of information.  The earnout helps the bidder to shift some of the risk 
associated with misvaluation to the target firm.  It also allows the bidding firm to retain 
key personnel and align the incentives of these individuals with the shareholders of the 
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combined firm.  The earnout can be used as a signal by target firms due to the fact they 
can convey their quality to the bidder by the amount of the contingent payment chosen.  
We find evidence that the proportion of the contingent payments associated with an 
earnout is determined by the same factors that determine the choice of this type of 
contracting technology.  Recall that an earnout contract is costly and difficult to enforce.  
Therefore, the benefits associated with the use of this contracting technology must be 
material to the bidding firm and these benefits must outweigh the cost associated with the 




CHAPTER 4: METHOD OF PAYMENT AND ADVISOR 
    UTILIZATION 
 
 
4.1 Overview and Relevance 
In this chapter, the method of payment and the use of advisors are examined with 
respect to earnout contracting.  Only transactions involving the acquisition of private 
entities and subsidiaries of firms are used in this chapter.  A later chapter in this 
dissertation examines transactions involving the acquisition of publicly traded firms.  As 
was noted earlier, the literature has determined various reasons that earnout contracting is 
utilized in the acquisition of private and subsidiary targets.  Earnout contracts lower the 
cost of asymmetry of information by attaching a contingent payment for part of the 
transaction based on various performance milestones.  This, in effect, lowers the 
probability for the misvaluation of the target by shifting some of the risk of misvaluation 
from the bidder to the target.  Another determinant for the use of this contracting method 
in acquisitions is the retention of talented employees, or manager/operators.  Yet another 
possible use for this contracting method in acquisitions is that the target can use the 
proportion of the deal that is paid contingently to signal the quality of the firm.  Since we 
are considering private and subsidiary targets, the information available to bidders is 
scant.  A target can signal its value by taking a greater proportion of the payment for the 
acquisition as a contingent payment.  Weak firms would not accept or propose this 
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contract, since the probability that they will be able to achieve the milestones necessary 
to receive the contingent payments is quite low.  These firms prefer getting as much of 
the proportion of the deal up front as they can, thereby guaranteeing the highest certain 
amount of payment possible.  Since this signal is costly for bad firms to replicate it is 
credible. 
The literature has already identified other technologies used in acquisitions that 
mitigate these aforementioned problems.  Investment bank advisors have been recognized 
in the literature to help identify targets for acquisitions.  Also, due to their superior 
information gathering abilities they help to mitigate bidder misvaluation.  Using equity to 
pay for an acquisition also helps to mitigate bidder misvaluation.  If the target is large 
enough relative to the bidder, then both parties will share any misvaluation by the bidder 
in the acquisition of the target.  Also by paying for the acquisition with stock, the target 
has the incentive to put its best efforts forward in order for the combined firm to be 
successful thereby maximizing the value of the payoff.   
Datar, Frankel, and Wolfson’s (2001) finding of significant costs associated with 
earnouts, combined with the increasing use of this contracting form, suggests that 
participants must be able to reduce these costs or that the benefits associated with this 
form of contracting outweigh them.  In other areas of mergers and acquisitions, the 
utilization of advisors and the choice of method of payment mitigate similar problems 
that earnouts have been identified to alleviate.  Is it the case that firms are engaging in the 
behavior of “wearing a belt and suspenders”?  In other words, are the problems of agency 
and asymmetry of information so great in these deals that they need the added protection 
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of an earnout coupled with either the utilization of investment bank advisors or stock 
payment in these transactions, or are these technologies are mitigating different problems 
inherent in merger transactions?  Using a sample of private firms and subsidiaries 
acquired via the use of an earnout, we examine the role of advisor utilization and the 
method of payment used in financing these types of acquisitions.  Moreover, by 
contrasting the results from this sample to that of a “traditional sample” of acquisitions, 
we make more exact inferences concerning informational problems, adverse selection 
and problems of agency. 
 
4.2 Hypotheses 
4.2.1  Method of Payment 
 The hypotheses of this section concern the method of payment of the up-front part 
of an acquisition involving an earnout.  These hypotheses are developed in the traditional 
acquisition literature to explain the method of payment used in an acquisition.  The 
literature is replete with evidence that the use of equity as the method of payment in 
acquisitions has an adverse effect on the value of the bidder relative to the effect when 
cash is the payment medium (Asquith, Brunner and Mullins, 1983; Travlos, 1987; 
Wansley, Lane and Yang, 1987; Franks, Harris and Mayer, 1988; Servaes, 1991).   
 The usual explanation for the negative reaction to equity issuances in general, 
stems from the assumption that managers possess superior information about their firms 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984).  To maximize existing shareholders’ wealth, management 
would issue equity only when it believes its firm’s shares are overvalued by the market.  
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The market thus treats equity issues as signals of overvaluation, and reacts unfavorably.  
Among studies of acquisitions, however, while the general finding of an adverse reaction 
to equity persists, contrary evidence exists of a positive effect associated with the use of 
equity in the acquisition of private firms (Chang, 1998) and in asset for equity sales 
(Slovin, Shushka and Polonchek, 2003).  Thus, the hypotheses associated with the choice 
of method of payment in an acquisition must go beyond asymmetric information.   
Following Martin (1996) these are referred to as the investment opportunity hypothesis, 
the control hypothesis, the outside monitoring hypothesis, the cash availability 
hypothesis, and the risk-sharing hypothesis.  
A.  Investment opportunity hypothesis.  Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) argue that an 
agency cost argument better explains the market reaction to security issuance than 
do informational asymmetries.  Funds raised by equity issues are unrestricted and 
are invested at management’s discretion.  They also generate less monitoring than 
funds from debt issues.  If management invests in low return projects, however, 
the increase in agency costs creates incentives for outsiders to act to realign 
management’s interests with those of the shareholders by increasing monitoring 
or replacing management.  Jung, Kim and Stulz report evidence that firms without 
valuable investment opportunities (measured by the ratio of firm’s market value 
to its book value) experience the greatest adverse (negative) stock price reactions 
when they issue equity.  Firms with valuable investment opportunities (high 
market to book ratios) are more likely to issue equity than debt; firms with poorer 
investment opportunities are more likely to issue debt.   Extending this argument 
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to the method of payment in acquisitions, it follows that bidders would prefer to 
issue stock when the market would perceive the target as a valuable investment 
(i.e., growth) opportunity.   
B. Control hypothesis.  The method of payment is potentially affected by the desire 
of management to retain control of the bidding firm.  Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) 
argue that unless management is entrenched, as with a high degree of managerial 
ownership, issuing equity increases the risk to management of losing control.  The 
importance of “control activities” such as monitoring by outside blockholders 
increases as agency costs increase.  In an acquisition, this would mean that the 
bidder would be more likely to issue stock when there are existing blockholders 
(to monitor the bidder and verify the value of the target as an investment 
opportunity, thereby lessening the agency costs).      
 Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990) find an inverse relation between 
managerial ownership and the use of stock to pay for an acquisition.  Martin 
(1996) finds a similar result, but notes that the relation is likely to be non-linear, 
in that at very high levels of ownership, management is insulated from threats to 
control, and at very low levels of ownership, management is aligned with outside 
shareholders.  Therefore, one should observe that, under these circumstances, 
equity offers are more prevalent in high and low levels of managerial ownership, 
where dilution of control is not of importance to management.  Since the data 
used in this chapter is from private firms and subsidiary firms, one would expect 
to see that more of these deals are paid with cash unless there are high or low 
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levels of managerial ownership in the bidding firm.  If an acquisition of a private 
or subsidiary firm were paid for with equity, a substantial blockholder would be 
created. 
C. Outside monitoring hypothesis.  Individuals and entities holding large blocks of 
the firm’s stock should be able to exert considerable influence over management’s 
decisions, including the method of payment in an acquisition.  Martin (1996) 
argues that, since the typical stock price response to the use of stock in 
acquisitions is negative, blockholders should prefer stock not be used, leading to 
an inverse relation between the degree of outside blockholdings and the likelihood 
of equity financing of an acquisition. 
D. Cash availability hypothesis.  Myers (1984) argues that managers prefer internal 
to external sources of financing.  The rationale is not clear, but likely is to avoid 
the transaction costs of new issues, the monitoring of debt holders, and the 
adverse price effects of equity issues.  A bidder would thus prefer to use internal 
funds for an acquisition rather than issue equity. Consistent with Myers, Martin 
(1996) argues that firms with higher free cash flows (or untapped debt capacity) 
are less likely to issue stock in an acquisition.   
E. Risk sharing hypothesis.  With a cash transaction, the bidder is left with all the 
risk (and return) of any misvaluation of the target.  Thus, as argued by Hansen 
(1987) and Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990), when the target likely has 
superior information about its value, the bidder will prefer a stock offer.  
Shareholders of the acquired firm bear some of the risk of misevaluation per 
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force.  The greater the likelihood or importance of this asymmetric information, 
the more likely is the acquirer to issue stock.  However, as was noted earlier, one 
determinant for employing earnout contracting in an acquisition is to shift some of 
the risk of bidder misvaluation from bidder to target.  Therefore, it may be the 
case that the risks of misvaluation are so costly that the bidder employs multiple 
techniques. 
 
4.2.2  Advisor Utilization 
 Servaes and Zenner (1996) examine the role of investment banks as advisors in 
acquisitions.  In particular, they conclude that the use of an advisor adds value through 
reduced transactions costs, decreased informational asymmetries, and certification in the 
absence of extant monitoring.  These three concepts form the basis for the hypotheses in 
this section. 
A. Transaction costs.  Servaes and Zenner (1996) argue that investment bankers 
have a comparative cost advantage in identifying and valuing potential targets or 
buyers, and in constructing structuring the deal.  Using this argument, investment 
bankers would be called upon when the transactions costs of the acquisition are 
likely to be high: complex deals, those involving resistance (hostile takeovers and 
bidding contests), non-cash consideration, or large targets.  Transactions costs 
would also be high when the bidder has little experience in acquisitions.  
 This argument should hold for earnouts, since they are a sample of the 
larger merger population.  Therefore, if the earnout acquisition involves multiple 
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considerations or equity payments, there should be a higher probability associated 
with the use of an advisor.  If the acquirer has used an earnout as a vehicle for 
prior acquisitions, we can say that this party has experience in the use of this 
contracting method and we should expect a lower probability that the entity uses 
an advisor.  Compared to traditional acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets, 
the earnout transactions should be more complex.  Earnouts require determining 
the amount of the up front portion of the payment, estimating the probability that 
the contingent payment will be made, and establishing the milestones for the 
contingent payments.  This poses a much more difficult transaction for the bidder 
to evaluate.  Thus investment advisors should be more likely in earnout 
transactions than in traditional acquisitions. 
B. Asymmetry of Information.  Servaes and Zenner (1996) propose that advisors 
are needed when the informational asymmetry between the target and acquirer is 
high.  Of particular relevance to the present research, Servaes and Zenner argue 
that informational asymmetries are likely to be high when the target is private or 
consists of specific assets (a subsidiary, for example).  Earnouts commonly 
involve such targets.  Due to the superior information collection and processing 
associated with investment bank advisors one should observe that their use is 
more prominent in earnout transactions than in traditional acquisitions.  Earnout 
use is a costly endeavor for the reasons previously mentioned.  If one observes the 
use of this contracting method in conjunction with an advisor (which is also 
costly) it may be that the informational asymmetries are so high between the 
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target and bidder that the bidder must use both in order to assure that this event is 
value increasing for its shareholders.   
C. Contracting costs.  Investment bankers are perceived in the literature as having 
the ability to effectively monitor an entity and signal the quality or value of that 
entity.  Serveas and Zenner (1996) argue that the investment banker can be 
viewed from the same perspective as in Beatty and Ritter (1986), in that the 
reputational capital of the investment banker is at stake and this credibly conveys 
the signal.  That is, in situations where there is an increased need for monitoring 
of the target, the use of an advisor should add value.   
 The targets used for analysis in this chapter are either private entities or 
subsidiaries.  These are exactly the types of entities that will have problems 
credibly conveying their quality to the bidders in these transactions.  One would 
expect that these acquisitions would have a greater instance of investment bank 
advisors when compared to the acquisition of a public entity due to the lack of 
information about these targets.  However, when the acquisitions of private and 
subsidiary targets is delineated between those that use an earnout in the 
acquisition and those that do not we can make further inferences concerning the 
motivation for the use of earnout contracts as well as investment bank advisors.  
Using an earnout contract in an acquisition is a more costly transaction than a 
non-earnout acquisition.  Also, the use of this contract can be thought of as a 
signaling mechanism (as discussed earlier).  If this is the case, then one should 
observe less advisor utilization in the earnout transactions than the non-earnout 
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transactions since the targets agreeing to an earnout contract are already signaling 
their quality to the bidder in the acquisition. 
 
4.3 Method of Analysis 
 The sample consists of transactions identified from Thompson Financial 
Securities Data Mergers and Acquisitions files (SDC) involving acquisition of a private 
entity or a subsidiary of a corporation.  The data was then collected using Compact 
Disclosure, Thompson Financial Securities Data Mergers and Acquisitions files (SDC), 
Standard and Poor’s Compustat files on Academic Universe, news releases found in 
Lexis/Nexis and Valueline Investment Surveys.  Extreme data points were verified by 
using Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, SEC filings and Compact Disclosure.  
Information on insider and institutional holdings is collected from Value Line. 
 
4.3.1  Method of Payment 
 Variables measuring characteristics of the firm and its ownership structure are 
used as proxies for each of the hypotheses. 
A. Investment opportunity hypothesis.  To proxy for the investment opportunities 
of the firm we use the market value of the firm to the book value of the firm, and 
the growth rate of the firm’s sales. 
B. Control hypothesis.  To proxy for the potential loss of control we use the percent 
of managerial ownership. 
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C. Outside monitoring hypothesis.  To proxy for the level of outside monitoring we 
use the percent of shares held by institutions, and the percent of shares held by 
outside blockholders. 
D. Cash availability hypothesis.  To proxy for the availability of free-cash we use 
the sum of cash holdings and marketable securities (relative to the value of the 
deal), cash flow relative to the value of the deal (where Lehn and Poulsen’s 
(1989) definition of cash flow is used as cash flow is equal to EBIDT minus 
interest, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends), and the ratio of the 
acquiring firm’s debt-to-capital ratio and the industry average (where debt is 
defined as the sum of long-term debt and short-term debt, and capital is debt plus 
the market value of common equity and the value of preferred equity). 
E. Risk sharing hypothesis.  Following Hansen (1987) and Martin (1996), we use 
the ratio of the target value relative to the sum of the bidder value and the amount 
paid for the acquisition. 
These proxies are the independent variables in logistic regressions to predict the use of 
stock, cash, or a mix for payment of the up-front portion of an earnout.  Logistic models 
are estimated for cash versus stock, cash versus mixed, and stock versus mixed.  Also, an 
ordered logit regression is estimated with the choice variable equal to one if cash is used, 
two is a mixed payment is used, and three if stock is the method of payment.  
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4.3.2  Advisor Utilization 
A. Transactions costs.  To proxy for the existence and size of the transactions costs 
associated with the acquisition we use the complexity of the deal (the number of 
considerations offered, the size of the deal relative to the bidder, and whether the 
up front payment is cash, stock, or a combination) and the experience of the 
bidder in acquisition activity (the number of prior acquisitions over a ten year 
period). 
B. Contracting costs.  To proxy for the need for monitoring we use the existence of 
blockholders, and the percent of the contingent portion of the earn-out with 
respect to the value of the deal. 
C. Information Asymmetry.  Proxies used for the existence of informational 
asymmetry between targets and acquirers are industry relatedness (which is equal 
to one if the firms have similar SIC codes, zero otherwise), and the number of 
industries in which the target/acquirer operates.   
Logistic regression models are estimated for each of the three hypotheses separately, then 
together as a full model.  The dependant variable of the models takes the value of one if 




4.4 Data and Statistics 
4.4.1  Method of Payment 
The method of payment sample consists of 9146 acquisitions of private and 
subsidiary targets by public firms completed through the period of January 1, 1990-May 
31, 2001.  These observations were identified from Thompson Financial Securities Data 
Mergers and Acquisitions files (SDC).  The data were collected using Compact 
Disclosure, Thompson Financial Securities Data Mergers and Acquisitions files (SDC), 
Standard and Poor’s Compustat files on Academic Universe, news releases found in 
Lexis/Nexis and Valueline Investment Surveys.  Observations involving the acquisition 
of public targets, acquisitions involving foreign entities, and acquisitions involving 
financial firms or holding companies were excluded.  Acquisitions for less than $1.0 
million dollars are dropped from the sample.  Tables six through ten present the entire 
universe for deals that fit this criteria and where a transaction value can be found or 
determined.  This leaves 8726 observations of transactions involving the acquisition of a 
private or subsidiary target by a public bidder.  For tables eleven and twelve, deals are 
dropped if information cannot be found for the variables in question.  This leaves a 
sample of 6772 observations.   
The method of payment sample is split between private and subsidiary firms and 
the value of the deals in question are presented in table six.  For the period in question, 
5229 of the 8726 observations are private targets.  The remaining 3497 observations are 
subsidiary targets.  For the sample as whole, acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets 
are rising in the early 1990’s and level off in the 1997-2001 period (remember the 
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observations from 2001 only consist of data from January 1 to May 31).  This may be due 
to the cash constrained economy, uncertainty on the NASDAQ concerning the dotcom 
debacle and that acquirers were waiting for the dust to settle.  Also, the size of the deals 
concerning the acquisition of private and subsidiary targets has been on the rise during 
the period in question.  
As one would expect, the deal value for subsidiary targets is greater than that of 
private targets.  This is possibly due to the fact that, in general, private targets are in the 
early stages of their life cycle and have not had the time or the opportunity to grow as 
much as subsidiary firms.  Also, subsidiaries have access to their parent’s capital, which 
helps account for their larger size.  When looking at the means and medians for the 
sample, it is apparent that the sample is somewhat skewed, due to a few large deals.  We 
will address the skewness issue later in the paper.  However, the medians tell the same 
story that subsidiary targets are larger than their private counterparts.  The deal size for 
private targets ranges from $1.0 million dollars (consisting of 40 acquisitions) to $7.78 
billion dollars (the acquisition of WebMD by Healtheon). The deal size for subsidiary 
firms ranges from $1.0 million dollars (consisting of 43 acquisitions) to $10.75 billion 
dollars (the acquisition of the entertainment subsidiary of USA networks by Vivendi 
Universal).  
Table seven presents the value of the transaction for the sub-sample of 
acquisitions that use an earnout as a contracting method.  The transaction value is 
determined by adding the upfront payment for the transaction to the amount of the 
contingent payment.  There are 533 observations in this sub-sample.  This sub-sample is  
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Table 6.  The transaction value for public firms acquiring private firms, and  
    subsidiaries 
Comparative summary statistics are presented for the announcement date by year and over the entire 
sample period by firm categorization.  The transaction value for non-earnout acquisitions is the market 
value of any equity, debt, etc. plus any cash offered in millions of U.S. dollars.  The transaction value for 
earnouts is the sum of the market value of the up front payment and the estimated value of the earnout in 





 All Firms  Private  Subsidiaries 
Panel A.  Measures of central tendency  
 Obs. Mean  Median   Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median 
All 8726 99.3883 19.0000  5229 66.2668 15.0000 3497 148.9142 28.5000
1990 267 56.5216 12.0000  106 20.2275 8.0000 161 80.4172 20.3700
1991 289 47.6230 10.5000  149 33.3976 9.0000 140 62.7629 12.9000
1992 440 45.5939 11.0000  239 23.2729 7.0000 201 72.1348 23.1300
1993 548 53.6033 11.8500  270 33.6635 8.9465 278 72.9693 20.0000
1994 613 66.6005 11.3400  347 48.2425 9.0000 266 90.5486 16.5000
1995 673 67.4549 15.6000  394 31.5464 11.0430 279 118.1644 26.1000
1996 823 89.6243 20.5000  487 53.0203 16.4900 336 142.6782 27.3500
1997 1068 98.1266 17.0000  649 55.1158 14.0000 419 164.7472 28.9000
1998 1127 97.5258 20.5000  716 57.3836 17.9280 411 167.4573 34.0000
1999 1065 145.2683 27.8860  721 108.1542 22.8200 344 223.0567 44.7500
2000 1107 148.8169 28.7490  771 118.0209 25.0000 336 219.4828 39.9875




 All Firms  Private  Subsidiaries 
Panel B.  Minimum and maximum values  
 Obs. Minimu
m 
Maximum  Obs. Minimum Maximum Obs. Minimum Maximum
All 8726 1.000 10749.48  5229 1.000 7782.97 3497 1.000 10749.48
1990 267 1.000 3294.00  106 1.000 225.00 161 1.000 3294.00
1991 289 1.000 1060.00  149 1.000 670.00 140 1.000 1060.00
1992 440 1.000 1275.00  239 1.000 577.00 201 1.000 1275.00
1993 548 1.000 3449.20  270 1.000 3449.20 278 1.000 1575.00
1994 613 1.000 2925.00  347 1.000 2094.38 266 1.000 2925.00
1995 673 1.000 5704.00  394 1.000 482.86 279 1.000 5704.00
1996 823 1.000 3879.23  487 1.000 3425.00 336 1.000 3879.23
1997 1068 1.000 9500.00  649 1.000 3096.09 419 1.000 9500.00
1998 1127 1.000 5676.00  716 1.000 1855.00 411 1.000 5676.00
1999 1065 1.000 7782.97  721 1.000 7782.97 344 1.046 5000.00
2000 1107 1.000 10528.66  771 1.000 3346.42 336 1.000 10528.66





again split into two categories for private targets and subsidiary targets.  
There are 392 transactions involving an earnout and the acquisition of a private 
target.  The remaining 141 transactions involve an earnout and the acquisition of a 
subsidiary target.  The implications for deal size and frequency for the sub-sample of 
earnout transactions is similar to that of the entire sample.  Deals are increasing during 
the period in question and level off during the period from 1997-2001.  Again, on 
average, subsidiary targets are found to be larger than private targets.  Looking at this 
table and comparing it to full sample of we can see that acquisitions involving private 
targets that use an earnout are, on average, smaller than those that do not use an earnout.  
This points to the fact that for the acquisitions of smaller firms there are more 
informational asymmetries between the parties than for larger firms.  The same is true for 
acquisitions involving subsidiary targets that were acquired via an earnout.  Looking at 
the maximums and minimums for transactions involving earnouts, we can see that the 
maximums for these acquisitions are substantially lower. 
Table eight presents the value of the contingent part of the deal for private and 
subsidiary targets acquired using an earnout.  From this table one can see that, on 
average, a higher percentage of the transaction value is paid contingently for private firms 
than for subsidiary firms.  On average about 28-29% of the deal is paid contingently for 
private firms compared to about 17-20% for subsidiary firms.  Again, this points to the 
fact that private firms are able to signal their value to the acquirer by taking a larger 
proportion of the payment contingently.  Since the acquisition of private firms has more  
 75
Table 7.  The sum of the up front payment and the value of the earnout for public 
    firms acquiring private firms, and subsidiaries 
Comparative summary statistics are presented for the announcement date by year and over the entire 
sample period by sector categorization.  The transaction size is the sum of the up front payment and the 





 All Firms  Private  Subsidiaries 
Panel A.  Measures of central tendency  
 Obs. Mean  Median   Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean  Median 
All 533 71.5216 15.5000  392 54.1172 13.9000 141 119.9083 25.0000
1990 9 53.5083 8.6000  7 21.4607 8.6000 2 165.6750 165.6750
1991 23 14.9174 6.6890  21 15.7286 6.6890 2 6.4000 6.4000
1992 24 32.1068 8.5000  17 32.5391 7.5000 7 31.0571 9.0000
1993 33 22.6057 11.3000  22 9.1697 7.6900 11 49.4776 19.9000
1994 33 26.0287 8.0000  22 11.5302 5.9000 11 55.0557 14.5680
1995 29 22.2610 11.7000  21 17.0224 11.1500 8 36.0125 21.6375
1996 29 138.8298 24.0000  18 22.8368 18.2500 11 328.6364 65.0000
1997 61 58.2420 11.2500  47 35.6778 11.0000 14 133.9931 13.9750
1998 76 44.6561 18.3800  61 39.0549 18.0000 15 67.4345 35.7500
1999 75 105.0083 20.1750  58 96.4972 18.6850 17 134.0460 21.0000
2000 80 131.0946 23.2975  54 125.0028 20.0000 26 143.7469 39.1540




 All Firms  Private  Subsidiaries 
Panel B.  Minimum and maximum values  
 Obs. Minimu
m 
Maximum  Obs. Minimum Maximum Obs. Minimum Maximum
All 533 1.000 3250.00  392 1.000 3250.00 141 1.000 2050.00
1990 9 1.350 330.00  7 4.000 94.95 2 1.350 330.00
1991 23 1.489 79.05  21 1.489 79.05 2 2.200 10.60
1992 24 1.783 264.80  17 1.783 264.80 7 5.000 125.00
1993 33 1.000 275.00  22 1.000 27.70 11 2.000 275.00
1994 33 1.500 191.00  22 1.500 42.50 11 3.100 191.00
1995 29 1.077 140.00  21 1.077 140.00 8 4.000 133.31
1996 29 4.825 2050.00  18 4.825 65.48 11 5.000 2050.00
1997 61 1.250 900.00  47 1.250 445.00 14 2.150 900.00
1998 76 1.131 287.81  61 1.131 287.81 15 3.850 276.60
1999 75 1.146 3250.00  58 1.146 3250.00 17 2.200 1050.00
2000 80 1.000 2068.09  54 1.588 2068.09 26 1.000 1700.00








Table 8.  Estimated value of the earnout for public companies acquiring private 
    firms and subsidiaries 
Comparative summary statistics are presented for the announcement date by year and over the entire 
sample period by sector categorization.  The size of the earnout is the estimated value of the earnout in 
Millions of U.S. dollars.   
 
 
 All Firms  Private  Subsidiaries 
Panel A.  Measures of central tendency  
 Obs. Mean Median  Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median
All 533 17.5340 4.5000  392 16.0959 4.0000 141 21.5319 5.0000
1990 9 8.4889 4.0000  7 7.9571 4.0000 2 10.3500 10.3500
1991 23 3.8783 2.1000  21 4.1524 2.3000 2 1.0000 1.0000
1992 24 13.8333 3.5000  17 17.1588 4.0000 7 5.7571 3.0000
1993 33 8.8879 2.0000  22 3.3000 1.5000 11 20.0636 4.4000
1994 33 5.1394 3.0000  22 3.4273 2.4000 11 8.5636 5.8000
1995 29 7.5759 3.0000  21 6.4000 3.0000 8 10.6625 7.7500
1996 29 21.2897 7.0000  18 9.5500 4.0000 11 40.5000 8.0000
1997 61 17.9689 4.0000  47 12.7851 4.0000 14 35.3714 4.5000
1998 76 12.5763 4.8000  61 11.9361 4.6000 15 15.1800 5.9000
1999 75 23.8307 5.9000  58 22.1431 7.7500 17 29.5882 5.0000
2000 80 31.5150 7.0000  54 36.5315 7.0000 26 21.0962 7.1500
2001 61 19.4689 7.0000  44 18.9705 7.0000 17 20.7588 6.0000
 
 
 All Firms  Private  Subsidiaries 
Panel B.  Minimum and maximum values  
 Obs. Minimu
m 
Maximum  Obs. Minimum Maximum Obs. Minimum Maxim
um
All 533 0.100 822.80  392 0.100 822.80 141 0.100 270.00
1990 9 0.700 30.00  7 0.800 30.00 2 0.700 20.00
1991 23 0.200 12.40  21 0.200 12.40 2 0.400 1.60
1992 24 0.100 200.00  17 0.100 200.00 7 1.000 25.00
1993 33 0.400 150.00  22 0.400 10.00 11 1.000 150.00
1994 33 0.300 23.00  22 0.300 10.50 11 2.100 23.00
1995 29 0.200 65.00  21 0.200 65.00 8 2.000 35.80
1996 29 0.800 250.00  18 0.800 31.00 11 2.000 250.00
1997 61 0.700 200.00  47 0.700 159.00 14 0.800 200.00
1998 76 0.200 130.00  61 0.200 130.00 15 1.000 105.00
1999 75 0.300 500.00  58 0.300 500.00 17 0.400 270.00
2000 80 0.100 822.80  54 0.700 822.80 26 0.100 150.00







Table 9.  The transaction value of the acquisition for public firms acquiring private firms and subsidiaries categorized 
    by the method of payment.  
Comparative summary statistics are presented for the announcement date by year and over the entire sample period for the total sample and by method 
of payment categorization.  For earnouts, the transaction size is the sum of the up front payment and the estimated value of the earnout in millions of 
U.S. dollars. The transaction value for non-earnout acquisitions is the market value of any equity, debt, etc. plus any cash offered in millions of U.S. 
dollars.  
 
     All Mergers Cash Stock Mix
Panel A.  Measures of central tendency  
     Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean      
   
Median Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median








   
   
   
   
  
267 56.5216 12.0000 169 49.2169 14.0000 30 37.6548 23.2000 68 82.9996 7.2000
1991 289 47.6230 10.5000 171 48.4277 10.5000 51 35.5690 12.5000 67 54.7445 8.5000
1992 440 45.5939 11.0000 228 45.9140 11.4000 76 60.1141 14.2100 136 36.9431 8.4500
1993 548 53.6033 11.8500 305 52.4077 15.0000 93 43.8527 10.2600 150 55.0388 9.4650
1994 613 66.6005 11.3400 331 81.1203 13.7500 86 35.6544 11.7800 196 56.1166 8.1300
1995 673 67.4549 15.6000 366 80.1857 17.0000 123 50.5813 20.0000 184 53.4113 12.7700
1996 823 89.6243 20.5000 445 94.2928 23.5000 162 55.4305 20.0500 215 106.6969 17.4330
1997 1068 98.1266 17.0000 609 91.4121 18.0000 166 62.3833 21.1695 293 132.9953 14.5000
1998 1127 97.5258 20.5000 645 107.8072 24.0000 183 60.3631 24.6040 299 98.8172 15.7000
1999 1065 145.2683 27.8860 565 105.3576 25.0000 242 223.6093 38.0000 258 160.0916 27.0000
2000 1107 148.8169 28.7490 489 124.8195 22.5000 288 222.6866 70.1690 330 119.9087 25.0000
























     All Mergers Cash Stock Mix
Panel B.  Minimum and maximum values  
    Obs. Minimum Maximum Obs. Minimum Maximum Obs. Minimum Maximum Obs. Minimum Maximum
All 8726 1.000 10749.48 4748 1.000 7800.00 1592 1.000 7782.97 2386 1.000 10749.48
1990 267   
    
    
   
   
   






1.000 3294.00 169 1.000 642.00 30 1.350 176.00 68 1.000 3294.00
1991 289 1.000 1060.00 171 1.000 1060.00 51 1.125 376.80 67 1.000 670.00
1992 440 1.000 1275.00 228 1.000 1275.00 76 1.090 1170.00 136 1.000 692.64
1993 548 1.000 3449.20 305 1.000 1575.00 93 1.250 922.25 150 1.000 3449.20
1994 613 1.000 2925.00 331 1.000 2925.00 86 1.050 325.03 196 1.000 2094.38
1995 673 1.000 5704.00 366 1.000 5704.00 123 1.017 1574.48 184 1.000 2412.12
1996 823 1.000 3879.23 445 1.000 3600.00 162 1.150 2870.00 215 1.012 3879.23
1997 1068 1.000 9500.00 609 1.000 2950.00 166 1.000 1500.00 293 1.000 9500.00
1998 1127 1.000 5676.00 645 1.000 5000.00 183 1.055 925.93 299 1.000 5676.00
1999 1065 1.000 7782.97 565 1.000 3270.00 242 1.050 7782.97 258 1.046 5000.00
2000 1107 
 
1.000 10528.66 489 1.000 7000.00 288 1.201 5761.65 330 1.000 10528.66








Table 10.  The sum of the up front payment and the value of the earnout for firms acquiring private firms and 
      subsidiaries using an earnout categorized by the method of payment 
Comparative summary statistics are presented for the announcement date by year and over the entire sample period for the total sample and by method 
of payment categorization.  The transaction size is the sum of the up front payment and the estimated value of the earnout in millions of U.S. dollars.   
 
     All Mergers Cash Stock Mix
Panel A.  Measures of central tendency  
    Obs. Mean 
 
Median Obs. Mean      
  
Median Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median
All 533 71.5216 15.5000 258 53.2695 15.0000 74 98.5653 10.5950 201 84.9947 19.1000
1990 9 
   
   









53.5083 8.6000 4 11.7250 11.6500 1 1.3500 1.3500 4 108.3313 49.6625
1991 23 14.9174 6.6890 6 32.2500 18.9500 6 4.4202 3.4015 11 11.1890 4.2500
1992 24 32.1068 8.5000 11 38.9620 16.0000 3 10.4800 7.5000 10 31.0541 8.5000
1993 33 22.6057 11.3000
 
15 38.5169 12.7500 6 7.9632 3.8750 12 10.0378 9.5400
1994 33 26.0287 8.0000 16 20.1319 10.0000 6 35.9045 2.9500 11 29.2492 14.5680
1995 29 22.2610 11.7000 16 12.4969 11.4250 2 11.2765 11.2765 11 38.4606 14.0000
1996 29 138.8298 24.0000 14 79.9107 37.0000 3 27.4583 12.0000 12 235.4115 15.2165
1997 61 58.2420 11.2500 40 51.8093 11.0000 5 94.8166 38.8700 16 62.8941 22.5000
1998 76 44.6561 18.3800 35 46.4245 20.0000 7 60.9434 18.0000 34 39.4825 17.6445
1999 75 105.0083 20.1750 42 40.7635 14.5000 10 35.2681 13.7180 23 252.6465 36.0530
2000 80 131.0946 23.2975 31 124.1820 25.0000 18 307.2271 37.9690 31 35.7368 21.1280
2001 61 80.9685 24.7000 28 57.0280 27.5000 7 11.8470 10.2520 26 125.3602 30.3500
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Table 10.  (continued)   
 
     All Mergers Cash Stock Mix
Panel B.  Minimum and maximum values  
   Obs. Minimum Maximum Obs. Minimum Maximum Obs. Minimum Maximum Obs. Minimum Maximum
All   533 1.000 3250.00 258 1.0000 1700.00 74 1.1460 2068.09 204 1.0000 3250.00
1990 9  
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
1.350 330.00 4 4.1000 19.50 1 1.3500 1.35 4 4.0000 330.00
1991 23 1.489 79.05 6 5.9500 79.05 6 1.4890 8.85 11 1.6640 36.04
1992 24 1.783 264.80 11 1.7830 264.80 3 2.4300 21.51 10 4.2560 125.00
1993 33 1.000 275.00 15 1.3500 275.00 6 1.4850 23.87 12 1.0000 27.70
1994 33 1.500 191.00 16 3.1000 83.20 6 1.5000 191.00 11 3.5500 170.00
1995 29 1.077 140.00 16 3.9000 30.00 2 2.2400 20.31 11 1.0770 140.00
1996 29 4.825 2050.00 14 5.2500 534.00 3 4.9000 65.48 12 4.8250 2050.00
1997 61 1.250 900.00 40 1.2500 900.00 5 7.3500 269.00 16 3.5800 685.00
1998 76 1.131 287.81 35 1.5720 276.60 7 6.9660 232.34 34 1.1310 287.81
1999 75 1.146 3250.00 42 1.7500 235.00 10 1.1460 201.82 23 3.8360 3250.00
2000 80 1.000 2068.09 31 1.0000 1700.00 18 1.3050 2068.09 31 3.1000 151.49
2001 61 1.000 1329.10 28 2.7500 331.00 7 6.1990 19.83 26 1.0000 1329.10
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problems associated with informational asymmetries than subsidiary firms, the need to 
signal their value is of more importance.   
Table nine and table ten present the value of the deal grouped by method of 
payment for the full sample and for the earnout sample respectively.  Looking at table 
nine and ten it can be seen that the transactions that are paid for using cash as the method 
of payment are, on average, smaller than those involving a payment of stock.  This should 
be the case if we expect that firms are using the method of payment to help finance the 
transaction due to the future need for favorable investment opportunities.  However, this 
table also shows that transactions that are paid for with cash outweigh the number of 
deals that are paid for with stock.  This could be due to the fact that the acquiring firm 
may have a reluctance to create a substantial blockholder.  Only the use of cross-sectional 
analysis will help us in determining the motives behind the observed behavior.   
Table eleven presents the mean values across the three methods of payment used 
in the traditional acquisitions and in the upfront portion of the earnout transactions. For 
each continuous variable, the results of the univariate F-tests for equality of means appear 
to the right of the table.  The results for the univariate t-tests for pairwise comparisons 
appear as superscript stars next to the value in the table.  The first set of stars refers to the 
comparison of cash deals to stock, and cash to mixed payment deals.  The second set of 
stars on the mixed payment means refers to the pairwise comparison between stock and 
mixed payments.  Since the data exhibits skewness, the sample was Winsorized at the ten 
percent level and the comparisons were run again for all pairs.  The results are not  
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Table 11.  Descriptive statistics of the determinants of the method of payment in the  
      sample of merger transactions for acquirer. 
Means are presented for the mergers in our sample.  Market to book is calculated as the market value of the firm 
divided by its book value.  Growth in sales is estimated for a three-year period prior to the transaction.  Managerial 
ownership is defined as the % of outstanding shares owned by management prior to the transaction.  % Institutional 
holdings refers to the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors prior to the transaction.  Outside 
blockholder is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is a presence of an outside blockholder.  Cash 
holdings and marketable securities were measured for the year prior to the transaction.  Cash flow is measured for the 
year prior to the transaction as in Lehn and Poulsen (1989).  The debt to capital ratio is measured for the year prior to 
the transaction and is divided by the industry average.  Target value is measured for the firm prior to the transaction and 
is divided by the value of the acquirer plus the amount paid for the acquisition. Significant differences in means are 
identified by an F-statistic that tests the null hypothesis of no difference in means.  T-tests are performed on pairwise 
compairisons of means between cash vs. stock, cash vs. mixed, and stock vs. mixed.  
 
 Cash Payment Stock Payment Mixed Payment F-Statistic 
 Mean Mean Mean  
Market-to-Book ratio 2.41 9.10*** 4.530 / ** 1.54*** 
Growth in Sales 38.88 77.37*** 66.25*** / * 2.04*** 
Managerial Ownership (%) 0.18 0.22 0.21 1.01 
Private 0.47 0.86*** 0.69*** / *** 1.70*** 
Earnout to Deal 0.0181 0.0197 0.027*** / ** 1.11** 
Same SIC 0.5836 0.595 0.56830 / * 1.02 
Acq # of SIC 3.96 3.02*** 3.15*** / * 1.22*** 
Trgt # of SIC 1.62 1.70** 1.68** / 0 1.02 
% Institutional Holdings 0.13 0.12 0.10 1.05 
Outside Blockholder  0.63 0.52 0.59 1.01 
Cash Holdings plus Marketable 
Securities Relative to Deal Value 
19.07 16.89 26.28 9.20*** 
Cash Flow Relative to Deal Value 1.51 -0.013 -2.07** / 0 7.53*** 
Debt to Capital Ratio Relative to the 
Industry Average 
42.94 22.51*** 38.800 / *** 9.02*** 
Target Value Relative to the Bidder 
Value plus Amount Paid 
40.72 45.26** 37.99 1.16*** 
Number of Observations 3613 1236 1923  
***Significantly different at the 1% level   **Significantly different at the 5% level    *Significantly different at the 10% level     
0No Significance 
 83
fundamentally different from those reported in the table.  The data was checked for 
heteroskedasticity and collinearity and no problems were found.   
In table eleven, one would expect more variation between sample means for the 
pairs of cash versus stock and cash versus mixed payment, than for mixed versus stock.  
Both a stock and mixed payment have similar implications involving the control of the 
firm, and risk and return sharing of the combined entity.   
With respect to the comparison of the cash payment sample to the stock payment 
sample, the variables of market-to-book, growth in sales, the private dummy, acquirer 
number of SIC codes, and the debt-to-capital ratio all differ significantly at the one 
percent level.  The number of target SIC codes and the values of the target relative to the 
combined value of the new firm are significantly different at the five percent level.   
The results for the two variables associated with the investment opportunity hypothesis 
are examined next.  The market-to-book values for acquirers that use stock to pay for the 
deal are, on average, higher than those that use cash as a payment.  The market assesses 
the future prospects of the acquiring firms in stock based transactions to be more 
favorable than those in cash based acquisitions.  At the same time, a higher growth in 
(past) sales is associated with acquirers using stock to pay for a transaction.  That is, 
realized growth and growth opportunities favor the use of equity financing.   
The acquirers using cash to pay for their transactions, on average, operate in more 
industries than those acquirers paying with stock.  However, targets in cash based 
acquisitions operate in fewer industries than targets acquired for stock.  Recall that this 
variable is associated with information asymmetry.  The greater is the number of 
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industries, the greater is the risk of misvaluation.  When the bidder operates in multiple 
industries, owners of the target are less willing to accept stock; when the target operates 
in multiple industries, the bidder is less willing to offer cash.  
A greater proportion of the stock payment sample involves a private firm than is 
the case for the cash payment sample.  Again, this may point to the fact that since deals 
involving private targets are, on average, ones that involve substantial informational 
asymmetries, the bidder will use equity as the method of payment to help shift some of 
the risks associated with misvaluation.  This need to shift some of the risk of 
misvaluation also explains why the acquisitions that use stock as a payment involve 
larger targets relative to the bidder than acquisitions for cash.  Larger targets mean 
greater repercussions from misvaluation for the acquiring firm. 
We find the relative debt to capital ratio significantly higher for cash than stock 
transactions.  The differences in cash and cash flow are not statistically significant.  
Martin (1996) argues that greater liquidity (more cash, greater cash flows, and more debt 
capacity) should be associated with the use of cash in acquisitions, but he finds only weak 
or inconsistent results.  Our results are inconsistent with Martin’s cash availability 
hypothesis. 
Relative to cash payments, mixed payments should have many of the same 
implications involving risk and control as the use of stock payments.  Although most of 
the mean values for the mixed sample ratio lie partway between the means for the cash 
and stock payment samples, the differences in means between the cash payment and the 
mixed payment samples draw many of the same conclusions that were mentioned earlier 
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for the differences between the cash and stock samples.  When compared to the cash 
payment sample, significant differences are much the same as found for the stock 
payment sample, with the exception of differences in the market-to-book ratio and the 
relative debt-to-capital ratio.   
Comparing the mixed payment sample to the cash payment sample, statistically 
significant differences in means exist for the growth in sales variable, private status 
dummy, earnout-to-deal value and the number of acquirer SIC codes (all significant at the 
one percent level), and the number of target SIC codes and the cash flow variable 
(significant at the five percent level). 
 The result for growth in sales is consistent with the prior finding.  The mean for 
the mixed sample is greater than the mean for the cash sample.  No significant different is 
observed for the market-to-book ratio, but the mean for the cash payment sample is 
numerically twice that of the mixed payment sample.  Realized growth favors the 
inclusion of equity in the initial payment; growth opportunities favor cash.   
The risk of misvaluation favors the inclusion of equity in the upfront portion of 
the payment.  As found for the stock payment sample, acquirers in the mixed payment 
sample operate in fewer industries than acquirers in the cash sample, while their targets 
are in more industries.  Again, like the stock payment sample, the mixed payment sample 
has a greater proportion involving the acquisition of a private entity than does the cash 
payment sample.  Unlike the stock payment sample, however, the relative size of the 
target in the mixed payment sample is not different from that of the cash sample.   
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 The earnout-to-deal value is greater, on average, for mixed payments than for 
cash payments.  This result is counterintuitive in that a higher earnout-to-deal value 
should serve as a positive signal of the target management’s valuation of their firm, and 
thereby lessen the need to share the risks of misvaluation through the use of equity.  This 
result is also difficult to interpret in that no significant difference was observed in the 
comparison of cash to stock financed acquisitions.  The proportion of earnouts in the 
mixed payment sample is much higher than in either the cash or stock payment samples.  
The effect that might have on the univariate results is not clear.   
The cash flow of the acquirer relative to the deal value is higher for those 
transactions that use a cash payment compared to those that use a mixed payment for the 
deal.  No significant differences were observed in the other two variables measuring cash 
availability, relative cash holdings and relative debt-to-capital. 
Mixed payments have characteristics of both stock and cash, and so differences 
from the stock sample are expected.  When looking at the pairwise comparisons between 
stock and mixed payment samples we find a statistically significant difference at the one 
percent level for private status and for the debt-to-capital ratio.  Market-to-book and 
earnout value to deal value are significantly different at the five percent level, while 
growth in sales, same SIC for target and acquirer and acquirer number of SIC codes are 
significant at the ten percent level. With the exception of the earnout-to-deal ratio and the 
proportion of the sample in which the bidder and target have the same SIC code, these 
differences are in the same direction as the differences between the cash and stock 
payment samples.    
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Table 12.  Predicted sign and logistic results of the determinants of the method of 
      up-front payment in the earnout transaction for acquirer. 
Predicted signs and logistic regression results are presented for the mergers in the sample.  Market to book is calculated 
as the market value of the firm divided by its book value.  Growth in sales is estimated for a three-year period prior to 
the transaction.  Managerial ownership is defined as the % of outstanding shares owned by management prior to the 
transaction.  % Institutional holdings refers to the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors prior 
to the transaction.  Outside blockholder is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is a presence of an 
outside blockholder.  Cash holdings and marketable securities were measured for the year prior to the transaction.  Cash 
flow is measured for the year prior to the transaction as in Lehn and Poulsen (1989).  The debt to capital ratio is 
measured for the year prior to the transaction and is divided by the industry average.  Target value is measured for the 
firm prior to the transaction and is divided by the value of the acquirer plus the amount paid for the acquisition. 
***Significantly different than zero at 1%   **Significantly different than zero at 5%     *Significantly different than zero at 10%  
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
1 if Stock 
0 if Cash 
1 if Mixed 
0 if Cash 
1 if Stock 
0 if Mixed 
3 if Stock 2 if 
Mixed 1 if Cash 
Mkt-to-Book + 0.000620 0.0078 0.0062 0.00188 
Sales Growth +/- 0.00287** 0.00579 0.00396*** 0.0083** 
Mgr Ownership - -0.0641 -0.0163 -0.0896 -0.0098 
Private  + 0.6011 0.9185** 1.1671*** 1.4114*** 
Earnout/Deal - -0.5078 -1.3175** -1.2457** -0.1720 
Same SIC - -0.1383 -0.2317 -0.0670 -0.0102 
Acq # of SIC - -0.1321** -0.2854*** -0.0205 -0.1264*** 
Trgt # of SIC + 0.0455 0.1972 0.0508 0.0695 
% Institutional  - -0.0219 -0.1002 -0.0135 -0.0194 
Blockholder - -0.0662 -0.0247 -0.0329 -0.0965 
Cash+Mktable 
Securities to Deal  
- 0.0106** -0.00815 0.0602 -0.0878** 
Cash Flow to Deal  - -0.0130 -0.0172 -0.0483 -0.0129 
Debt to Capital 
Relative to  Industry 
+ -0.00024 0.0173* -0.0163 0.0070 
Tgt Value Relative 
to Combined Value  
+ 0.00181** 0.0074* 0.0041 0.00111** 
Obs.  237 329 192 379 
Psuedo R2  0.138 0.130 0.081 0.082 
Lklihd Ratio  67.6326*** 38.4031*** 41.0746*** 61.3948*** 
Wald Statistic  49.1964*** 29.1853*** 30.1471*** 51.5051*** 
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Table twelve presents the logistic regression results and the ordered logistic 
results for the sub-sample of earnout transactions identified earlier. In the first regression, 
the dependent variable takes the value of zero if the method of payment in the upfront 
portion of the transaction is cash, and one if stock. Earnouts with a mixed payment are 
omitted. In regression two, the dependent variable takes the value of one if the up front 
portion of the transaction was a mixed payment and zero if cash was used. Stock only 
payments are omitted. In the third regression, the dependent variable takes the value of 
one if the payment is stock and zero if the payment method was a mix. Cash only 
payments are omitted. Finally, the fourth regression is a ordered logit in which the 
dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the method of payment is cash, 2 if the acquirer 
uses a mixed payment, and 3 if the payment is stock. 
 The Wald statistic of the regressions, and the likelihood statistic of the regressions 
are significant at the one percent level.  This implies that the independent variables have 
more explanatory power than the intercept alone in describing the choice in these 
regressions. Using the formula for McFadden’s pseudo R2, we find a pseudo R2 of about 
13 percent for the cash versus stock and cash versus mixed regressions and about an 8 
percent pseudo R2 for the stock versus mixed and the ordered logistic regressions. 
With respect to the stock versus cash logit, the percentage of sales growth for the 
acquirer is significant at the five percent level. Firms with higher growth opportunities 
tend to finance the up front portion of the acquisition with stock, consistent with the 
investment opportunities hypothesis. Contrary to Martin (1996), we find support for the 
risk-sharing hypothesis. The coefficient for the variable measuring the target’s value 
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relative to the sum of the bidder’s value and the amount paid is significant at the five 
percent level and is positive as hypothesized. The coefficient for the variable that 
measures the sum of cash and marketable securities relative to the value of the deal is 
significant at the five percent level and its sign is negative as hypothesized under the cash 
availability hypothesis.  We also find that the acquirer number of SIC codes significantly 
influences the choice of cash versus stock as a method of payment, consistent with the 
risk-sharing hypothesis.  We do not find support for the control hypothesis. The variables 
associated with control all have estimated coefficients not significantly different than 
zero. 
In the logistic regression comparing cash to mixed methods of payment, the 
results mostly relate to the risk-sharing hypothesis.  The significance and sign on the 
coefficient of the private dummy variable is consistent with that hypothesis.  Subsidiary 
firms are larger and more transparent than private firms.  Therefore one would expect that 
the coefficient on this variable would be positive, since an acquirer would have less 
information to value the target if private and would require the target to share in the risk 
associated with misvaluation. We find additional support for the risk sharing hypothesis 
in that the acquirer number of SIC codes and target value relative to the combined value 
of the new firm are both significant and in the direction of the hypothesized sign on the 
coefficients.  Finally, the coefficient for the value of the earnout to deal value is 
significantly less than zero at the five percent level.  When the target signals its quality to 
the bidder by taking more of the payment for the transaction as a contingent payment it is 
sharing in the risk associated with misvaluation.  In the comparison of pure cash to pure 
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stock transactions (the first model), the statistically not significant coefficient on this 
variable indicates that when the upfront payment is all stock or all cash, the proportion of 
the deal that is the earnout has no effect on the method of payment.  In contrast, the 
negative coefficient in the cash versus mixed payment model indicates that if some cash 
is going to be received in the upfront payment, then a larger contingent part of the deal is 
associated with a greater likelihood that the upfront portion is all cash rather than a 
mixture of cash and stock.  When all stock is not a possibility, risk sharing is limited to 
the contingent part of the deal.  The results for the mixed versus cash model also support 
the cash availability hypothesis.  The coefficient for the debt to capital ratio is significant 
and its sign is in the direction that the cash availability hypothesis would predict.   
Looking at the logistic regression for mixed versus stock we find support for the 
investment opportunity hypothesis, signaling hypothesis, and the risk-sharing hypothesis.  
Similar to the result in the first model (all cash versus all stock), the coefficient for sales 
growth is significant and positive indicating that investment opportunities as measured by 
recent sales growth are associated with a greater tendency to use all stock in the upfront 
payment.  Similar to the result in the second model (all cash versus mixed payment), the 
coefficient for the dummy variable for private firms is significant and positive.  The 
greater informational asymmetry of private targets favors bidders offering stock.  Also 
similar to the result in the second model, the coefficient for the ratio of earnout to deal 
value is significantly less than zero.  When all cash is not a possibility, the proportion of 
the deal to be paid as earnout is inversely related to the likelihood of an all stock upfront 
payment.  Some cash is preferred to none.   
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The results for the ordered regression (model four) confirm the initial findings 
from the logistic regressions.  We find evidence for the cash availability hypothesis, 
investment opportunity hypothesis, and the risk-sharing hypothesis.  We find no evidence 
in support of the control hypothesis.  Investment opportunities as measured by recent 
sales growth are associated with a greater (smaller) tendency to use all stock (all cash) in 
the upfront payment.  Private targets increase the likelihood that stock will be the 
medium of payment.  The more diversified is the acquirer (greater number of SIC codes) 
and the more cash available to the bidder (relative to deal value) the less likely stock is to 
be in the upfront payment.  Finally, the larger the target is relative to the bidder, the more 
likely stock will be offered.  The role of earnout to deal value appears to be nonlinear, in 
that statistical significance is observed only when comparing mixed payments to either all 
stock or all cash (favoring the choice which offers the most cash upfront), but not when 
the choice is all stock versus all cash (model one) with mixed payments in the middle 
(model four).   
The sample is Winsorized at the ten percent level and the results for the 
regressions, for the most part, were stable.  The coefficient for the debt-to capital ratio is 
no longer statistically significant in the cash versus mixed regression.  All of the signs of 
the coefficients remained in the direction hypothesized.  Due to the fact that the earnout 
sub-sample contained many deals that were small, we believed it better to leave the data 
intact.  We would rather retain the information contained in those observations as long as 
they were not driving the results.  Since the results did not fundamentally change after 
being Winsorized, the results reported for the logistic regressions are robust to outliers.  
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The models were also run with dummy variables for the year in which the acquisition 
took place.  None of the dummy variables for the year of the acquisition were significant.   
It is possible that the results reported in table twelve reflect characteristics of all 
acquisitions during this period.  Although the distribution of method of payment differ 
significantly between the two samples, in that a larger proportion of the earnout sample is 
of mixed payment and smaller proportions are for all cash and all stock than is observed 
in the traditional sample (Χ² = 18.473; p # 0.001), the factors underlying the choice of 
method of payment might not differ between the two samples. Table thirteen presents the 
results for the entire sample of private and subsidiary firms acquired by public bidders.  
These regressions are used in order to determine if the behavior that was observed in the 
previous table for earnout transactions is a consequence of the sample as a whole and has 
nothing to do with the earnout.  A dummy variable is included to differentiate the earnout 
sample from the traditional acquisitions.   
Qualitatively, the results for the pooled sample are similar to those for the 
earnouts alone.  Each of the variables that are significant in model four (the ordered logit 
regression) of table twelve are also significant with the same sign in model four of table 
thirteen.  The pooled sample also generates statistically significant coefficients for the 
variables measuring market-to-book, the target’s number of SIC codes, and the relative 
debt to capital ratio.  As expected, the coefficient for the earnout dummy variable is 
highly significant at the one percent level for each of the logistic regressions and is 
significant at the five percent level for the ordered logit regression.  To determine 
whether this is simply a difference in the proportion of the sample associated with each of  
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Table 13.  Predicted sign and logistic results of the determinants of the method of 
      payment in merger transactions for acquirers. 
Predicted signs and logistic regression results are presented for the mergers in the sample.  Market to book is calculated 
as the market value of the firm divided by its book value.  Growth in sales is estimated for a three-year period prior to 
the transaction.  Managerial ownership is defined as the % of outstanding shares owned by management prior to the 
transaction.  % Institutional holdings refers to the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors prior 
to the transaction.  Outside blockholder is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is a presence of an 
outside blockholder.  Cash holdings and marketable securities were measured for the year prior to the transaction.  Cash 
flow is measured for the year prior to the transaction as in Lehn and Poulsen (1989).  The debt to capital ratio is 
measured for the year prior to the transaction and is divided by the industry average.  Target value is measured for the 
firm prior to the transaction and is divided by the value of the acquirer plus the amount paid for the acquisition. 
***Significantly different than zero at 1%   **Significantly different than zero at 5%     *Significantly different than zero at 10% 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
1 if Stock 
0 if Cash 
1 if Mixed 
0 if Cash 
1 if Stock 
0 if Mixed 
3 if Stock 
2 if Mixed 
1 if Cash 
Mkt-to-Book + 0.0283*** 0.00341** 0.0078 0.00231*** 
Sales Growth +/- 0.00093*** 0.00120*** 0.0003*** 0.00048*** 
Mgr Ownership - -0.0117 -0.0319 -0.0296 -0.0179 
Private  + 0.7570*** 0.4622*** 0.3506** 0.6350*** 
Earnout to Deal - -0.4325* -0.3329** -0.4916** -0.2732 
Same SIC - -0.1036 -0.1143* -0.0640 -0.0681 
Acq # of SIC - -0.0966*** -0.0961*** -0.0185 -0.0983*** 
Trgt # of SIC + 0.0975** 0.0774*** 0.0328 0.0923*** 
% Institutional - -0.0093 -0.0076 -0.0036 -0.0065 
Outside Blockholder - -0.1038 -0.0391 -0.0968 -0.0873 
Cash+Mktable 
Securities to Deal 
- -0.00691*** -0.00976*** -0.00228 -0.00613*** 
Cash Flow to Deal - -0.0005 -0.00177** -0.00074 -0.00644 
Earnout - -0.9100*** -0.5356*** -0.4832*** -0.4423** 
Debt to Capital Ratio 
Relative to Industry 
+ 0.0180*** 0.0153 0.0134*** 0.00521*** 
Tgt Value Relative to 
Combined Value 
+ 0.0086*** 0.00455*** 0.0036*** 0.0053*** 
Obs.  4849 5536 3159 6772 
Psuedo R2  0.268 0.088 0.128 0.092 
Lklihd Ratio  1418.71*** 656.1468*** 497.1490*** 1311.96*** 
Wald Statistic  771.35*** 505.3757*** 262.6394*** 1058.15*** 
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Table 14.  Predicted sign and logistic results of the determinants of the method of  
      payment in mergers for acquirer with earnout interactive terms. 
Predicted signs and logistic regression results are presented for the mergers in the sample.  Market to book is calculated 
as the market value of the firm divided by its book value.  Growth in sales is estimated for a three-year period prior to 
the transaction.  R&D plus advertising is measured for the year prior to the transaction.  Managerial ownership is 
defined as the % of outstanding shares owned by management prior to the transaction.  % Institutional holdings refers 
to the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors prior to the transaction.  Outside blockholder is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is a presence of an outside blockholder.  Cash holdings and 
marketable securities were measured for the year prior to the transaction.  Cash flow is measured for the year prior to 
the transaction as in Lehn and Poulsen (1989).  The debt to capital ratio is measured for the year prior to the transaction 
and is divided by the industry average.  Target value is measured for the firm prior to the transaction and is divided by 































                   
***Significantly different than zero at the 1% level 
                       
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
3 if Stock 
2 if Mixed 




Mkt-to-Book + 0.0026*** 0.0041 
Sales Growth +/- 0.0005*** 0.0003 
Mgr Ownership - -0.0164 -0.0098 
Private  + 0.6709*** 0.4175 
Earnout/Deal - -0.0422***  
Same SIC - -0.0735 -0.0898 
Acq # of SIC - -0.0909*** -0.0210 
Trgt # of SIC + 0.0989*** 0.0737 
% Institutional  - -0.0055 -0.0076 
Outside Blockholder - -0.0888 -0.1002 
Cash+Mktable 
Securities to Deal  
- -0.0061*** -0.0146*** 
Cash Flow to Deal - -0.0006 -0.0111 
Debt to Capital Ratio 
Relative to Industry 
+ 0.0064*** 0.0101* 
Tgt Value Relative to 
the Combined Value  
+ 0.0005*** 0.0004 
Obs. 6772 Psuedo R2 0.093 
Lklihd Ratio 1263.85*** Wald Statistic 1014.47*** 
                                      **Significantly different than zero at the 5% level 
      *Significantly different than zero at the 10% level
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the three methods (cash, mixed, or stock) or represents differences across the individual 
variables, we re-estimate the ordered logit regression including an earnout interactive 
term for each variable.  The results are presented as table fourteen.   
In table fourteen, the coefficients on the interactive terms indicate the extent to 
which the earnout sample differs from the traditional sample in explaining the method of 
payment.  Looking at this table, it is apparent that the evidence presented with respect to 
the full sample in table twelve is confirmed here.  Only the coefficients for cash plus 
marketable securities relative to the value of the deal and the relative debt-to-capital ratio, 
two variables associated with the cash availability hypothesis of method of payment, are 
significantly different for earnout transactions than for traditional acquisitions.  Earnout 
transactions have a greater probability of being paid for with cash the greater the bidder’s 
cash position and the smaller the bidder’s debt to capital ratio, when compared to non-
earnout transactions.  Given that the coefficients are significant for the pooled sample as 
well, we interpret the result to mean that cash availability is an important determinant of 
method of payment in all acquisitions of private and subsidiary firms, but even more so in 
earnouts.  This may be pointing to the possibility that a bidder, as a means to help finance 
the transaction is using an earnout agreement.  This is the case since the upfront burden 
on the acquirer is lessened by the use of this type of agreement.  Again the data was 
Winsorized with no fundamental difference in the results. 
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4.4.2  Advisor Utilization 
The advisor utilization sample consists of 5626 acquisitions made by public firms 
completed through the period of January 1, 1990 to May 31, 2001.  These observations 
were identified from Thompson Financial Securities Data Mergers and Acquisitions files 
(SDC).  The data were collected using Compact Disclosure, Thompson Financial 
Securities Data Mergers and Acquisitions files (SDC), Standard and Poor’s Compustat 
files on Academic Universe, news releases found in Lexis/Nexis, and Valueline 
Investment Surveys.  Observations involving the acquisition of public targets, 
acquisitions involving foreign entities, and acquisitions involving financial firms or 
holding companies were excluded. 
Table fifteen reports the values of transactions involving the acquisition of  
private or subsidiary entities by year, grouped by the use of investment bank advisors.  
Transactions involving the use of an investment bank as advisors are, on average, larger 
than those transactions that do not.  Larger transactions are likely to be more complex and 
have more severe ramifications for misvaluation by the bidder, and therefore require the 
bidder employ an investment banker for help in valuation.  For smaller deals, the costs of 
an investment bank advisor would consume a greater part, if not all, of the expected 
benefits.  Table fifteen also indicates that while the number of deals per year is greater in 
the latter part of the sample period, the frequency of deals that use investment bank 
advice is around 80 percent, down from near 90 percent in the first four years.  
Looking at table sixteen, the same inferences can be made about the earnout sub-
sample as the full sample with respect to deal size.  The sub-sample of transactions  
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Table 15.  The transaction value for public firms acquiring private firms, and 
      subsidiaries categorized by advisor utilization 
Comparative summary statistics are presented for the announcement date by year and over the entire 
sample period categorized by investment bank use.  The transaction value for non-earnout acquisitions is 
the market value of any equity, debt, etc. plus any cash offered in millions of U.S. dollars.  The transaction 
value for earnouts is the sum of the market value of the up front payment and the estimated value of the 
earnout in millions of U.S. dollars.   
 
 
 All Firms  Investment Bank Used  In House Transaction 
Panel A.  Measures of central tendency  
 Obs. Mean  Median   Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean  Median 
All 5626 157.0247 30.0000  4460 170.9758 31.5000 1166 103.6614 25.0000
1990 162 83.42040 15.2500  144 88.3588 16.7500 18 43.9125 12.0000
1991 157 77.6474 14.0000  136 78.7629 14.0000 21 70.4233 36.8000
1992 216 74.0389 22.2500  193 79.6328 23.1300 23 27.0991 17.7000
1993 283 90.8125 14.9000  253 80.7612 13.5000 30 175.5787 33.5000
1994 401 118.7781 17.5640  323 125.9611 18.8630 78 89.0331 11.9700
1995 505 95.2521 23.0000  381 108.2671 24.2600 124 55.2627 16.3975
1996 619 134.6250 25.0000  437 162.9966 34.0000 182 66.5019 16.7000
1997 704 159.8148 24.2300  548 180.7540 26.0000 156 86.2572 15.9450
1998 658 155.3456 36.3000  535 173.4736 39.7530 123 76.4960 25.0000
1999 691 227.4135 47.0000  521 252.6151 48.0000 170 150.1779 39.5000
2000 694 236.5473 64.5460  564 248.3714 65.0000 130 185.2487 60.0000




 All Firms  Investment Bank Used  In House Transaction 
Panel B.  Minimum and maximum values  
 Obs. Minimum Maximum  Obs. Minimum Maximum Obs. Minimum Maximum
All 5626 0.0100 10749.48  4460 0.0100 10749.48 1166 0.0500 5000.00
1990 162 0.5000 3294.00  144 0.5000 3294.00 18 1.0000 150.00
1991 157 0.1000 1060.00  136 0.1000 1060.00 21 4.9300 450.00
1992 216 0.2500 1275.00  193 0.2500 1275.00 23 0.2500 76.50
1993 283 0.0700 3449.20  253 0.0700 3449.20 30 0.2500 1575.00
1994 401 0.1500 2925.00  323 0.1500 2925.00 78 0.2700 1270.00
1995 505 0.2500 5704.00  381 0.2500 5704.00 124 0.3000 482.86
1996 619 0.0100 3879.23  437 0.0100 3879.23 182 0.2500 3085.70
1997 704 0.1000 9500.00  548 0.1000 9500.00 156 0.3000 1408.30
1998 658 0.3750 5676.00  535 0.4000 5676.00 123 0.3750 690.00
1999 691 0.0580 7782.97  521 0.0580 7782.97 170 0.5000 5000.00
2000 694 0.0160 10528.66  564 0.0160 10528.66 130 0.1400 1237.85






involving an earnout numbers 329.  Again, size of the deals generally increases with time 
and around 80 percent involve an investment bank advisor. 
Table seventeen presents the value of the contingent portion of the deal when an 
earnout is utilized.  Similar to the earlier result, deals involving investment banks are 
generally larger than in-house deals.  However, looking at the proportion of the 
contingent payment relative to deal value we find that the average contingent proportion 
of the payment is significantly smaller when investment bankers are utilized.  On 
average, the contingent proportion of deals involving investment bankers is about 21 
percent.  The acquisitions that do not utilize investment bankers have a contingent 
proportion that averages 28 percent.  It may be the case that since the target firm is able 
to credibly signal its value to the bidder by the proportion of the deal that is paid 
contingently, the problems associated with informational asymmetries are somewhat 
mitigated.  Alternatively, recognizing that these are smaller transactions for which the 
expected benefits might not exceed the cost of an investment banker, it is also possible 
that the bidder requires a larger portion of the deal to be in the earnout as a form of 
insurance against misvaluation. 
Table eighteen presents mean values for the characteristics believed to influence 
the decision to use an investment bank as an advisor in acquisitions.  This table presents 
the full sample of 4909 transactions involving the acquisition of private and subsidiary 
entities by public firms where information is available for the data items in question.  For 
each continuous variable, the results from the univariate t-test for equality in means 
appear to the right of the table.  From this table, one can see that the experience of the 
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Table 16.  The transaction value for public firms acquiring private firms and  
      subsidiaries using an earnout categorized by advisor utilization 
Comparative summary statistics are presented for the announcement date by year and over the entire 
sample period categorized by investment bank use.  The transaction value for earnouts is the sum of the 
market value of the up front payment and the estimated value of the earnout in millions of U.S. dollars.   
 
 All Firms  Investment Bank Used  In House Transaction 
Panel A.  Measures of central tendency  
 Obs
. 
Mean  Median   Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median 
All 329 95.7459 20.0000  262 107.6188 20.3810 67 49.3175 18.8630
1990 7 124.7250 94.9500  7 124.7250 94.9500   
1991 12 23.2462 19.4000  9 24.9333 8.8500 3 24.9333 8.8500
1992 15 26.1435 8.0000  15 26.1435 8.0000   
1993 10 20.9605 13.5000  9 23.0672 13.5000 1 2.0000 2.0000
1994 21 41.7663 18.8630  17 43.9215 18.8630 4 32.6065 18.8630
1995 25 33.3555 10.5000  17 29.4341 10.5000 8 41.6884 11.4000
1996 10 137.3655 26.0000  8 167.7069 37.0000 2 16.0000 16.0000
1997 48 51.4665 12.6250  38 61.2875 13.2500 10 14.1470 10.5000
1998 44 75.0513 19.2910  37 76.0014 19.8820 7 70.0289 17.2100
1999 42 227.4187 20.9810  29 310.7063 36.0530 13 41.6233 16.4980
2000 49 144.0911 35.1500  38 167.7216 39.0250 11 62.4586 30.4550
2001 46 92.9845 29.2500  38 89.6202 28.2500 8 108.9649 51.2575
 
 
 All Firms  Investment Bank Used  In House Transaction 
Panel B.  Minimum and maximum values  
 Obs. Minimum Maximum Obs. Minimum Maximum Obs. Minimum Maximum
All 329 0.3800 3250.00 262 0.3800 3250.00 67 1.0770 340.23
1990 7 4.1000 330.00 7 4.1000 330.00   
1991 12 1.6640 60.00 9 1.6640 60.00 3 5.9500 60.00
1992 15 1.7830 121.26 15 1.7830 121.26   
1993 10 2.0000 110.00 9 4.1050 110.00 1 2.0000 2.00
1994 21 4.0000 191.00 17 4.0000 191.00 4 9.5000 83.20
1995 25 0.3800 140.00 17 0.3800 140.00 8 1.0770 133.31
1996 10 5.1800 625.00 8 5.1800 625.00 2 13.0000 19.00
1997 48 2.1500 900.00 38 2.1500 900.00 10 4.200 27.75
1998 44 1.6500 287.81 37 1.6500 287.81 7 4.1130 276.60
1999 42 3.5000 3250.00 29 5.0000 3250.00 13 3.5000 162.50
2000 49 1.0000 1915.11 38 1.0000 1915.11 11 3.9000 340.23








Table 17.  The earnout value for public firms acquiring private firms, and 
      subsidiaries categorized by advisor utilization 
Comparative summary statistics are presented for the announcement date by year and over the entire 
sample period categorized by investment base use.  The value for the contingent earnout payment is the 





 All Firms  Investment Bank Used  In House Transaction 
Panel A.  Measures of central tendency  
 Obs. Mean  Median   Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median 
All 329 20.6015 5.4000  262 22.3366 5.3000 67 13.8164 6.0000
1990 7 15.3000 20.0000  7 15.3000 20.0000   
1991 12 4.8500 2.7500  9 4.3556 2.0000 3 6.3333 6.5000
1992 15 5.4533 3.0000  15 5.4533 3.0000   
1993 10 6.7300 4.0000  9 7.2556 4.0000 1 2.0000 2.0000
1994 21 8.9381 8.0000  17 8.4824 8.0000 4 10.8750 8.0000
1995 25 10.6200 2.0000  17 9.6765 2.0000 8 12.6250 6.7000
1996 10 17.1300 9.0000  8 19.6625 11.2500 2 7.0000 7.0000
1997 48 18.8354 4.0000  38 22.5263 4.0000 10 4.8100 4.2000
1998 44 21.0909 9.5000  37 23.0703 10.0000 7 10.6286 8.0000
1999 42 43.5661 5.5000  29 58.8828 12.0000 13 9.4000 3.0000
2000 49 26.1857 11.0000  38 27.7816 10.8000 11 20.6727 12.0000





 All Firms  Investment Bank Used  In House Transaction 
Panel B.  Minimum and maximum values  
 Obs. Minimum Maximum  Obs. Minimum Maximum Obs. Minimum Maximum
All 329 0.1000 500.00  262 0.1000 500.00 67 0.2000 170.00
1990 7 0.8000 30.00  7 0.8000 30.00   
1991 12 0.4000 10.00  9 0.4000 10.00 3 2.5000 10.00
1992 15 0.1000 23.00  15 0.1000 23.00   
1993 10 1.5000 30.00  9 1.5000 30.00 1 2.0000 2.00
1994 21 0.5000 23.00  17 0.5000 23.00 4 4.5000 23.00
1995 25 0.2000 65.00  17 0.3000 65.00 8 0.2000 35.80
1996 10 3.5000 53.00  8 3.5000 53.00 2 4.0000 10.00
1997 48 0.7000 200.00  38 0.7000 200.00 10 0.8000 18.50
1998 44 0.2000 130.00  37 0.2000 130.00 7 0.5000 39.60
1999 42 1.8000 500.00  29 2.0000 500.00 13 1.8000 45.00
2000 49 0.3000 363.00  38 0.5000 363.00 11 0.3000 66.70




Table 18.  Descriptive statistics of the determinants of the use of an investment bank versus in-house transactions for  
      acquirer. 
Means are presented for the mergers in my sample.  # of considerations offered is the ln of the number of considerations the acquirer extends to the target during the 
acquisition.  The size of the deal relative to the bidder is the value of the transaction, measured in millions of U.S. dollars, divided by the value of the acquirer.  Cash 
payment is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the deal is financed using cash, zero otherwise.  Bidder merger experience measures the ln of the number of 
prior acquisitions that the bidder has been involved in during the ten-year period leading up to the transaction date.  Contingent portion of the earnout divided by deal 
value measures the earnout payment as a percentage of the total value of the deal.  Industry relatedness is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the firms 
have a SIC code match based on the first three digits of the code.  # of industries the target operates is measured as the ln of the number of SIC codes based on multiple 
SIC code listing of the target firm. Private target takes the value of 1 if the target is private, zero if the target is a subsidiary.  Outside Blockholder takes the value of one 
if an outside blockholder is present.  Same state takes the value of one if both the target and bidder are in the same state.  Significant differences in means are identified 
by a T-statistic that tests the null hypothesis of no difference in means. 
 
 Investment Bank Used In-house Transaction T-Statistic 
    Mean Mean
# of Considerations Offered 0.3111 0.3056 -0.40 
Size of the deal relative to the Bidder 0.3701 0.2628 -1.37 
Cash Payment 0.1939 0.1998 0.45 
Bidder Merger Experience 0.7196 0.8363 4.32*** 
Outside Blockholder  0.7534 0.7388 1.04 
Contingent Portion of the Earnout 
Divided By Deal Value 
0.0187   0.0192 0.17
Industry Relatedness 0.5978 0.5935 -0.26 
Private Target 0.5812 0.6226 2.59*** 
Trg and Bid in Same State 0.0341 0.0352 0.18 
# of  Industries the Target Operates 0.4021 0.3752 -1.64* 
Number of Observations 3980 929  
***Significantly different at the 1% level 
    **Significantly different at the 5% level 
      *Significantly different at the 10% level 
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bidder in prior acquisitions, the private target dummy variable, and the number of 
industries in which the target operates are all significantly different when comparing 
transactions involving the use of investment bankers as advisors to those transactions that 
are done “in house”.  On average, if a transaction is done without the use of an 
investment banker, the bidder has significantly more experience in merger transactions 
than those deals that involve investment bankers.  A greater proportion of the in house 
transactions involve private companies than is observed in the investment banking group.  
This is contrary to the expectation that the superior valuation ability and information 
gathering ability of investment bankers would be needed  for private targets since bidders 
have much less information about private targets to help in their valuation of the 
acquisition.  If there are sufficient private transactions too small to justify the use of an 
investment banker, this proportion would be skewed in the observed direction. Finally, 
we observe an increased use of investment bankers as the number of industries in which 
the target has operations increases.  These types of transactions are much harder to value 
for the bidding firm due to the informational asymmetries and the fact that some of the 
industries the target operates in may be out of the bidder’s expertise.   
Table nineteen presents the results from each of the individual models and the full 
model for transactions involving the use of investment banks as advisors when a public 
firm acquires a private or subsidiary entity.  The first model contains the proxies used to 
test hypotheses related to transactions costs.  The second model tests the asymmetric 
information hypothesis using the proxies identified earlier.  The third model examines the 
contracting costs hypothesis.  The full model estimates these three models together. 
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Table 19.  Predicted sign and logistic results of the determinants of the use of an 
      investment bank in merger transactions for the acquirer. 
Predicted signs and logistic regression results are presented for the mergers in the sample.  The three models are 
estimated individually as a logit and then combined.  The dependant variable takes on a value of one if investment 
bankers are used as advisors, zero otherwise.  The # of considerations offered is the number of considerations the 
acquirer extends to the target during the acquisition.  The size of the deal relative to the bidder is the value of the 
transaction, measured in millions of U.S. dollars, divided by the value of the acquirer.  Cash payment is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the deal is financed using cash, zero otherwise.  Bidder merger experience 
measures the number of prior acquisitions that the bidder has been involved in during the five-year period leading up to 
the transaction date.  Contingent portion of the earnout divided by deal value measures the earnout payment as a 
percentage of the total value of the deal.  Industry relatedness is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the 
firms have a SIC code match based on the first three digits of the code.  # of industries the target operates is measured 
based on multiple SIC code listing of the target firm.  Outside blockholder takes a value of one if an outside 
blockholder is present.  Earnout takes the value of one if the transaction is structured as an earnout.  Private takes the 
value of one if the target is private, zero if the target is a subsidiary. 
 







Costs Model Full Model 
LN (# of 
Considerations 
Offered) 
+ 0.0510 ___ ___ 0.0156 
Size of the deal 
relative to the Bidder + 0.0220 ___ 0.0250 0.0184* 
Cash Payment - -0.0508 ___ ___ -0.0111 
LN (Bidder Merger 
Experience) - -0.1949*** ___ ___ -0.1920*** 
Private + ____ 0.1833* _____ 0.1597** 
Earnout + 0.00089 0.1355 0.1626 0.1538 
Outside Blockholder  - ___ ___ -0.0220 -0.0153 
Contingent Portion of 
the Earnout Divided 
By Deal Value 
+ ___ 0.3061 0.4374 0.4524 
Industry Relatedness - ___ -0.0189 ___ -0.00701 
LN (# of  Industries 
the Target Operates) + ___ 0.1055* ___ 0.1215** 
Obs.  4909 4909 4909 4909 
Psuedo R2  0.04 0.02 0.001 0.06 
Lklihd Ratio  21.3158*** 10.1550 2.1572 29.2528*** 
Wald Stat  21.1076*** 10.0425 1.4812 28.9858*** 
***Significantly different than zero at 1%  **Significantly different than zero at 5%   *Significantly different than zero at 10% 
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Looking at table nineteen, we find only very limited evidence for the contracting 
costs argument for the use of investment bankers in these merger transactions.  For the 
individual contracting costs model (column five) we find no support.  The likelihood ratio 
and the Wald statistic are not significant, indicating that the data does not have any 
explanatory value over the intercept.  In the full model (column 6), the coefficient for the 
size of the deal relative to the bidder is significant at the ten percent level, but this 
variable is also associated with the transaction costs model (discussed below), and the 
effect is clearly secondary to another variable or variables in this model.     
  Similarly we find scant evidence in favor of the informational asymmetries 
argument for the use of investment bankers as advisors in these acquisitions.  The 
coefficient on the natural log of the number of industries in which the target operates is in 
the hypothesized direction and is significant at the ten percent level in the individual 
informational asymmetry model (column four) and is significant at the five percent level 
in the full model.  This is indicative of the notion that as the number of industries in 
which the target operates increases, the informational asymmetries between the bidder 
and target are exacerbated.  It becomes less likely that the bidder would have specific 
knowledge about all of the target’s operations as the scope of these operations increases.  
Therefore, an investment banker can help due to its superior informational gathering 
abilities.  The coefficient for the private target dummy variable is also significant and its 
sign is in the hypothesized direction for both the individual and the full model.  Private 
targets would present greater problems in valuation and thus greater needs for the 
superior information collection and valuation abilities of the investment banker.  
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We find significant evidence concerning the transactions costs argument for why 
investment bankers are used in these transactions.  The Wald statistic and the likelihood 
ratio are both significant in the individual model (column three).  The natural log of the 
number of merger transactions that the bidder has been involved with over the previous 
ten-year period is significant at the one percent level and the sign is also in the direction 
hypothesized for both the individual model and the full model.  As the bidder’s merger 
experience increases, the need for outside help in valuation decreases.  
In none of the reduced models nor in the full model is the coefficient on the 
earnout dummy variable significant.  Unlike its effect on the method of payment, the 
presence of an earnout does not change the likelihood that an investment banker will be 
utilized (Χ² = 0.025; p # 1.0, not significant).  An earnout could still influence the effect 
of other variables have on the decision to use an investment bank advisor. 
Table twenty presents the full logistic model with earnout interaction terms.  The 
results in this table confirm the results from table fourteen.  Again, the coefficients for the 
size of the deal relative to the bidder, the natural log of bidder experience, the private 
dummy variable, and the natural log of the number of industries in which the target 
operates are all significant and have a sign in the direction that was previously 
hypothesized.  The likelihood ratio and the Wald statistic are significant at the one 
percent level, meaning that the variables in question have explanatory value above the 
explanatory value of just the intercept alone.   
With respect to the earnout interaction terms, the coefficient for the size of the 
earnout transaction relative to the value of the bidder is significant and positive at the ten  
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Table 20.  Predicted sign and logistic results of the determinants of the use of an  
      investment bank in mergers for the acquirer with earnout interaction 
      terms. 
Predicted signs and logistic regression results are presented for the mergers in the sample.  The dependant variable 
takes the value of one if an investment bank was used as an advisor, zero otherwise.  The earnout interaction terms are 
calculated by multiplying the earnout dummy by the variable in question.  The # of considerations offered is the 
number of considerations the acquirer extends to the target during the acquisition.  The size of the deal relative to the 
bidder is the value of the transaction, measured in millions of U.S. dollars, divided by the value of the acquirer.  Cash 
payment is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the deal is financed using cash, zero otherwise.  Bidder 
merger experience measures the number of prior acquisitions that the bidder has been involved in during the five-year 
period leading up to the transaction date.  Contingent portion of the earnout divided by deal value measures the earnout 
payment as a percentage of the total value of the deal.  Industry relatedness is a dummy variable that takes on the value 
of one if the firms have a SIC code match based on the first three digits of the code.  # of industries the target operates 
is measured based on multiple SIC code listing of the target firm.  Outside blockholder takes a value of one if an 
outside blockholder is present.  Private takes the value of one if the target is private, zero if the target is a subsidiary. 
 




LN (# of 
Considerations 
Offered) 
+ 0.0265 0.0329 
Size of the deal 
relative to the 
Bidder 
+ 0.0856* 0.1092* 
Cash Payment - -0.0212 -0.1953 
LN (Bidder Merger 
Experience) - -0.1888*** -0.0891 
Private + 0.1557** 0.0708 
Outside Blockholder  - -0.0120 -0.0904 
Contingent Portion 
of the Earnout To 
Deal Value 
+ 0.4784  
Industry Relatedness - -0.0219 -0.2669 
LN (# of  Industries 
the Target Operates) + 0.1407** 0.3791* 
Obs. 4909   
Psuedo R2 0.08   
Lklihd Ratio 41.9196***   






























***Significantly different than zero at the 1% level 
  **Significantly different than zero at the 5% level 
    *Significantly different than zero at the 10% level
 107
percent level.  For a given relative size of target, there is a greater probability that an 
investment banker will be used as an advisor in earnouts than in non-earnout transactions, 
due to the complex nature of earnout deals.  Earnouts require decisions concerning what 
is an appropriate amount for the contingent payment to the target, as well as what 
company milestones to which this payment should be tied.  This creates a greater 
magnitude of complexity when compared to a non-earnout transaction.  The complexity 
of these deals is further exacerbated when the target operates in multiple industries.  
Consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis, the interaction coefficient for the 
natural log of the number of industries in which the target operates is significant and 
positive.  Earnout transactions have a greater probability that an investment bank will be 
used as the number of industries in which the target operates increases, when compared 




Datar, Frankel, and Wolfson (2001) argue that earnout transactions contain 
significant informational asymmetries and agency problems. They also argue that the 
costs of inefficient risk sharing, increased contractual complexity, increased 
administrative costs, and litigation risk associated with the earnout likely offset the 
informational benefits. In these transactions we also observe the use of investment bank 
advisors and a continuum of methods of payment. Both of these characteristics of merger 
transactions are shown in the literature to mitigate the very same problems of agency and 
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asymmetry of information as the earnout. Since these contracting technologies are costly, 
there must be a reason that we observe them being used in conjunction with one another. 
Examining the method of payment used in the upfront portion of these 
transactions, we find support for the investment opportunities hypothesis, the cash 
availability hypothesis, and the risk sharing hypothesis. We do not find support for any of 
the hypotheses related to agency and control.  We observe that the distribution of method 
of payment for earnouts differs from that for traditional acquisitions, with mixed 
payments being more common than would otherwise be expected.  We find the 
availability of cash to have a greater influence on the method of payment in these 
earnouts than in the control sample, and that the complexity of the deal favors the 
inclusion of stock in the payment.  The literature has shown that earnouts are used to 
mitigate problems of agency and adverse selection. When this is coupled with the results 
of this paper, it can be seen that although earnouts may alleviate the previously 
mentioned problems, these firms are faced with an adverse selection problem that is 
beyond the scope of the earnout. In these cases, firms achieve a further reduction of the 
costs of adverse selection problems by choosing a method of payment appropriate to the 
transaction. 
With respect to the use of an investment bank as an advisor in these transactions, 
we find support for the transactions costs hypothesis.  This result confirms the notion that 
investment bankers have a comparative advantage in identifying targets, valuing targets, 
and preparing a bid.  We find some support for the informational asymmetries hypothesis 
but only questionable support for the contracting costs hypothesis.  These results show 
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that although an earnout may alleviate some of the informational asymmetries and agency 
issues associated with a merger transaction, the transactions costs associated with these 
deals are quite large.  Given this, it appears that firms that acquire a target using an 








CHAPTER 5: THE MARKET’S PERCEPTION OF EARNOUT 
     CONTRACTING 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter we examine the market’s perception of mergers involving earnout 
transactions.  In chapter 3 we construct a sample of publicly traded firms that acquire a 
private or subsidiary firm via the use of an earnout, and contrast those firms to a sample 
of similar traditional mergers.  We found evidence that earnouts are used to mitigate the 
consequences associated with agency problems and asymmetry of information.  In 
particular, these contracts are found to help shift some of the risk of misvaluation from 
the bidder to the target.  Also, this type of contract structure allows high quality targets to 
signal their value to the bidding firm by taking a larger proportion of the deal as a 
contingent payment.  Finally, we find that the earnout contract can help retain and incent 
managers of the target firm to work for the combined firm’s best interests, in order to 
maximize their contingent payout received under this type of contracting method. 
In chapter four we examine the method of payment and the use of investment 
bank advisors in these types of transactions.  Both the method of payment used in 
acquisitions and the use of investment bank advisors appear in the literature on mergers 
and acquisitions as factors that help mitigate problems associated with informational 
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asymmetry and agency.  But these are the same hypothesized reasons for the use of an 
earnout.  Either earnouts mitigate different types of problems, or the firms that use 
investment bank advisors and specific methods of payment in earnouts face consequences 
from problems of informational asymmetry and agency that are so great, that redundant 
costly contracting methods are employed in order to avoid detrimental outcomes.  We 
find that earnouts are used in conjunction with method of payment and advisor utilization 
to mitigate the problems of informational asymmetry and agency.  We also find that 
earnouts are used as a financing mechanism in merger transactions. 
Earnout acquisitions are a costly form of merger contracting.  It must be that in 
any earnout, these costs must be outweighed by the benefits that are expected to be 
received.  The empirical question is whether the market perceives that these types of 
contracting methods are in fact beneficial to the shareholders of the firms involved.  Prior 
studies of mergers and acquisitions suggest that the returns to bidder firms are on average 
negative or near zero when the targets are publicly traded firms, but positive when the 
targets are private firms.  Similar results are found for secondary equity offers (negative) 
versus privately placed equity (positive).  This suggests that the market perception of an 
earnout when the target of an earnout is a private entity may well be different from that 
when the target is a publicly traded firm. 
In the present chapter, we examine the market perception of earnout transactions, 
as measured by the stock price reaction to the announcement of those earnouts.  In 
addition to our sample of publicly traded bidders in earnouts of private or subsidiary 
firms, and our control sample of bidders in similar but traditional acquisitions, we expand 
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the analysis to include earnouts in which both the bidder and the target are publicly 
traded.  Unfortunately, the number of such transactions is very small, limiting our 
analysis of this group strictly to the market reaction itself.   
Myers and Majluf (1984) present the case for adverse selection, or the “lemons 
problem,” leading to a negative price response to a firm issuing equity.  The authors 
argue that management has an incentive to issue equity when the market overvalues the 
firms stock.  Knowing this the market perceives an issuance of equity as a negative 
signal, and reduces its valuation of the shares.   
Chang (1998) argues that issuing equity to acquire a privately held, potentially 
creates a new blockholder of the combined firms, which should be perceived as a positive 
event.  The new blockholder increases monitoring of the combined firm, lessening the 
problems associated with agency.  Chang (1998) finds that, on average, the acquisition of 
a private target is perceived more favorably by the market than the acquisition of a public 
target.  In his study, acquirers of private firms experience mean abnormal returns of 4.96 
percent when a new blockholder is created compared to 1.77 percent when no 
blockholder is created; acquisitions involving publicly traded targets, on average, 
experience an abnormal return of –1.24 percent when a blockholder is created, compared 
to an abnormal return of –2.565 percent when no blockholder is created.   
Based on these results, it is apparent that the market perceives the acquisition of 
publicly traded firms quite differently than it perceives the acquisition of private or 
subsidiary firms.  Also, when these results are compared to Bradley, Desai, and Kim 
(1988), and Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) who find abnormal returns for bidders of 0.97 
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percent and 0.4 percent, respectively, it is apparent that the market views the acquisition 
of private targets much more favorably due to the potential creation of a new 
blockholder.  (Differences in sample and length of event window account for the 
differences in results.  Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) and Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) 
use an event window of five days prior to the announcement of the acquisition to five 
days following a successful announcement; Chang (1998) uses an event window of the 
day before and the day of the announcement of an acquisition.)  Chang’s results are also 
consistent with Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993), who find a favorable market 
reaction to private placements of equity due to the creation of new blockholders, and 
Slovin, Shuska and Polochek (2003) who report a positive reaction to asset for equity 
sales. 
To determine the market’s perception of earnout events, results for a sample of 
earnout acquisitions will be contrasted to those for a non-earnout sample.  Abnormal 
returns (prediction errors) generated around the announcement of the acquisition will be 
used to determine whether the market perceives these mergers as value creating events.  
These abnormal returns will be examined for both acquirers of private and subsidiary 
targets as well as public targets.  When the acquisition involves a public target, we will be 
able not only to observe the gains to the acquiring firm, but also the gains to the target.  
This will allow us to determine if an earnout transaction creates more value for the 
existing shareholders than a traditional merger, as opposed to just shifting some of the 
gains from the target to the bidder.  We do expect that some of the gains from the target 
will be shifted to the bidder, due to the more efficient risk sharing that the earnout 
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provides.  However, we also expect that, on average, both parties in the merger will be 
made better off due to the use of an earnout.  Using a matched sample of public targets 
and bidders we can also determine how the gains from the transaction are split between 
the target and the bidder for earnout versus non-earnout transactions. 
We next conduct a cross-sectional analysis of the abnormal returns to determine 
the factors underlying the market’s reaction to the announcements of earnout 
transactions.  This analysis is restricted to the sample involving private and subsidiary 
targets, however.   
The sections of this chapter are organized as follows.  Section two examines the 
methods used to determine the gains from the transactions and describes the variables 
used to determine the markets perception of these events.  The hypotheses used in the 
analysis of these events are discussed here.  Section three will look at the data used for 
the analysis.  In section four we report the results of the analysis of the abnormal returns 
for acquisitions involving public bidders and private and subsidiary targets, and the 
transactions involving public bidders and public targets.  Section four also reports the 
results of the cross-sectional analysis of the sample of acquisitions involving public 
bidders and private and subsidiary targets.  Section five contains concluding remarks. 
 
5.2 Method of Analysis and Hypotheses 
 We estimate the gains to target and bidding firms based on the usual event study, 
market model approach as in Brown and Warner (1985) and Bradley, Desi, and Kim 
(1988).  In this model, expected returns on a particular stock on day t are expressed as:  
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Expected Return t = a + b Market Portfolio Return t  
The parameters of the market model are estimated for each announcement using ordinary 
least squares over a 240-day period beginning 300 days before the announcement of the 
acquisition and ending 61 days prior to the announcement.  The market portfolio return is 
estimated as the return on the equally weighted market portfolio on day t.  There is 
always some uncertainty regarding the actual timing of a corporate announcement.  To 
capture the market reaction to the announcement, we calculate abnormal returns for each 
bidder over a three-day event window:  the day before, the day of, and the day after the 
official announcement date:   
Abnormal Return t = Actual Return t – Expected Return t 
For each of the bidders in the sample involving the acquisition of private and subsidiary 
firms, the three abnormal returns are summed to form a cumulative abnormal return for 
the (-1,1) event window.  Our (-1,1) event window is comparable to the (-1,0) window 
that Chang (1998) uses and the (0,1) window that and Kohers and Ang (2000) use. 
 For the transactions that involve the acquisition of a public target by a public 
bidder utilizing an earnout, the above procedure is implemented for both the bidders and 
the targets, except that the event window is expanded to that used in Bradley, Desi and 
Kim (1988) among others.  In this case, our event window is the eleven days from five 
trading days prior to the announcement of the acquisition to five days after the 
announcement of a successful acquisition.  Since our transactions are all successful, do 
not involve multiple bidders and are friendly acquisitions, we believe that the downward 
bias due to failure of the acquisition at the end of the event window, and upward bias due 
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to the positive probability that another bidder will top the outstanding bid, as mentioned 
by Bradley, Desi, and Kim (1988), would not pertain to this analysis.   
Dollar gains for the acquiring firms are calculated using the market value of the 
acquiring firm’s equity six days prior to the announcement of the acquisition multiplied 
by the cumulative abnormal return previously discussed.   
In the sample involving publicly traded targets and bidders, the total percentage of 
abnormal gains are computed by estimating the cumulative abnormal return using the 
market model for a value weighted portfolio of the two firms as in Bradley, Desi, and 
Kim (1988).  The reason a value weighted portfolio is used to determine the abnormal 
return, rather than an equal weighted average of the abnormal returns to the bidder and 
target, is that the properties of the two distributions of target and bidder abnormal returns 
may not be comparable.  Therefore the properties of the distributions of the value 
weighted portfolio abnormal returns may not be the same as the distribution of the equal 
weighted average of bidder and target abnormal returns.  Again, the market model is 
estimated for a period involving 300 days prior to the announcement of the acquisition to 
60 days prior to the acquisition for the value-weighted portfolio of targets and bidders.  
The event window is from five days prior to the announcement of the acquisition to five 
days after the announcement of a successful acquisition.  The dollar gains for the 
combined portfolio are obtained by taking the market value of the target, as measured six 
days prior to the announcement of the acquisition, plus the market value of the bidder, 
measured six days prior to the announcement of the acquisition, and multiplying this 
measure by the cumulative abnormal return for the value weighted portfolio. 
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The hypotheses that will be tested in the following section are motivated by the 
discussion contained in the introduction of this chapter.  Specifically, we expect that the 
market will have a favorable reaction to acquisitions involving publicly traded bidders 
acquiring private and subsidiary targets.  This favorable reaction will manifest itself in 
the form of positive cumulative abnormal returns for the event window in question.  If the 
firm issues cash to pay for the acquisition, one would expect a slightly positive or no 
reaction from the market based on the literature mentioned earlier.  If the firm issues 
stock to pay for the transaction, then we expect the market to react favorably to these 
transactions due to the fact that these events are tantamount to a private issuance of 
equity.  Due to this, a potential new blockholder is created, resulting in a higher degree of 
monitoring for the combined firm.  Also, the potential new blockholder has, to some 
extent, certified the future prospects of the combined firm since he will now hold a 
considerable proportion of the bidding firms stock.  He therefore has the incentive to 
highly scrutinize the firm, and his holding of a large block of the firm’s stock conveys 
positive information to the market. 
For the subset of these transactions that involve the use of an earnout, we expect 
the market to react even more favorably than in a traditional acquisition, in that the 
earnout achieves added benefits above all of the benefits mentioned in the earlier 
paragraph, and does so much more efficiently than a straight issuance of stock used to 
pay for the transaction. The earnout will more effectively align the incentives of the 
target owner/manager by requiring him to stay with the combined firm as well as 
maximizing his efforts in order to receive the highest payout possible.  The earnout ties 
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the future compensation of the owner/manager directly to the performance that his firm 
brings to the combined firm, rather than tying his future compensation to the performance 
of the combined firm, as is the case when the acquisition is paid for with stock.  Also, the 
risk of misvaluation is more efficiently shared between the target and the bidder, due to 
the use of an earnout in an acquisition.  Additionally, the owner/manager of the target can 
credibly signal the quality of the target to the bidder and the market. 
With respect to the cross-sectional analysis of the transactions involving the 
acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets, we expect the following to be motives 
affecting the market’s perception of these events, as measured by the cumulative 
abnormal return over the event window.  First, we expect that the market will react more 
favorably to acquisitions when a new blockholder is created for the reasons mentioned 
earlier.  Second, we expect that when a service or hi-tech firm is acquired, this will have a 
negative effect on the markets perception unless an earnout is involved.  The reason for 
this is that these transactions involve problems associated with agency and high degrees 
of informational asymmetry.  The earnout can circumvent some of the problems 
associated with informational asymmetries by allowing the target to share in the risk 
associated with misvaluation.  The earnout can also lower problems associated with 
informational asymmetry by allowing the target to credibly signal the quality of their firm 
by taking a greater proportion of the deal as a contingent payment tied to the future 
performance of the target within the combined firm’s operations.  Along this line of 
reasoning, we also expect that the higher the proportion of the earnout deal taken as a 
contingent payment, the more favorable will be the market’s reaction to this event.  
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We expect that when the bidding firm has had prior experience in mergers and 
acquisitions, the market will react more favorably to the merger due to the superior 
valuation and information gathering ability of the bidder.  Therefore, when an earnout is 
employed in conjunction to this, we should not observe an additional favorable reaction 
by the market.  We also expect this to be true for deals that involve the use of investment 
bank advisors for the same reasons.  When looking at the amount of informational 
asymmetry associated with the deal we expect that when an acquirer and a target are in 
the same industry, the market will have a more favorable reaction than for diversifying 
acquisitions.  This should be the case since the acquiring firm can better value and access 
the future prospects of the target firm.  We expect that when the target operates in 
multiple industries the market will not react favorably to these transactions unless an 
earnout is involved.  When a target operates in multiple industries, it is much more 
difficult for the acquirer to value the future prospects of this firm and the earnout will 
help to mitigate the effects associated with misvaluation.  When the bidder has a higher 
growth in sales we would expect the market to have a more favorable reaction when an 
earnout is employed since this type of contracting will tie the compensation of the target 
to the performance of the target within the combined firm instead of allowing target 
owners to share in the performance of future opportunities that the bidder already had in 
place at the time of the acquisition.  The same is true for the market to book value of the 
acquiring firm. 
When the target firm involved in the transaction is publicly traded we must 
reconsider the hypotheses that we have laid out due to the reasons mentioned in the 
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introduction.  This is why these transactions must be examined separately.  Again, to 
access the market’s perception of these ev ents, or from another perspective, the gains that 
these transactions create, cumulative abnormal returns will be measured over an event 
window surrounding the announcement of the transaction.  We must also take into 
account that the transactions that are involved in this section of hypotheses are ones 
where the level of informational asymmetry is high.  We expect that when a publicly 
traded firm acquires a publicly traded target where informational asymmetry is quite 
high, the market will not react favorably with respect to the bidding firm’s shares unless 
an earnout is utilized.  This is due to the fact that when informational asymmetry is high 
there is a huge risk of misvaluation.  The earnout contract can mitigate some of this by 
allowing both the target and bidder to more efficiently share this risk as well as affording 
the target the opportunity to credibly signal its quality to the bidder and the market.  
When looking at the targets cumulative abnormal return, we expect that with 
these transactions involving high levels of informational asymmetry, most of the gains 
from the transaction will flow to the target unless an earnout is used.  Due to the fact that 
the earnout forces the target to more efficiently share in the risks associated with 
misvaluation, we expect to see that targets involved in transactions that employ an 
earnout will have a smaller cumulative abnormal return than those that are involved in 
non-earnout transactions.  With respect to the total gains created by the transaction, we 
expect that acquisitions involving an earnout will create more gains for both parties than 
acquisitions that do not involve an earnout.  Therefore, both parties in the transaction will 
be better off when an earnout is used in the acquisitions involving high informational 
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asymmetries and agency problems.  This is due to the factors influencing the other 
hypotheses mentioned earlier, including more efficient risk sharing, increased 
monitoring, the mitigation of problems associated with agency, and the decreased level of 
informational asymmetry due to the ability of the target to credibly signal its quality.      
         
5.3 Data 
The sample of public firms acquiring private and subsidiary targets, as described 
in chapters 3 and 4, is used to help determine the motives behind the market’s perception 
of earnout transactions.  Market information was gathered using the Center for Research 
on Security Prices (CRSP) data files.  In order for an observation to be included in the 
sample, returns must be available on CRSP for the period involving 300 days prior to the 
announcement of an acquisition to one day after the announcement of a successful 
acquisition.  This leaves us with a sample of 4398 total acquisitions in which 4131 are 
traditional acquisitions and 267 involve the use of an earnout.   
The sample data for acquisition of publicly traded targets consists of 100 earnout 
acquisitions of public targets by public firms completed through the period of January 1, 
1990-May 31, 2001.  These observations are identified from Thompson Financial 
Securities Data Mergers and Acquisitions files (SDC).  The data are collected using 
Compact Disclosure, Thompson Financial Securities Data Mergers and Acquisitions files 
(SDC), Standard and Poor’s Compustat files on Academic Universe, news rele ases found 
in Lexis/Nexis and corporate fillings with the SEC of 10Ks and 10Qs.  Observations 
involving the acquisition of private and subsidiary targets, acquisitions involving foreign 
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entities, and acquisitions involving financial firms or holding companies are excluded.  In 
order for an observation to be included in the analysis, return data must be available on 
the CRSP files for the period involving 300 days prior to the announcement of an 
acquisition to five days after the announcement of a successful acquisition.  Eighteen 
observations involving the use of an earnout contract in the acquisition of a public target 
meet these qualifications.  This sample was then matched to a sample of traditional 
mergers, based on acquirer size, target size, and industry characteristics.  This produced a 
sample of 18 matched pairs of traditional and earnout acquisitions.   
 
5.4  Analysis 
 Cumulative abnormal returns are shown in panel A of table twenty-one.  
Traditional mergers have a mean cumulative abnormal return of 1.97 percent, which is 
statistically different from zero at the one percent level and comparable to the results in 
Chang (1998).  Chang reports a mean cumulative abnormal return of 0.09 percent for 
cash offers and a mean cumulative abnormal return of 2.64 percent for offers involving 
the payment of stock.   
.  Acquisitions that involve the use of an earnout experience a cumulative 
abnormal return of 2.88 percent, which is significantly different from zero at the one 
percent level. Comparing the CARs of bidders using an earnout to those that do not, the 
cumulative abnormal returns are significantly different at the ten percent level.  When 
bidders use an earnout to acquire a private or subsidiary firm, the bidder takes more of 
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Table 21.  Cumulative abnormal returns and t-tests for differences between acquirer CARs of earnout vs. non- 
      earnout transactions where the target is a subsidiary or private firm. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are estimated using the market model for the acquirers in the sample using a (-1, 1) event window around the 
announcement of the acquisition.  Dollar abnormal returns are estimated by multiplying the CAR for the bidder times the market value of the bidder 
taken six days prior to the announcement of the acquisition.  Standardized abnormal dollar returns are estimated by dividing the cumulative dollar 
abnormal return by the value of the transaction.  
 
   All  Earnout  Traditional 
(Number of Transactions)                                                 (4398)                                                      (267)                                                    (4131) 
 
Panel A.  Acquirer Abnormal Returns 
              
Mean Abnormal Returns   0.0198  0.0288  0.0197 
t-Statistic (H0: mean equals zero)   12.51***  3.72***  12.00*** 
t-Statistic (H0: means are 
different) 
    -1.65* 
Median Abnormal Return   0.0065  0.0089  0.0063 
Standard Deviation   0.1153  0.0994  0.1162 
              
Panel B.  Acquirer Abnormal Dollar Returns 
              
Mean Abnormal Returns   61.5611  19.5742  64.0812 
t-Statistic (H0: mean equals zero)   2.39**  0.60  2.36** 
t-Statistic (H0: means are 
different) 
    1.05 
Median Abnormal Return   1.4654  0.6746  1.5027 
Standard Deviation   1774.30  502.85  1821.10 
              
Panel C.    Standardized Abnormal Dollar Returns 
           
Mean Abnormal Returns   2.6645  0.2709  2.8072 
t-Statistic (H0: mean equals zero)   1.66*  0.36  1.65* 
t-Statistic (H0: means are 
different) 
    0.36 
Median Abnormal Return   0.0828  0.554  0.0836 
Standard Deviation  110.44  11.48  113.58 
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the gains from the transaction, as hypothesized, indicating that the earnout helps shift 
some of the risk of misvaluation from the bidder to the target firm.    
For this sample of acquisitions, acquirers, on average, gained a total dollar return 
of $61.5 million dollars.  When the sample is divided between traditional acquisitions and 
those that involve an earnout, we observe that the traditional acquisitions account for 
most of these gains.  This is to be expected since the acquiring firms that use an earnout 
tend to be smaller firms where the problems associated with very high levels of 
asymmetry of information are much more detrimental.  The same result obtains when 
these dollar returns are standardized, by dividing the dollar return by the value of the 
target.  Both samples have a very skewed distribution of abnormal dollar returns as 
evidenced by the difference between the mean and median in each group. 
The results from the multivariate regression in table twenty-two indicate some of 
the motives behind the market’s perception of the use of earnouts in acquisitions of 
private and subsidiary targets.  The regression results in table twenty-two represent a 
model where the cumulative dollar abnormal return to the acquirer is the dependent 
variable in a multivariate interactive framework.  The coefficient on the variable that 
represents the value of the earnout relative to the value of the deal is significant at the ten 
percent level, and its sign is in the direction hypothesized.  The market reacts more 
favorably the greater the contingent portion of the deal.  This is due to the fact that a 
greater portion of the risk of misvaluation is shifted from the bidder to the target.  Also, 
the target is able to credibly signal its quality to the bidder and the market by the 
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Table 22.  Predicted sign and regression results using acquirer dollar abnormal 
      returns as the dependant variable with  earnout interaction terms for 
      transactions with private and subsidiary targets. 
Predicted signs and regression results are presented for the mergers in the sample.  The dependant variable in the 
regression is the acquirer dollar cumulative abnormal return measured on an event window of (-1, 1) around the 
announcement of the acquisition.  Market to book is calculated as the market value of the firm divided by its book 
value.  Growth in sales is estimated for a three-year period prior to the transaction.  Outside blockholder is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if there is a presence of an outside blockholder.  Private is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the target is a private firm.  Earnout to deal is calculated as the potential earnout payment 
divided by the total value of the transaction.  Same SIC take the value of one if the transaction in question involves the 
merger of two entities with the same first two digits of their SIC code.  Target number of SIC is the number of different 
SIC codes the target has.  The variable for prior acquisitions is the number of acquisitions the bidder has been involved 
in over the prior ten year period.  Investment bank advisor is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one when an 
investment bank is used as an advisor in the transaction.  Service target takes the value of one when the target is 



























                np – no prediction for interaction term 
                                  ***Significantly different than zero at the 1% level     
**Significantly different than zero at the 5% level  
  *Significantly different than zero at the 10% level 







Mkt-to-Book + + 0.1597 3.61332 
Sales Growth -/+ + -0.2597* 0.35117 
Private  - + 0.4445 64.81415 
Earnout/Deal +  65.58949*  
Same SIC + np 32.3202 -96.47511  
Trgt # of SIC - + -125.8688** 75.37977 
Prior Acquisitions  + + 47.7474*** -51.54291 
Outside Blockholder + np 39.8224* -25.48940 
Service Target - + -128.1464** 98.87995* 
Investment Bank 
Advisor 
+ + 130.6298* -174.03086 
Hi-Tech Target - + -148.7298*** 185.36064* 
Obs. 4398 R2 0.0299 
F-Value 3.86***   
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proportion of the deal that is paid contingently based on the future milestones put in place 
by the earnout contract. 
The coefficient on the variable that represents the number of industries in which 
the target operates is significant at the ten percent level and is in the direction 
hypothesized.  When a target operates in multiple industries, it is much more difficult for 
the bidder to value the future prospects of the firm.  When this is coupled with the fact 
that these transactions involve high levels of asymmetry of information, one would 
expect the market to react unfavorably.  An earnout arrangement has no statistically 
significant influence on this effect. 
We find that the coefficient of the variable associated with the number of 
acquisitions that the bidder has been involved within the prior ten-year period to be 
significantly positive.  This indicates that when a bidder has more experience in the 
merger and acquisition realm, the market recognizes the superior information gathering 
and valuation abilities of this entity and reacts favorably.  Again, earnouts have no 
statistically significant influence on this effect. 
When examining the coefficient on the dummy variable that measures whether or 
not the target is in a service industry, we find that in general, the market reacts 
significantly unfavorably.  This is possibly due to the high amount of information 
asymmetry and agency problems associated with these firms.  These are the type of firms 
that have a small amount of assets in place, as well as a large amount of their value 
determined by the individuals employed with the firm.  However, when looking at the 
earnout interaction term for this variable, we observe that some of this negative reaction 
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is significantly reversed, as indicated by the positive significant coefficient on this term.  
The earnout agreement mitigates some of the markets negative perception regarding the 
acquisition of targets involved in service industries.  Similarly, the coefficient for the 
variable that relates to whether or not the target operates in a high-tech industry is 
significantly negative.  These acquisitions, like the acquisition of service targets, involve 
a great amount of asymmetry of information and problems associated with agency.  As 
with the service industries, the earnout interaction term for this variable reveals a reversal 
of this negative reaction by the market.   
Investment bank advisors and outside blockholders have a positive effect on the 
dollar returns to acquiring firms in general.  Earnouts have no statistically significant 
influence on these effects.  As argued in the previous chapter, investment bank advisors 
are perceived as having superior information gathering and valuation abilities, while 
outside blockholders are better able to monitor and influence management’s actions.  The 
results from the F-test are significant at the one percent level, meaning that the model has 
more explanatory power than the intercept alone.  The R2 for this model appears to be 
quite low, just under 3 percent, but a low R2 is to be expected in cross-sectional 
regressions of acquirer abnormal returns.  Similarly low values of R2 are reported by 
Travlos (1987), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Chang (1998), and Kale, Kini, and 
Ryan (2003). 
Now we will consider acquisitions for publicly traded bidders that acquire a 
publicly traded target.  As was mentioned earlier, these are quite different than those 
acquisitions involving a private or subsidiary target.  When a private target is acquired, 
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there is a possibility that a new blockholder of the bidding firm’s stock i s created.  This 
may not be the case for a publicly held target, due to the lack of concentration of public 
ownership for the firm.  We observed in our previous analysis that the creation of a new 
blockholder positively affects the abnormal return that the bidder receives. 
Looking at table twenty-three, panel B, we observe this to be the case for our 
sample of acquisitions involving publicly traded targets.  Recall that, on average, 
acquirers of private and subsidiary targets had abnormal returns of about two percent.  
For our sample involving publicly traded targets this measure is about 1 percent, and is 
statistically not different from zero at the usual levels.  However, when one considers the 
average mean abnormal return for bidders when no earnout contract is involved, the mean 
abnormal return falls to a negative four percent.  Although this is a smaller return than 
previous literature has observed, this makes sense when one considers that the 
acquisitions in the matched sample of traditional acquisitions includes the type of targets 
that are associated with severe problems of informational asymmetry and agency.  When 
the deal is structured as an earnout, however, the average return to the acquiring firm is 
almost seven percent and is significant. 
The results in panel A indicate that on average, targets in this matched sample 
earned an abnormal return of 31.01 percent, consistent with the findings of Bradley, 
Desai, and Kim (1988), Stulz, Walkling and Song (1990) and Kale, Kini and Ryan 
(2003).  When the abnormal returns are split by acquisitions that used an earnout and 
those that did not, we find that the abnormal returns for these two groups are statistically 
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Table 23.  Cumulative abnormal returns and t-tests for differences between the matched sample of earnout and 
      non-earnout transactions. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are estimated using the market model for the acquirers and targets in the sample using an event window of five days prior 
to the announcement of the acquisition to five days following a successful merger announcement.  Value-weighted abnormal returns are estimated using 
the market model for the value-weighted portfolio of targets and bidders. 
 
   All  Earnout  Traditional 
(Number of Transactions)                                                            (36)                                                        (18)                                                   (18) 
 
Panel A.  Target Abnormal Returns 
              
Mean Abnormal Returns   0.3101  0.2003  0.4199 
t-Statistic (H0: mean equals zero)   8.02***  7.27***  8.65*** 
t-Statistic (H0: means are different)     1.99** 
Median Abnormal Return   0.3462  0.2493  0.4387 
Standard Deviation   0.1623  0.1468  0.1747 
              
Panel B.  Acquirer Abnormal Returns 
              
Mean Abnormal Returns   0.01385  0.0690  -0.0413 
t-Statistic (H0: mean equals zero)   1.25  1.65*  -2.33** 
t-Statistic (H0: means are different)     -2.81*** 
Median Abnormal Return   -0.0101  0.0120  -0.0521 
Standard Deviation   0.1258  0.1103  0.1468 
              
Panel C.  Value-Weighted Portfolio Abnormal Returns   
           
Mean Abnormal Returns   0.02525  0.07495  -0.02445 
t-Statistic (H0: mean equals zero)   1.56*  1.73*  -1.87* 
t-Statistic (H0: means are different)     -2.35** 
Median Abnormal Return   -0.0153  0.0248  -0.0228 
Standard Deviation  0.1397  0.1247  0.1563 
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different at the five percent level.  When targets are acquired via an earnout they receive 
an abnormal return of 20.03 percent, compared to an abnormal return for targets that were 
not acquired by an earnout of 41.99 percent.  This is the result that was hypothesized.  
When the acquisition employs the use of an earnout, some of the consequences associated 
with the risk of misvaluation are shifted from the bidder to the target.  In other words, the 
bidder receives more of the gains from the acquisition at the targets expense.  Looking at 
the bidder gains in these transactions, we find that when a bidder uses an earnout, the 
abnormal return received is 6.9 percent, compared to an abnormal return of –4 percent 
when an earnout is not involved.  This difference is significant at the one percent level.   
The value-weighted portfolio of abnormal returns for the matched sample has a 
mean of 2.5 percent, statistically significant at the ten percent level.  When an earnout is 
utilized the mean abnormal return for the value weighted portfolio is 7.5 percent, 
compared to a mean of  -1.4 percent for the non-earnout matched sample.  Both means 
are significantly different from zero at the ten percent level and their difference is 
significant at the five percent level.  This is evidence that the earnout transaction creates 
more value for the parties involved, compared to non-earnout transactions. 
Table twenty-four examines the dollar abnormal returns for the matched sample 
of merger transactions.  We find that the mean dollar abnormal return for targets in the 
matched sample is $27.13 million dollars, which is significantly different from zero at the 
ten percent level.  When the matched sample is split between earnout and non-earnout 
transactions, we observe that targets that are acquired via the use of an earnout gain about 
$19.6 million dollars of abnormal return compared to a mean dollar abnormal return of  
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Table 24.  Cumulative abnormal dollar returns and t-tests for differences between the matched sample of earnout 
      and non-earnout transactions. 
Dollar returns are estimated for the target bidder and value weighted portfolio for the matched sample of earnout versus non-earnout transactions.  These 
values are obtained by multiplying the cumulative abnormal returns for the target, bidder, and value weighted portfolio of the two by the market value of 
the entities in question as measure six days prior to the announcement of the acquisition. 
 
   All  Earnout  Traditional 
(Number of Transactions)                                                            (36)                                                        (18)                                                 (18) 
 
Panel A.  Target Abnormal Dollar Returns 
              
Mean Abnormal Dollar Returns   27.1300  19.5842  34.6758 
t-Statistic (H0: mean equals zero)   1.32*  1.11  1.42* 
t-Statistic (H0: means are different)          1.01 
Median Abnormal Return   30.1735  24.4381  36.7648 
              
Panel B.  Acquirer Abnormal Dollar Returns 
              
Mean Abnormal Dollar Returns   21.6698  70.3140  -26.9744 
t-Statistic (H0: mean equals zero)   1.18  1.28  -1.38* 
t-Statistic (H0: means are different)              -1.75** 
Median Abnormal Return   4.4756  9.0818  -10.0253 
              
Panel C.  Value-Weighted Portfolio Abnormal Dollar Returns   
           
Mean Abnormal Dollar Returns   43.6467  81.8657  5.4276 
t-Statistic (H0: mean equals zero)   1.21  1.18  0.99 
t-Statistic (H0: means are different)           -1.53* 
Median Abnormal Dollar Return   6.3384  11.8364  -1.6354 
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$34.68 million dollars for non-earnout transactions.  This is what one would expect 
considering the fact that on average earnout targets received less of the gains from the 
transaction on a percentage basis when compared to non-earnout transactions.  The 
difference is not statistically significant at the usual levels, however.   
For acquirer abnormal returns, we observe the same pattern as we did in table 
twenty-three.  Acquirers that use an earnout reap more of the gains from the transaction 
than those that do not employ an earnout contract.  These acquirers, on average, lose 
value.  Acquirers using an earnout experience an abnormal dollar return of $70.31 million 
dollars compared to –$26.97 million dollars for non-earnout bidders.  These amounts are 
significantly different at the five percent level.  The amount of abnormal dollar returns 
for non-earnout bidders is a greater loss than what was found in Bradley, Desai, and Kim 
(1988) and Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003), $17.3 million and negative $17.49 million 
respectively.  However, this is probably due to the fact that the acquisitions in this 
matched sample involve targets with high degrees of problems associated with 
asymmetry of information and agency.   
When considering the mean abnormal dollar return of the value-weighted 
portfolio for the target and bidder, we observe an average of $43.65 million dollars.  
Therefore, these events appear to be value creating, on average, but this mean is not 
significantly different from zero at the usual levels.  We then split these transactions into 
earnout and non-earnout acquisitions in order to see if we can ascertain whether one of 
these types of transactions creates more total value for the existing shareholders.  We find 
that transactions involving an earnout have a mean of $81.87 million dollars for the 
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value-weighted portfolio of targets and bidders, compared to a mean of $5.43 million for 
non-earnout transactions.  This difference is significant at the ten percent level.  This 
result confirms another hypothesis mentioned earlier.  Due to the nature of the earnout 
contract, both the target and bidder are made better off.  The target is required to 
maximize their efforts in order to maximize their future payout.  The bidder reaps some 
of the benefits for this maximized effort as well.  Both parties share in the consequences 
associated with an initial misvaluation of the target, which gives both parties the 
incentive to more objectively judge the future opportunities of the target as well as the 
combined firm. 
 
5.5  Summary 
Throughout this dissertation we have hypothesized that an earnout contract 
creates value in certain instances in merger transactions.  This should be the case because, 
as mentioned earlier, this type of agreement is costly to implement and monitor.  In order 
to observe this type of contracting method in practice it must be the case that for some set 
of firms the benefits outweigh the costs.  In this chapter of the dissertation we have 
shown that for the set of firms that employ an earnout, the market has determined that the 
benefits received do indeed outweigh the cost, and the market responds favorably to the 
use of this contracting method in certain circumstances.  By utilizing an earnout, target 
and bidding firm more efficiently share the risks associated with misvaluation due to 
asymmetry of information.  It is also the case that problems associated with agency are 
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mitigated, to some extent, due to the alignment of incentives between targets, bidders, 
and shareholders. 
The results in this chapter show that for transactions involving a publicly traded 
acquiring firm merging with a private or subsidiary target, an earnout creates value for 
the bidder’s shareholders.  When a sample of these types of transactions that involve an 
earnout are compared to non-earnout acquisitions, we find that the cumulative abnormal 
returns for acquirers are higher when an earnout is employed.  However, the abnormal 
dollar returns are not found to be higher for transactions involving earnouts.  This is 
potentially due to the fact that the acquirers involved in earnout transactions are smaller 
than their non-earnout counterparts.  When the dollar abnormal returns are standardized 
by the value of the target the same conclusion is drawn.   
When examining the motives for the perception of these transactions by the 
market we find that the market reacts favorably to the use of an earnout.  Interaction 
terms involving hi-tech targets and service targets both mitigate, if not eliminate, the 
negative perception of the market with respect to these types of transactions.  Since the 
acquisitions of hi-tech and service targets involve transaction fraught with agency 
problems and high levels of informational asymmetry, it is not surprising that the market 
reacts negatively to these events, especially when this is coupled with the fact that the 
targets are either a private or subsidiary firm.  It appears that the earnout helps to alleviate 
some of the problems of informational asymmetry and agency inherent in these deals, 
which may account for the markets perception of these events when an earnout contract is 
used.  We also find that when the proportion of the deal that is paid contingently through 
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the use of an earnout contract is increased, the market reacts favorably.  This is possibly 
due to the fact that under this type of contract the target can credibly signal its quality to 
the bidding firm and the market.  Also, the bidder benefits by being able to align the 
incentives of the target owner/managers and retain their valuable human capital.  The 
bidder further benefits by being able to finance the transaction with a small upfront 
expense and contingent payments that are funded by the future cash flows of the target 
firm’s operations within the combined firm.  Finally, both the target and the bidder are 
better off due to the fact that the target can reap the benefits of their potentially 
overoptimistic valuation while the bidder is insulated from initially overpaying for the 
targets operations.   
For transactions involving a publicly traded bidder and publicly traded target, the 
earnout seems to accomplish what we have hypothesized it accomplishes throughout this 
dissertation.  When looking at the cumulative abnormal returns for the targets involved in 
these transactions, we find that the mean cumulative abnormal return for targets 
involving an earnout are significantly less than their matched sample counterparts that do 
not.  This is due to the fact that the earnout shift some of the risk of misvaluation to the 
target resulting in more efficient sharing of this risk between the two parties.  Also, the 
earnout requires that the target firm will get less of the value of the deal upfront, leaving 
the remainder of the deal’s payment in an uncertain future amount contingent on the 
target’s performance in the combined firm.   
When examining the cumulative abnormal return to bidders for the transactions in 
the matched sample involving public targets, we find that bidders earn a significantly 
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greater return when an earnout is employed.  The reasoning behind this result is that in 
transactions that involve an earnout, most of the risks of misvaluation are shifted to the 
target firm.  The bidder has a much lower probability that they have initially overpaid for 
the target firm due to the construction of the earnout contract.  If the target firm meets its 
valuation of future performance, the contingent payments associated with the earnout will 
be paid and the bidder has essentially accomplished the task of financing the acquisition 
with little initial outlay and benefits received from the acquisition of the target.  If the 
target does not meet the valuation of its future performance, little or no contingent 
payments will be made to the target and the bidder has not initially overpaid for this 
overoptimistic assessment of the future opportunities of the target firm.   
Based on this type of argument, we hypothesized that both firms will be made 
better off by the use of the earnout agreement.  Therefore we should expect to find that 
the market’s perception of these events would be more favorable compared to similar, 
non-earnout transactions.  In other words, more value should be created from the merger 
of the two entities when an earnout is employed.  This is in fact the case.  We find that 
when an earnout agreement is utilized in merger transactions, the value weighted 
portfolio of the target and bidder has a significantly higher cumulative abnormal return 
than those transactions that do not employ an earnout.  Therefore, both parties are better 
off when an earnout is used in transactions involving a high degree of informational 
asymmetries and problems associated with agency.  These results are further buttressed 
when looking at the abnormal dollar returns that the parties involved in these transactions 
realize. 
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In sum, it appears that earnout contracts can create value in transactions that 
involve great amounts of informational asymmetry and problems associated with agency.  
In this chapter we have also determined some of the reasons behind this increased value 
as perceived by the market.  However, the analysis of the motivations behind the 
market’s perception of these events was only accomplished for the samp le involving the 
acquisition of private and subsidiary targets.  Further research in this area can be 
accomplished for the set of transactions that involve the acquisition of a publicly traded 
target, once enough observations are in place.  It has already been observed that the 
frequency of this type of contracting in acquisitions has been rising.  Therefore, it is just a 







Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
In this dissertation, we examine various hypotheses involving the use of earnout 
contracting in mergers and acquisitions.  An earnout is a contracting method used in 
mergers and acquisitions in which a certain, up front, amount is paid for an acquisition 
with additional future payments contingent upon the successful attainment of milestones 
set forth in the earnout contract.  These milestones are based on the future performance of 
the target’s operations within the combined firm.  Therefore, an earnout agreement is 
effectively an equity claim on the future cash flows of the combined firm, and is treated 
as such in this dissertation.  An earnout is a relatively new type of contracting technology 
in the merger and acquisition realm.  However, the use of this type of contracting 
technology is growing in frequency and size of the deal. 
The previous literature has put forth the notion that earnout contracts are used in 
transactions where there are problems associated with informational asymmetry and 
agency.  An earnout is, perhaps, most valuable as a means of having the owners of the 
target firm bear some of the risk of misvaluation of the target, whether those errors in 
valuation stem from agency or incomplete information about the target.  The alternative 
means for risk sharing would be for the acquirer to pay for the acquisition with its stock.  
That, however, creates a potential adverse selection problem for the bidder in that the 
stock market could react negatively to the equity issuance.  In addition, with equity as the 
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means of payment the owners of the target firm would per force share the rewards of any 
undervaluation of the target with the owners of the acquiring firm.  Moreover, since the 
targets of earnouts tend to be small relative to the bidder, the performance of the target 
post-merger would have a proportionately small effect on the future returns to the owners 
of the target.  Consequently we see a strong preference for cash in both the traditional and 
the earnout sample, but especially so in the earnout sample.  Nearly half of the earnouts 
in this study are for cash alone, and another 37 percent are for some combination of cash 
and stock.  Pure stock transactions account for only 13 percent of the earnouts.  Although 
all-cash is also the dominant method of payment in sample of traditional acquisitions, that 
sample involves a significantly greater use of pure stock deals as well. 
The preference for cash also reflects an advantage earnouts provide the bidder in 
financing the transaction.  Rather than having to pay the full amount of the transaction in 
the initial payment, the bidder in an earnout defers a portion of the total deal at least for 
the duration of the earnout (permanently if the milestones are not met).  Moreover, in an 
earnout involving cash payments, the bidding firm will be able to fund the future 
contingent payments from the cash flows generated by the target’s operations within the 
combined firm.  Therefore, by using an earnout, the bidder can get around the negative 
consequences associated with paying for a transaction with stock.  The bidder can keep 
his cash to deploy elsewhere.   
The earnout affords bidders a mechanism in which it can mitigate agency 
problems associated with the acquisition.  This type of contracting method can require 
that owner/managers of the target firm stay on board with the combined firm in order for 
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the contingent payments to be made.  This is advantageous due to the types of 
transactions in which earnouts are used.  These transactions involve firms that have few 
assets in place and derive most of their value from human capital and intellectual 
property.  Here, an earnout accomplishes two goals.  First, the earnout can retain this 
valuable human capital and align the incentives of the combined firm and the human 
capital from the target.  This type of agreement will push retained managers to optimally 
perform in order for the managers to receive the maximum value of their contingent 
payments.  Secondly, by retaining the owner/manager, the earnout has effectively 
captured the intellectual property of the target firm.  In this circumstance, the intellectual 
property of the target firm may not be deployed elsewhere, and ultimately compete 
against the target’s operations within the combined firm. 
The earnout gives the target firm an opportunity to signal its quality to the bidder 
as well as the market.  We know that in order for a signal to credible, it must be costly for 
poor quality firms to imitate.  Therefore, by a target firm agreeing to accept a greater 
proportion of the deal as payments contingent upon the attainment of future performance 
milestones, the target has credibly signaled its quality to the bidder as well as the market.  
This signal is credible due to the fact that a poor quality firm will not agree to this type of 
arrangement, knowing that it does not have a chance of reaching these future milestones, 
and will want to receive as much of the payment that it can in a certain up-front amount. 
Previous research has noted that an earnout is a costly type of contracting method 
used in mergers and acquisitions.  This contract is costly for the bidder to employ.  
Performance milestones must be set, lawyer’s fees and the negotiation process is costly.  
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The contract is also costly for both the bidder and the target to monitor.  The bidder must 
be certain that the performance milestones are not being achieved at the detriment of the 
future performance of the combined firm.  For all of these reasons, the costs for this type 
of contracting may outweigh the benefits derived from its use.  However, we observe that 
this contract exists in practice.  We also observe that the use of this type of contracting 
method is on the rise.  Therefore, it must be the case that for a certain set of transactions 
this type of contracting method is optimal.  Otherwise, we would not observe the use of 
this contracting method in mergers and acquisitions. 
 We have explored many hypotheses involving the use of this type of contracting 
technology.  In chapter three we examined the motives behind the use of earnouts in 
mergers and acquisitions.  In chapter four, the use of method of payment and advisor 
utilization in conjunction with earnouts help us to determine additional motives for the 
use of earnout contracting as well as further buttressing our prior findings.  In chapter 
five, we examined the markets reaction to this type of contracting in mergers and 
acquisitions and analyzed the motives behind the markets perception of these events. 
Looking back at the evidence, we find that private targets are taking a greater 
proportion of the payment in the transaction contingently when compared to the 
subsidiary targets.  This makes sense due to the fact that private targets need the earnout 
contract to signal their quality to the bidding firm.  We also observe that when a target is 
acquired using an earnout there are a greater number of SIC codes associated with the 
target compared to a traditional acquisition.  The larger the target value relative to the 
combined firm value for earnout acquisitions, points to the greater consequences resulting 
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from misvaluation for the deals that employ earnouts.  Therefore, in these transactions we 
observe an increased use of earnout contracting.  The number of prior acquisitions by the 
bidder is significantly greater for traditional transactions than for those that involve an 
earnout. Therefore as bidder experience in valuing targets increases, there is less of a 
need for earnout contracting.   
All of this points to the fact that private and subsidiary targets are harder to value 
due to the asymmetry of information between the parties.   As was mentioned earlier in 
chapter three, private firms can use the earnout contract to signal their quality to the 
bidding firm. When considering the types of industries in which the private and 
subsidiary targets operate (for example, hi-tech and service firms), one can see that these 
firms traditionally have fewer assets in place, thereby exacerbating the problem of 
valuation.  In addition, private targets have a greater propensity to be operated by their 
owner.  In the case of hi-tech and service firms, the retention of the owner/operator may 
be necessary for a variety of reasons.  In these cases the earnout helps to shift some of the 
problems associated with the risk of misvaluation to the target as well as retain valuable 
human capital.       
When a target operates in a service related industry there is a greater probability 
that these acquisitions will involve earnouts.  This points to the notion that with service 
related industries, it is key to retain managers and their client relationships Also, since 
these targets generally have fewer assets in place, they are more difficult to value.  We 
also find that when a target is involved in a high-tech industry, there is a greater 
likelihood that an earnout will be used in the acquisition. Mergers where the target and 
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bidder share the same first two digits of their SIC code are associated with a decreased 
likelihood that the deal will employ an earnout contract.  In these transactions, the bidder 
is better positioned to analyze the value of the target firm.  Since private targets involve a 
higher degree of asymmetry of information, an earnout is chosen to help shift some of the 
risk of misvaluation from the bidder to the target.  When a bidder is of large enough size, 
the problems associated with the risk of misvaluation are not as devastating to the 
bidder’s financial position.  As bidding firms have more experience in acquisitions, their 
expertise helps them to better value the target firm.  Therefore, as bidder merger 
experience increases and bidder size increases, we observe a decreased probability that an 
earnout contract will be utilized. 
We also find that earnout transactions have a greater probability of being paid for 
with cash, the greater the availability of access to cash by the bidder, when compared to 
non-earnout transaction.  This may be pointing to the possibility that a bidder, as a means 
to help finance the transaction, is using an earnout agreement.  This is the case since the 
upfront burden on the acquirer is lessened by the use of this type of agreement. We find 
that the use of investment bankers in earnout transactions is significantly different than 
their use in non-earnout transactions. The size of the earnout transaction relative to the 
value of the bidder yields a higher probability that an investment banker will be used as 
an advisor when compared to non-earnout transactions.  This is probably due to the 
complex nature of earnout deals.  In these deals it is difficult to decide what is an 
appropriate amount for the contingent payment to the target, as well as what company 
milestones to which this payment should be tied.  This creates a greater magnitude of 
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complexity when compared to a non-earnout transaction.  The complexity of these deals 
is further exacerbated when the target operates in multiple industries.  We find evidence 
that with earnout transactions there is a greater probability that an investment bank will 
be used as the number of industries in which the target operates increases when compared 
to non-earnout transactions. 
Comparing the CARs of bidders using an earnout to those that do not, the 
cumulative abnormal returns are significantly different.  When bidders use an earnout to 
acquire a private or subsidiary firm, the bidder takes more of the gains from the 
transaction.  This was the hypothesized result, due to the fact that the earnout helps shift 
some of the risk of misvaluation from the bidder to the target firm.  Furthermore, if a 
target firm meets the future milestones required by the earnout, both the target and the 
bidder will share in these gains.  Since the targets future payments are tied to the 
performance of the target firm’s operations, this will help to gi ve managers that stay on 
an incentive to maximize their operations.  Both parties in the deal win. 
When more of the deal is financed by the contingent payments afforded by the 
earnout contract, the market reacts more favorably.  This is due to the fact that a greater 
portion of the risk of misvaluation is shifted from the bidder to the target.  Also, the target 
is able to credibly signal its quality to the bidder and the market by the proportion of the 
deal that is paid contingently based on the future milestones put in place by the earnout 
contract. When a target operates in multiple industries, it is much more difficult for the 
bidder to value the future prospects of the firm.  When this is coupled with the fact that 
these transactions involve high levels of asymmetry of information, one would expect the 
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market to react unfavorably.  We find this to be the case.  We observe that the coefficient 
of the variable associated with the number of acquisitions that the bidder has been 
involved within the prior ten-year period to be significantly positive.  This indicates that 
when a bidder has more experience in the merger and acquisition realm, the market 
recognizes the superior information gathering and valuation abilities of this entity and 
reacts favorably.  
When examining the coefficient on the dummy variable that measures whether or 
not the target is in a service industry, we find that the market reacts significantly 
unfavorably.  This is possibly due to the high amount of information asymmetry and 
agency problems associated with these firms.  These are the type of firms that have a 
small amount of assets in place, as well as a large amount of their value determined by 
the individuals employed with the firm.  However, when looking at the earnout 
interaction term for this variable, we observe that some of this negative reaction is 
significantly reversed, due to the positive significant coefficient on this term.  When the 
two are taken together, we observe that the earnout agreement has helped to mitigate 
some of the markets negative perception regarding the acquisition of targets involved in 
service industries.   
The coefficient for the variable that relates to whether or not the target operates 
in a high-tech industry is significantly negative.  Again, these acquisitions, just as the 
acquisition of service targets, are the types of transactions that involve a great amount of 
asymmetry of information and problems associated with agency.  When the earnout 
interaction term for this variable is examined, we find that this negative reaction by the 
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market is reversed.  Therefore, when an acquisition of a high-tech firm involves the use 
of an earnout the market perceives this as a favorable event. When the bidding firm 
utilizes an investment bank in the acquisition of a private or subsidiary target the market 
reacts favorably, as measured by the significant positive coefficient on the dummy 
variable for investment bank use.  
Our prior discussion in this chapter has involved acquisitions where the bidder is 
public and the target is a private or subsidiary firm.  The acquisitions where both the 
bidder and target are publicly traded must be considered separately for the reasons 
previously mentioned in chapter five.  When looking at these transactions we find, on 
average, targets in the matched sample earned an abnormal return of 31.01 percent.  
When the sample is delineated between earnout and non-earnout mergers, we find that 
the targets that are acquired via an earnout receive an abnormal return of 20.03 percent, 
compared to an abnormal return for targets that were not acquired by an earnout of 41.99 
percent.  When the acquisition employs the use of an earnout, some of the consequences 
associated with the risk of misvaluation are shifted from the bidder to the target.  In other 
words, the bidder receives more of the gains from the acquisition at the targets expense.  
Looking at the bidder gains in these transactions, we find that when a bidder uses an 
earnout, the abnormal return received is 6.9 percent, compared to an abnormal return of –
4 percent when an earnout is not involved.  The value-weighted portfolio of abnormal 
returns for the matched sample has a mean of 2.5 percent.  When an earnout is utilized 
the mean abnormal return for the value weighted portfolio is 7.5 percent, compared to a 
mean of  -1.4 percent for the non-earnout matched sample.  This is evidence that the 
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earnout transaction creates more value for the parties involved, compared to non-earnout 
transactions. 
Acquirers that use an earnout reap more of the gains from the merger transaction 
than those that do not employ an earnout contract.  Bidders using an earnout experience 
an abnormal dollar return of $70.31 million dollars compared to –$26.97 million dollars 
for non-earnout bidders.  When considering the mean abnormal dollar return of the value-
weighted portfolio for the target and bidder, we observe an average of $43.65 million 
dollars.  Therefore, we believe that, on average, mergers are value creating.  We then split 
these transactions into earnout and non-earnout acquisitions in order to see if we can 
ascertain whether one of these types of transactions creates more value for the existing 
shareholders.  We find that transactions involving an earnout are associated with an 
abnormal dollar return of $81.87 million dollars for the value-weighted portfolio of 
targets and bidders, compared to a mean of $5.43 million for non-earnout transactions. 
Due to the nature of the earnout contract, both the target and bidder are made better off, 
and the market reacts accordingly.  The target is required to maximize their efforts in 
order to maximize their future payout.  The bidder reaps some of the benefits for this 
maximized effort as well.  Both parties share in the consequences associated with an 
initial misvaluation of the target, which gives both parties the incentive to more 
objectively judge the future opportunities of the target as well as the combined firm. 
All in all, the combined evidence of the chapters point to the fact that earnout 
contracting is employed in mergers and acquisitions to mitigate problems associated with 
asymmetry of information and agency.  Earnout contracts are used by bidders to 
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efficiently shift some of the consequences associated with the risk of misevaluation to the 
target firm.  Earnout contracts are used by bidders to help retain the valuable human 
capital of target firms and to help align the incentives of the target’s human capital to that 
of the combined firm’s shareholders.  The earnout contract does this much more 
efficiently than when a bidding firm uses stock to finance the transaction.  The earnout 
contract is used by bidding firms as a vehicle to help finance the merger transaction.  This 
contract allows the bidding firm to acquire a target with a lesser amount of upfront 
capital.  The remainder of the deal is paid with future contingent amounts that are 
effectively financed by the target’s operations within the combined firm.  Targets can 
credibly signal their quality to the bidding firm and the market through the use of an 
earnout.  By using this type of contracting the deal can get done and the target can share 
in its own valuation of the future performance of its operations within the combined firm.   
The market reacts favorably to this type of contracting method in mergers and 
acquisitions.  When earnout contracts are employed in deals with high levels of 
informational asymmetry and greater potential for problems associated with agency, 
more value is created for shareholders than when and earnout is not used.  In addition the 
gains from transactions involving earnouts are more efficiently split between the target 
and bidding firms involved.  However, the increased gains to the bidding firm are not just 
a redistribution of transaction gains from the target to the bidder.  These deals create 
more value for the combined portfolio of firms involved, and therefore the increased 
gains to the bidder are not solely a consequence of a redistribution of the gains.  Both 
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